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ABSTRACT 
Perfonnance pay has been identified as a key element ofmodem human resource 
strategy but published field research has been limited. This thesis investigated the 
objectives, methods of operation and outcomes of several performance pay schemes 
through the creation and testing of several hypotheses. Evidence was gathered through 
a longitudinal study in one organisation augmented by case studies in two further 
organisations. 
The findings showed that organisations demonstrated a mix ofoperational and 
cultural objectives for introducing performance pay while the desired outcomes were 
to promote cultural change, internal equity and increased motivation. However, the 
findings from the longitudinal survey showed that the desired outcomes were not met, 
as viewed by the employees. Motivation was not increased, nor did the scheme help to 
change culture while pay satisfaction remained at a low level, although the employee 
response to the scheme showed a limited improvement after operating for one year. 
Positive employee viewpoints were highly correlated to the level of communication 
and satisfaction with pay. 
In terms of the influence of employee characteristics, women and non-union members 
were significantly more positive than men and union members. A cluster analysis 
showed that negative views were more strongly held than positive views which 
statistically influenced the outcomes and employees with such negative views had a 
'bundle' of characteristics, namely middle grade males with long service and union 
membership. 
> 
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This research has made a number of contributions. It has added to the limited number 
of UK field studies and its longitudinal nature provides unique fmdings. It has 
provided data on the launch and initial period of operation of a perfonnance pay 
scheme, as perceived by the employees. It has shown further evidence of strategic use 
of performance pay schemes with a newly constructed model. The findings have 
important implications for management, especially in relation to the identification of 
key supporter groups and opponents to the scheme and the issues that employees 
regard as key to the success of the scheme. 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION, AIMS AND OBJECTIVES 
1.1 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND TO THE RESEARCH 
The growth in perfonnance pay has been one of the most significant developments in 
human resource practices in recent years (Harris 1999). Research, analysis and 
discussion of performance pay has taken a number of forms in recent years both in the 
UK and in the rest of the English-speaking world. There have been numerous reports 
of the introduction and operation ofperformance pay schemes (Arkin 2002, cases on 
Unilever, Woolwich Building Society and Yorkshire water in Brown and Armstrong, 
1999, Keeler, 1991, Hilton 1992, Willing 1994, IDS 1996). Alongside these positive 
and, generally, uncritical narratives, there has been a large body ofprescriptive 
literature developed by consultants and other commentators advising on how schemes 
should be designed and introduced and operated in both the public and private sectors 
(Makinson 1998, Murlis 1990 and 1993, Turner 1996). Finally, there has been a 
consistently high level of academic studies in the form of surveys and case studies 
which have provided a far more critical and evaluative analysis on the subject. 
(Morris & Fenton-O'Crevy 1996, Heywood et al1997, Kessler and Purcell 1994, 
Lewis 1997, Marsden and French 1997, Heery 1998, Grimshaw 2000, Harris 2001) 
I' 
This large body of published material reflects the continuing interest in the study of 
the subject where pay is influenced by the level ofperformance of the individual or 
the team and demonstrates its current relevance. The proponents and analysts of 
performance pay, as a key component of human resource management, have set out a 
wide range oflong-term objectives. These can include increased worker commitment, 
(Guest 1991, Storey 1992) improved quality ofwork and customer service (Snape et 
al 1996) together with enhanced flexibility in working practices. (Kruse 1996, Hurne 
1995, Lawler 2000). Performance pay may also aid recruitment and retention (Bevan 
and Thompson 1992), produce a fairer environment (Brown and Armstrong 1999) and 
contribute towards a more satisfactory psychological contract (Guest 1998). 
The interest in perfonnance pay can be traced back to two key publications. Beer et 
aI's (1984) Managing Human Assets and Fombrun et aI's (1984) Strategic Human 
Resource Management promoted reward management to the foreground of strategic 
thinking by becoming central to the employment relationship. In Fombrun's model, 
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pay and rewards became one of the four important human resource management 
policy areas, together with selection, appraisal and development. 
The growing rise in importance of strategies for paying employees has coincided with 
the changing economic, social and technological context. Changes in the management 
of people at work are part of wider changes to organisations and to society. The 
pressure for changes in human resource policies and practices stems from economic, 
societal and technical change. According to Flannery et al (1996) there are at least six 
major changes that are common to almost every organisation which will have a major 
influence on all forms of employment policies, including reward, in the foreseeable 
future. Globalisation, associated with the liberalisation of markets, has brought in its 
wake the need for labour to be cost-effective if the organisation is to survive. Charles 
Handy (1994) reminds us that the new equation for success is '112 workforce, paid 
twice as much, producing 3 times as much'. Performance pay is one method of 
attempting to improve such cost ratios. 
Rapidly changing technologies and the shorter cycle times has produced immense 
pressures on organisations to move nimbly, to continually re-invent themselves and to 
put flexibility at the heart of the business. Performance pay has a role to play in 
supporting flexible work systems. (Grimshaw 2000, Stredwick 1997) Today's ever­
demanding customers are a further driving force in improving choice, quality and 
personalised sensitivity. These pressures often put the emphasis on short-term 
performance and many organisations have responded to this by introducing better 
performance measures and instituting revised payment systems appropriate to these 
measures. (Brown 2001, Pettigrew 1999) 
Flannery et al's (1996) final changes are the major responses organisations make. 
They focus on 'fundamental competencies and capabilities that will set them aside 
from the pack' (Pll) and the demands they make on their employees. Hamel and 
Prahalad (1994) emphasise the importance of such a change: 'Delegation and . 
empowerment, for example, are not just buzzw'Ords, they are desperately needed 
\ 
antidotes to the elitism that robs so many companies of so much brainpower.' (P131) 
Employees are being asked to accept new values, behave differently, learn new skills 
and be prepared to take more risks. Performance pay systems have been introduced to 
3 
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reinforce these new demands and to channel employees' effort and ability in the 
direction the organisation wants. 
Despite the range of research publications, there are many gaps. In fact, Dowling and 
Richardson (1997) comment that: 
'In spite of the rapid growth in the use ofperfonnance pay schemes in the UK, there 
have been surprisingly few attempts to gauge their success and even fewer attempts to 
explain empirically any observed success or failure' (p 348) 
The current study was initiated largely from the author's interest in the subject, having 
operated, as a practitioner, various performance pay schemes over a 20-year period in 
both the public and private sectors and in large and SME organisations. 
1.2 ROLE OF REWARD MANAGEMENT 
The need to initiate changes in employee practices represents a major challenge for 
the human resources department. The role of reward management in the introduction 
of effective change has taken a number of forms, each one related to the link between 
pay and performance: 
• 	 The greater emphasis on the performance of employees at aU levels in the 
organisation. It has been increasingly recognised that the quality of the human 
resources is a serious factor in producing a long-term competitive advantage, 
especially ifthose resources are efficient and productive (Patterson 1997, Ulrich 
1998, Thompson 2000). That is why much more attention is now focused on 
identifying, appraising, managing and rewarding the performance of all 
employees. This stretches from increasingly sophisticated board-level and 
executive incentives to schemes that reward all employees in the organisation. The 
pay system can be seen as a cultural tool that can be actively engineered by 
managers who attempt to achieve particular behavioural or attitudinal outcomes 
from employees (Kunda 1992). An interesting development has been the equal 
movement down this line in both the public sector and the private sector. For 
example, The Sheehy report (1993) into the pay and conditions of the police force 
4 
recommended that police pay at all levels be linked to performance and it has been 
a factor in higher education settlements on a number of occasions since 1990. 
+ 	The need for reward strategy to reflect the overall business strategy, 
especially in tenns of competitive differentiation. Milkovich and Newman (1996) 
contrast the 'cost leader' (prevalent in the 1960s to 1980s) which strives to 
achieve desired quality at the lowest price for its products/services against the 
'innovator' (more prevalent today) which strives to constantly introduce new 
products by shortening cycle times and by focusing on customer satisfaction with 
innovative products and services. Their different approaches to pay systems is 
shown in Table 1 where the innovator places a much higher emphasis on 
performance based pay and less on internal consistency. 
Table 1- Organisational Approaches to Pay Systems 
Policy Choices Cost leader Innovator 
Internal consistency: Emphasis on assessing job High Low 
content/person's skills 
External competitiveness: emphasis on variable pay Low High 
(performance based) over fixed pay (seniority or across 
the board increases) 
Employee Contribution: emphasis on merit or incentive Moderate High 
based pay over cost of living or seniority adjustments 
Source: MllkoviCh and Newman 1996 p16 
+ 	A shift towards the individualisation of the employment relationship. Rather 
than determine pay through the traditional processes ofnegotiation with trade 
unions or staff associations where an employee's pay is directly determined by 
their payor grade, organisations have moved towards reward systems where a 
sizeable proportion of their pay arises from aspects of their individual 
performance. This system may be called merit payor performance related pay. 
Research by Beery and Warhurst (1994) showed that the majority of 61 unions 
surveyed reported that they had at least a proportion of their members covered by 
individually detennined pay arrangements, with the highest prevalence in non­
manual unions and financial services. Geary (1992) reports clear evidence of a 
company in his study attempting to individualise relations through encouraging 
personal effort and performance as part of a controlled and systematic 
performance pay scheme. 
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• 	 Increasing the flexibility within reward systems. This has shovm itself in a 
number of ways. Firstly by the development ofbroad-banded salary systems 
which have replaced inflexible job evaluation schemes. These allow more 
freedom for the employee's basic salary to rise through a larger range reflecting 
an employee's changing job role, wider responsibilities, increased skills and 
competencies plus improved performance. (Abosch 1995, IPD 1997) Pay, 
therefor, becomes related to performance. 
Secondly, by encouraging employees, through pay incentives, to adopt the 
required behaviours or competencies that lead to improved performance. These 
schemes are often linked to an organisational competency framework that drives 
much of the human resources strategy. The introduction of such competency 
frameworks and associated pay schemes are supported by research showing that 
competence-based management development leads to improvements in individual, 
organisational and business performance (Winterton and Winterton 1996). 
Finally, by encouraging the learning and adoption of skills that aid flexibility and 
lead to increased performance, both individually and collectively. There is a very 
strong association in studies by Lawler and Ledford (1987) in America and Cross 
(1992) in the UK with the integration of such a reward system with other features 
of human resource management, including employee involvement, job 
enlargement, commitment and total quality management. As Lawler and Ledford 
(1987) put it: 
'A high level of employee involvement may be necessary to realize fully the 
benefits of skills-based pay. Increased employee flexibility and broadened 
employee perspectives may be wasted if employees are not given the power to use 
what they learn through participation groups and job designs that create greater 
self-management.. Rewards for learning mUltiple jobs may also facilitate job 
rotation and cross-training which are essential to self-managing team designs. ' 
(P24) 
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• 	 Attempts to increase employee commitment through the linking of linking 
pay with organisational performance. This can take a number offorms 
including profit-sharing, (Kruse 1996) gainsharing (Graham-Moore and Ross 
1990, O'Dell 1987,Welboume and Mejia 1995) and encouraging employees to 
consider themselves as 'intrepreneurs'. As Ros Kanter (1987) explains: 
'Many companies are encouraging potential entrepreneurs to remain within the 
corporate fold by paying them like owners when they develop new 
businesses ...... Most of the entrepreneurial schemes pay people base salaries, 
generally equivalent to those of their former job levels and then ask them to put 
part of their compensation at risk, with their ownership percentage determined by 
their willingness to invest. This investment then substitutes for any other bonuses, 
perks or special incentives they might have been able to earn in their former jobs. 
This arrangement allows potential entrepreneurs to take less risk although the 
returns are proportionally less high compared to actual ownership' (P64) 
1.3 PAY FORMATS 
Lawler (1971) provided an early classification ofpay for performance schemes along 
three dimensions. First, pay can be distributed to individuals (piecework, merit pay), 
groups (group PBR, team-based pay) or organisations/units (profit related pay, 
gainsharing). Secondly, performance can be measured by productivity, cost­
effectiveness or supervisor/manager evaluations. Thirdly, payments can be made as a 
salary increase or a cash bonus. A further, more obvious, distinction is made by 
Kessler (1992) between payment for time worked and payment for performance. The 
former is associated chiefly with basic pay while the latter with 'add-ons', payments 
that augment the basic pay. 
This research will be dealing primarily with aspects ofperformance pay. In the UK, it 
is common for the nomenclature to be 'performance related pay' whereas, in America, 
it is more commonly known in as 'merit pay'. For ease of identification, it will be 
referred to throughout this dissertation as 'performance pay'. 
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Although the different varieties of Performance pay will be set out in more detail in 
the literature review, a basic explanation and definition is in order at this early stage. 
Brown and Armstrong (1999) define individual performance pay as: 
'Any pay scheme which relates the award of a base pay increase or an individual cash 
bonus to the results achieved by that individual.' (p15) 
Performance pay is the outcome arising from the performance management process as 
set out by Armstrong (1999). In his model, Armstrong demonstrates the integrated 
process of corporate missions spawning business plans that lead to individual 
performance agreements, performance measures and reviews which ultimately lead to 
the pay awards. 
The performance measures can be constructed, essentially, in three ways: 
«II By way of explicit, quantifiable measures, such as output, sales, or deliveries. 
• 	 By way of the achievement of certain personal objectives related to the 
individual's job which are usually time-related. 
• 	 Through the measurement of employee skills or competencies that the 
organisation has defined and incorporated into the reward system. 
Finally, payments can be distributed as individual bonuses on top of basic payor the 
process can be utilised as a determinant of the basic pay increase itself. 
We shall see from the literature search and findings chapters that each of the above 
approaches are not bereft of difficulties, both in theory and practice. They confirm 
Beer et aI's (1984) view that 
'The design and management of reward systems constitute one of the most difficult 
HRM tasks for the general manager.' (p113) 
1.4 RELEVANCE, TOPICALITY AND ORIGINALTY 
The success of performance pay schemes is of considerable importance in today's 
organisational context. Unless organisations continually improve their performance 
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and maintain their competitive stance (or keep within their public sector monetary 
restraints), their long-term future is in doubt (McClure and Tyson 1995). By utilising 
performance pay systems, they have the opportunity to define their required 
performance through an integrated performance management system, project this to 
their workforce and motivate their employees through the process ofmeasurement, 
feedback and reward. 
Research into this area, therefore, is both relevant and topical to today's working 
environment. If it can be shown that such reward systems as performance related pay 
may have terminal faults, then this would have an influence on prescriptive policy. If, 
on the other hand, it can be shown that such systems have a degree of success, then 
this can influence the approach that can be taken both in the academic field and in the 
practitioner area to keep examining systems that may meet general and specific 
requirements for companies and organisations. 
In terms of originality, it will be shown that, although there have been a large and 
regular number of 'macro' reports examining performance pay from a management 
viewpoint, there have been very few that take into account the other side of the 
picture, namely the viewpoint of employees as to the relevance, operation and success 
factors of a performance pay scheme. Certainly, those that question the issue of 
individual versus team-based reward from the perceptions ofemployees have been 
negligible in number in the UK. A further dimension of originality extends to the 
nature of the longitudinal study contained in this dissertation. 
1.5 AIMS AND OBJECTIVES 
Heneman (1990) set out over 30 areas of possible research into performance pay. 
These included an examination of the external context and organisational driving 
forces for the introduction of performance pay, the extent and varieties of 
performance pay schemes, their effectiveness in practice, the strength of causality 
between performa.."'1ce and pay and the views of the stakeholders. For this project, a 
number of these areas have been selected where gaps in the literature have been 
identified. 
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The general aim of this research is to examine the objectives for introducing 
performance pay and to examine whether these objectives are met in practice, from 
the viewpoint of both management and the workforce. A subsidiary aim is to 
demonstrate some of the strategic reward changes that organisations have made in the 
field of using performance-directed systems 
The main objective is to identify the inter-action between employers' expectations of 
performance pay and the outcomes in practice. This will be achieved through 
undertaking field research in appropriate recipient organisations including measuring 
employee attitudes and outcomes. 
1.6 Research Questions 
The research questions start with the question of scheme objectives and continue with 
the actual outcomes principally as seen by employees working under the scheme. 
They are set out as follows: 
1. 	 What are the reasons for organisations to introduce performance pay? 
2. 	 Does the introduction of performance pay improve the distribution ofpay 
increases so that they reflect an individual's performance and are therefore fairer 
and more equitable? (FAIRNESS) 
3. 	 Does performance pay increase the level of employee morale in the organisation 
and thereby the commitment of employees? (MORALE/COMMITMENT) 
4. 	 Does performance pay help to motivate the workforce towards a higher level of 
performance and productivity? (MOTIVATION) 
5. 	 Does performance pay help to change the culture of the organisation so that it 
becomes more geared to improving performance? (CULTURE) 
6. 	 Does performance pay assist in retaining employees? (RETENTION) . 
7. 	 Does performance pay, paid individually, harm or hinder team working? 
8. 	 Is it possible to identify employees by specific characteristics who may be more 
positive or negative towards performance pay? 
The first question will be examined through an analysis of three organisations that 
have introduced performance pay. The remaining questions will be examined mainly 
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through detailed analysis of data obtained in one organisation, principally from 
employees working under a performance pay scheme. 
The data will be examined at two stages as this is a longitudinal survey. Firstly the 
views ofemployees when the scheme is introduced and, secondly, when it has been 
operating ror a year in practice. Hypotheses relating to the employees' perception of 
the success ofthe scheme will be set up. Full details of the methodology are given in 
chapter 3. 
1.7 Structure of Thesis 
The structure of the thesis is set out as follows: 
Chapter 2 is the Literature Review, which will consider published evidence on a 
number of themes. It will start with a short analysis of the origins and development in 
practice ofvarious forms of performance pay and its current extent before moving 
onto an examination of the literature associated with the research questions identified 
for this thesis. The remaining four themes relate to the large body of literature which 
is opposed to performance pay, the difficulties that organisations face in practice and 
the ways that success in schemes can be identified and the theme specific to group 
pay systems. 
Chapter 3 is the Methodology chapter where the various research options are 
discussed, taking into account approaches that have been made by other researchers in 
this field. This is followed by the description and justification of the methodology 
used. 
Chapter 4 provides the Findings relating to the first research question, namely why 
organisations introduce performance pay with the outcomes from three case studies 
where qualitative research took place together with a commentary on those findings. 
Chapter 5 is the Findings which deal with the background and empirical findings 
relating to research questions two to eight. This takes place in Telecoms, the 
organisation where quantitative field work took place, together with an initial 
commentary . 
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Chapter 6 provides a Summary, Interpretation and Discussion of the findings and 
their relationships with the research questions together with the Implications for 
Management and Suggestions for Further Research. 
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CHAPTER 2 - LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter one, it was suggested that the use of performance pay is one of the 
strategies chosen by organisations to assist them to meet their strategic objectives. 
This strategy is normally not an isolated strategy but part of a collection of strategies 
centred around the way employees are managed, usually referred to as human 
resource strategies. In turn, human resource strategies link with associated business 
strategies, such as marketing, sales, manufacturing, service-providing and finance to 
make up a total organisation strategy. This is the conventional theory, although 
practice rarely portrays this tightly integrated approach. 
The literature search is set out as follows: 
• 	 Firstly, a brief background explaining why organisations have moved towards the 
principle ofperformance pay. 
+ 	Secondly, an examination of the current state of performance pay and the 
influences, philosophical, strategic and tactical, that underpin its operation, 
including measures of its 'success'. 
• 	 Thirdly, the literature as it relates to the research questions 
• 	 Fourthly, how performance pay applies in the group or team situation. 
2.2 ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF PERFORMANCE PAY 
Performance pay systems can take a multitude offorms. The earliest examples were 
based on forms of piece-work. Robert Owen, in one of the first factory settings, used a 
'silent monitor: a piece of wood mounted over a machine with one of four colours to 
denote the daily performance of the operator. At the end of the week, the payments 
. made were based on the colours of the wood (Stredwick 2000). A number of analyses 
of the role of performance pay schemes (Brown 1962, Bowey 1986, Berlet and 
Cravens 1991) have concluded that production schemes, such as piece-work, with too 
narrow a focus and without widespread support within the organisation, have lead to 
wage drift, poor employee relations and early degeneracy of the system. 
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The changing business environment of the late 20th century has led to a series of 
writings which have set out to demonstrate that reward strategies need to be devised 
and implemented to match this highly competitive, customer-driven environment 
(Kaplan and Norton 1992, Lawler 1990, Milkovich and Milkovich 1992). Probably 
the most well known ofthese has been called the phenomenon of 'New Pay' by 
Zingheim and Schuster (1995) where pay programmes are designed to reward results 
and behaviours consistent with the key goals ofthe organisation and used as a positive 
force for organisational change: 
'New pay links companies and people by means of an economic partnership in which 
. the results of successful company performance are shared with the people who make 
the success a reality. Strategic alignment means people and organisations share goals 
and the rewards of success' (P42) 
2.3.1. Current Extent of Performance Pay 
The 1988 ACAS survey found that 33% of organisations operated a form of 
individual performance pay while the Cannell and Wood survey (1992) reported that 
47% of private sector organisations had performance pay schemes for all non-manual 
grades. 37% of public sector organisations operated some form of performance pay 
for non-manual staff, although only 6% of schemes covered all non-manual staff. 
Cannell and Wood's view was that: 
'The impression that individual performance pay is tending to replace many of the 
fixed incremental systems which existed previously was confirmed by the .... survey 
and by the review of settlements from 1983. Both of these showed that it had spread 
from senior managementto non-manuals generally.' (P44) 
By 1998, the IPD survey (IPD 1998) of 5000 organisations found that performance 
pay was in place for 40% ofmanagement staffbut only 25% of non-management 
staff. This does not, on the surface, indicate much, if any, growth in the use of 
performance pay and the results were met by a generally bemused response from 
practitioners at the 1998 IPD Compensation Conference when they were announced. 
Despite a degree of contradiction, the IPD report goes on to support the idea of 
growth in performance pay schemes: 
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'Contrary to the popular belief that organisations are becoming disillusioned with 
performance pay, and with individual performance pay in particular, the results 
strongly suggest that the use of all forms of performance pay is growing ....... 59% of 
schemes, for example, have been introduced within the last five years.' (P6) 
A number of other smaller surveys have also supported their findings of gradual 
growth. An IRS survey in 1994 (IRS 1994) found that 87% ofmanagers, 57% of 
professionals and 41 % ofclerical staff were paid under such schemes. A Personnel 
Today survey a year earlier (Creelman 1995) reported that the proportion of 
organisations was as high as 67%, although from a survey of under 200. Two years 
later, an IRS survey (IRS 1997) indicated that the proportion had risen to 70%, 
compared to 63% two years earlier, with a further 13% planning to introduce such a 
system. In the same year, an IDS report (IDS 1997) of 400 organisations found that 
there had been a slow growth in performance pay from 1990 to 1996 but there had 
then been a marked shift in this direction in the services sector, especially financial 
services. The same indication emerged from a 1998 Personnel Today (Daly 1998) 
survey where the coverage in financial services was 72%. 
Continuing in the public sector, John Major's launch of the Citizens' Charter (1991) 
directed employers in that sector, including the government itself, 'to make a regular 
and direct link between a person's contribution to the standards of the service 
provided and his or her reward' (P7). By the mid-1990s, all civil servants' pay 
contained an element which was performance related. By 2000, experienced teachers 
at the top of their scale were able to apply for additional pay points which would be 
applied on the basis ofmeasured elements of the teachers' performance and 70% of 
those eligible obtained the performance based increment within two years of the 
introduction of the scheme. 
There has also been an apparent expansion in local authorities. A survey (LACSAB 
1990) revealed that 39% of local authorities had performance pay in force or had 
taken the decision to introduce them while a further 27% were considering them. 
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However, this view of expansion in both the public and the private sector was not 
shared by Incomes Data Services (IDS 1998) who commented that: 
'The large number of organisations dropping performance pay is a striking revelation 
because it is a far larger number than any previous survey has revealed. To an extent 
it reflects dissatisfaction with performance pay in some public sector organisations 
and NHS Trusts ...... However, it points to one unavoidable conclusion. There has 
been a great deal of flux over the past few years. Many organisations have adopted a 
new system, found it unsatisfactory and moved on, often reverting to their old 
approach - or a modified version of it.' (P8) 
Implementation in certain parts of the public sector have also been reported as patchy. 
Its penetration in the NHS, for example, has not so far been very deep (Arrowsmith et 
a12001). 
Official statistics, which have often changed the nature of the questions that form the 
basis of their reports, throw little light on this subject. An examination of the New 
Earning Survey for 1982 to 1993 (quoted in Burne 1995) show that the percentage of 
full-time employees in all industries who, as part of their total remuneration, have an 
element which is performance related, fell from 55% in 1982 to 43% in 1993. Burne 
explains, not exactly convincingly, that the survey relates only to full-time employees 
and that the inclusion of part-time employees would increase the percentage. 
Certainly there has been a growth in part-time employment over this period but it has 
not all been in the services or administrative areas where performance pay is more 
likely to operate. 
The findings from the 1998 Workplace Employee Relations Survey (Cully et al1998) 
showed that individual performance pay schemes for non-managerial employees was 
in place in only 11% of establishments. An explanation of the differences between 
this finding and those earlier is that the 1998 WERS covers organisations and 
premises ofall sizes whereas most reports sample mostly large organisations. Smaller 
organisations are far less likely to have formal systems of performance pay 
(Downing-Burn and Cox 1999). Having said this, anecdotal evidence would suggest 
that informal systems of performance pay are widespread in the sense that pay 
16 
po 
increases for managerial and administrative staff in SMEs are usually decided 
personally by the Chief Executive. Because he or she would know that individual's 
performance, then it would be an important factor in the pay decision. In larger 
organisations, that personal knowledge would not apply so formal systems would 
need to be in place. 
Performance pay in boardrooms has been long established, although there has been a 
slower trend towards low basic, higher bonuses than in America. Rogers (2000) 
explained that British executive reward was moving towards a US model and the 
introduction of US-style reward assessment that measures the impact of executive 
reward on shareholder funds. 
2.3.2 How Performance pay works in theory. 

There is a wide range of methods used in operating performance pay schemes. This 

chapter sets out an overview of some of the more common methods in operation. 

According to Kessler and Purcell (1992) there are three steps in the performance pay 
process: 
• Stage 1 Establishing the criteria upon which performance is based 
III Stage 2 Measuring the performance of the individual 
• Stage 3 Converting this measurement of performance into a pay increase. 
Stage 1 Establishing the criteria. 

There are two main methods here. Firstly, there is the setting of individual objectives. 

They may be cascaded down from organisational objectives set out in business plans 

(Wright 1994) and, ideally, a performance agreement is reached with the individual 

who will agree with these objectives (Brown 1989). The objectives should be 

SMART (Specific, or stretching, measurable, achievable or agreed, realistic, time­

based) and the number of objectives should be limited to between 4 and 8 (Armstrong 

and Murlis 1998). 
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The second method is to establish a competencyframework (Brown and Armstrong 
1999) which provides the base for the skills and competencies that employees should 
aim to achieve. These will consist of organisational competencies, which aim to make 
the organisation unique or give it a competitive advantage, and specific job related 
competencies. 
Some performance pay schemes are based on one method or the other but, 
increasingly, schemes combine the two. This is because there are major advantages 
and disadvantages for each approach. 
Heery (1998) describes an approach by a local government that set up a performance 
contract with each employee without objects or indicators and relied heavily on line 
management's subjective assessment of individual performance. This was introduced 
to 'keep it simple'. The director of personnel explained that the system was 'intended 
to be relatively informal and to maximise the discretion of the appraising manager' 
(P80). The Inland Revenue revised scheme, introduced in 1993, set targets which 
were specifically related to the Inland Revenue's 'Four es', namely customer service, 
compliance, cost efficiency and caring for staff, although teamworking also had an 
important role (Marsden and French 1997). 
In most of the organisations studied by Kessler and Purcell (1992), rewarding both 
inputs and outputs was common, reflecting a view that that it is just as valid to 
recognise and encourage individual growth within ajob as the ability to meet 
specified targets. 
Stage 2 Measuring the Performance 
Where objectives are set, performance can be measured by judging whether the 
objectives have been achieved or not. Where competencies are involved, however, it 
becomes necessary to carry out a rating of the employee's performance. One of 
Thompson's (1993) organisations had a three level rating scheme, 'exceptional', 
'competent' and 'unsatisfactory', which replaced an earlier eight level rating scheme 
which had proved unworkable. Another of his organisations, a local authority, had a 
six point rating scheme. In the Inland Revenue scheme (Marsden and French 1997) 
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staff are rated as 'not met, succeeded or exceeded' their targets. In addition, jobs may 
be counted as 'extra loaded' and, if so, the rewards for 'succeeded and exceeded' are 
increased. 
The distribution of the ratings is a subject of considerable controversy as it has a 
serious impact on the issue of the conversion into pay. If all employees are rated as 
excellent, then the scheme can become extremely expensive. In one of Thompson's 
(1993) organisations, the response to the over-rating of employees was to devolve 
salary budgets to departmental managers. This was intended to have the effect of 
giving managers responsibility and the ability to use the pay bill to motivate 
employees more effectively. 
However, in many examples, this has led to a perception of unfairness where the 
distribution of the ratings is predetermined. In Marsden and Richardson (1991), there 
was a widespread impression that a 'quota' system existed and 74% of employees 
believed that some staff were denied the box marking they deserved because of this 
informal quota. Following their report, the Inland Revenue expressly ruled out the 
existence of a quota in their subsequent 1993 Guide. Despite this clear protestation of 
all employees being treated equitably over rating, 78% of respondents to the later 
survey (Marsden and French 1997) still believed it operated. 
Stage 3 Converting the Performance into Pay 
For one of Geary's (1992) companies, when it has decided the amount ofmoney 
available for performance awards, a pay matrix was developed which linked 
performance ratings to a range ofpay increases, varying depending on the current 
position ofthe individual on their salary grade. An example of a performance pay 
matrix is shown in Table 2. 
As an example, an employee who was rated very effective and who was on the 
midpoint of their salary scale (100%) would receive an increase of5%. 
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Table 2 Example of a Performance pay Matrix 

Grid showing percentage increases to be paid to individuals 

Position i~ 90-94% 95-99% 100% 101-105% 105-110% 
salary 
band 
Rating T 
Excellent 8 8 7 7 6 
Very 7 6 5 4 3 
Effective 
Effective 5 4 3 2 1 
Developing 4 3 2 1 0 
Basic 2 2 0 0 0 
Source: author 
An alternative method to the pay matrix of allocating pay awards arising from a 
performance pay scheme is shown in Figure 1, called the 'pot of gold' method 
(Brown and Armstrong 1999). The intention here is to maintain a cap on pay awards 
but for the money to be more fairly distributed according to the performance of the 
unit as well as the individual. 
In this case, the organisation decides how much money is available for distribution, 
usually on a formula related to the profits of the organisation and the current level of 
inflation. The sum available is then split between departments and teams according to 
the performance of that department/team. Within the team/department, the allocated 
sum is then split between the individual employees. This is the method used by one of 
the organisations studied by Lewis (1997). He reported a major disadvantage of this 
method. Managers at the bank could not tell their staff what level of ratings would 
lead to specific pay levels as this depended on the profit achieved in the bank overall. 
Disclosing these figures earlier would have 'revealed management's negotiating hand 
to the trade unions.' (p13). The outcome was that managers gave higher ratings than 
they felt reasonable in case the pot was small and their good managers would receive 
little in terms of reward. 
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Figure 1- Allocating pay through 'Pot of Gold' Method 
Pot of Gold Distribution 
Company decick to substitute one week Christmas bonus (2% of pay) for 3% bonus distributed 
according to performance. 
Note: Adjustments need to be mack for any variety of numbe~ in each unit, area, etc. 
The awards can be in the form of additions to the basic pay, separate supplements or 
the payment of a lump sum, or a combination of the three. A further option is for the 
performance rating to trigger a progression further up their scale. In Thompson's 
(1993) local authority, an employee on point one of a five point scale, who was rated 
as excellent, would progress two further scale points. Another employee who was at 
the top of the scale and rated as excellent would receive a cash bonus. A similar 
system operated in the Inland Revenue (Marsden and Richardson 1991). 
The CBIIHAY (1995) survey (eBI 1995) showed some interesting figures on the 
elements of performance rewarded in performance pay schemes, a summary of which 
is shown in Table 3 
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Table 3 Elements of performance rewarded in variable pay schemes 
Employee Achievement Achievement of personal Team 
group of Objectives development goals contribution 
(competencies) 
Executives 37% 11% 14% 
Senior 39% 13% 15% 
Management 
Management! 34% 12% 15% 
Professional 
Supervisors/ 20% 8% 10% 
Technicians 
Clerical! 19% 8% 10% 
Secretarial 
Manual 14% 2% 7% 
(Source: CBIIHA Y 1995 p29) 
These are the responses for all organisations in the survey, not just those operating a 
performance pay (variable pay) scheme. Objectives are still clearly in the lead as a 
basis for the measurement of performance but the element of team contribution is 
surprisingly high. 
Forms of rating the performance were present in around 50% of organisations with 
the highest proportion (77%) in the financial sector. 5 ratings were the most popular 
(21 %) and 4 ratings coming next (9%) 
The amount of at-risk pay can vary. Reery (1998) indicates that most performance 
pay schemes have a much lower proportion of pay at risk than the 30% common on 
shop floor payment by results schemes. The figure in his research of local government 
schemes was around the12% level but many other schemes are well below this, as 
indicated by the pay matrix in Table 2. For most organisations, therefore, performance 
pay moves only tentatively in the direction of increasing the proportion of pay at risk. 
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2.3.3 Best Fit versus Best Practice 
Since the mid 1980s, a debate has continued as to whether performance pay can be 
considered to be a 'best practice', one that should be applied in all organisations as a 
fundamental part of the pay determination process. The alternative view here is that 
each organisation faces different circumstances and therefore the 'contingency' 
approach should be adopted where the reward systems to be used are those that 'best 
fit' the circumstances of the organisation and the market place (Purce111999; 
Hutchinson, Purcell and Kinnie 2000). 
Early research in this area sought to identify the links between individual practices, 
such as pay systems, and organisational performance (Becker and Gerhart 1996) with 
the implicit assumption that the effects of such practices were additive. However, 
there is now a clear view that these practices have a much stronger effect when they 
are used in combination. Research evidence seems to indicate that the collection of 
such practices produced enhanced results and there are a number of advocates whose 
research gives some support to this viewpoint (Pfeffer 1994, Huselid 1995, Storey 
1992: McDuffie 1995). In each of their research pUblications of employment practices 
that should be central to any organisation that claims to be at the forefront of best­
practice, performance-related reward is one of those central practices (Marchington 
and Wilkinson 2002). Incidentally, recent evidence by Guest (2000) indicates that 
very few companies actually operate many of these practices. Of237 organisations 
studied in a cross-section of organisations of various sizes, only one per cent of 
respondents operated 13 or more out of the 18 best practice HRM practices they 
specified. 
The fundamental problems associated with the 'best practice' concept are pointed out 
by Purcell (1999), particularly the lack of a link with company strategies and the ways 
of defining precisely the components of the bundle of HR practices and their 
interconnection. Furthermore, there appears to be little concern for the unitarist 
assumptions made about the goals or interests served by these best practices. 
Wood (1996) examined the practices of what he called 'high commitment 
management' (HeM) in manufacturing plants in the UK. The study found that those 
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plants in which merit (performance) pay is paid as a permanent increase to the basic 
wage are likely to have higher levels of HeM and that these practices had been 
adopted irrespective of observable external environmental factors. However, he also 
found no systematic association between the use of HCM and the use of performance 
or contingent pay systems. 
Other authors on high commitment take a different approach to pay practices 
associated with high commitment. Roach (1999), for example, reports a high 
incidence of both individual and collective performance pay, as does Walton (1985). 
In Gallie et aI's (1998) survey, it was established that the greater the extent of the 
performance management! performance pay scheme, the higher was the commitment 
measure. 
Looking further at the contingent approach to pay, proponents of the 'New Pay' point 
out the obvious contrasts of organisational contexts so pay systems need to be 
appropriate to the structural, technological, procedural and market characteristics 
internal and external to that organisation (Kessler and Purcell 1992). For example, the 
context of the prison service is very different indeed to the context of an e-commerce 
company and it would be wildly unrealistic to put forward the view that similar best 
practice pay systems could be successful at two such organisations. 
Recent governments have appeared to take the view that performance pay is a 'best 
practice' that should be introduced throughout the public sector. John Major's 
Citizen's Charter (1991) gave strong encouragement: 
'Pay systems in the public sector need to make a regular and direct link between a 
person's contribution to the standard of the services provided and his or her reward.' 
(P7) 
Under the Labour government, the Treasury report (Makinson, 1998) provided a 
whole raft of recommendations on linking pay to performance in the public sector as 
though the government had not changed. As detailed earlier, teachers have also been 
faced by the drive towards a performance pay scheme (School Teachers review Body 
1998) 
24 
Critics ofperformance pay in the public sector would point to a number offactors 
indicating its lack of success. The IPD research project on performance pay (IPD 
1998) found that 'public sector respondents are much less likely to feel that their 
schemes are generating beneficial outcomes for their organisation on virtually every 
indicator' (P6). Furthermore, research into schemes at the Inland Revenue and 
elsewhere (Marsden and Richardson 1994, Marsden and French 1998) showed a very 
poor response from employees working under the scheme. 
Proponent of the 'best fit' concept are not immune from criticism. Legge (1995) 
rejects the assumption that there is an organisational strategy with which the HR 
practices can fit, pointing out that this is often the case of rhetoric after the event. In 
any case, if the 'best fit' bundle is adopted by all the competing parties, then none will 
gain competitive advantage, which Purcell (1999) calls 'mimetic isomorPhism' . In the 
double glazing industry, for example, the strategic lead taken in the early 1960s by 
Everest Double Glazing of using commission-only, highly financially-focused sales 
employees was quickly copied by incoming competitors which quickly eroded the 
dominant position within 10 years (Author'S experience). 
The final refined view here adopts the resource-based view of strategy (Boxall 1996) 
which argues that successful firms are those that develop an approach which is closely 
matched to their own circumstances and which takes advantage of their particular 
strengths, referred to as idiosyncratic contingency. 
2.4 Addressing the Research Questions 
'Performance pay schemes are like illicit love affairs ..... when you are not personally 
involved in one you feel that you are missing out on something marvellous. When you 
are involved, you spend most ofthe time being miserable' 
Torrington (1992) p178 
2.4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, existing research studies are examined to discuss viewpoints and 
findings that relate to the research questions set out on page 9. Reference will be made 
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especially to a number of UK studies and, to place these in context, a brief 
classification of these studies is now given in Figure 7, including their methodology. 
A more detailed summary is set out in Appendix 3. 
Table 4 Classification of main UK Research on Performance pay 
Research Year Nos Org Nos of Research Type of I, Findings 
orgs areas emplo Typology scheme 
yee 
Swabe 1989 1 Financial 9000 Case study Individual 77% employees considered scheme was 
services perform- an improvement after one year. 42% 
Interviews ance pay. considered pay did not accurately reflect 
Merit rating their performance. 
on 5-point Costs were constrained 
scale 
Geary 1992 3 Electroni Total Case study Varied Less than half happy with performance 
cs cc5000 Interviews review. Sense of satisfaction with overall 
level of pay. Allowed consequential 
changes in operational requirements 
Proctor 1993 1 Manufact 600 Case Study Perform- Scheme costly to operate, lack of 
et al uring 20 interviews ance pay confidence in scheme, no appeal system, 
general dissatisfaction. 
Lewis 1997 3 Financial unkno Qualitative Perform- Centralised ratings, favouritism, lack of 
services wn 86 interviews ance pay communication, not integrate with 
business objectives. 
Kessler 1992 8 Various unkno Interview Various Scheme supported by younger 
and 1994 wn plus two unspecified employees, women and those with short 
Purcell attitude service. Opposed by older and long-
surveys service employees. Union membership 
did not affect views. Principle of 
performance pay supported. 
Marsden 1991 1 Inland C3500 2423 Box rating Strong views against scheme in 1992 ­
and and Revenue questionnaire with quota Did not motivate (80%), box marking 
Richard­ 1997 s (1992) system process fundamentally flawed. 
son and (1992) 1997 results even more negative. 57% 
Marsden without thought managers rewarded their 
and (1997) favourites. Number of management who 
French saw scheme as increasing performance 
rise from 22% in 1992 to 42% in 1996. 
Thomp­ 1993 3 Building 1000 Various Performance pay had neutral effect, no 
son a society, questionnaire effect on high performers, it did not help 
local s to change organisational culture, 
authority, importance of relationship with manager 
supermar on views of scheme identified, more 
ekt chain positive views from senior staff. 
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Dowling 1997 6 NHS 114 Various 
and Trusts questionnaire 
Richards to managers 
on 
Heery 1998 4 Local 1300 Various 
authoritie questionnaire 
s plus 47 
interviews 
Harris 2001 80 Various N/a 80 managers Various 
interviewed 
plus 36 
follow up 
three years 
later 
Managers considered scheme to raise 
their own motivation, level of challenge 
important. 
Schemes generated neither positive nor 
perverse effects. Own performance fairly 
assessed, satisfied with total pay but still 
undercurrent of suspicion. 
Managers do not share principles or 
stated objectives ofschemes. 
Organisational constraints felt strongly. 
Size of compensation pot restrictive. 
Process took up too much time. 
2.4.1 Research Question 1 Objectives of Performance pay 
A simplistic version of managerial objectives for performance pay was set out by 
Kessler and Purcell (1992), namely that they replicate the core aims of any payment 
system: to recruit, retain and motivate the workforce, although refinement of these has 
involved highlighting the need for 'fairness' and 'equity'. 
Objectives for performance pay can vary considerably, depending on the context of 
the organisation and this section will examine this complexity by dividing objectives 
into two main groups, operational and cultural. 
Operational Objectives 
Figure 2 Operational Objectives 
OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVES 
• Control 
• Communication 
• Recruit and Retain employees 
• Effectiveness 
Operational Objectives, set out in Figure 2, serve to lead and control. As organisations 
exist in an increasingly competitive environment, it becomes more and more 
important for employees to have clear guidance and direction towards the 
organisation's aims and objectives. Underpinning the performance pay scheme will be 
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a performance management system that sets out to communicate that link between an 
organisation's mission and strategic direction and the required employee performance. 
This will be in the form of targets and objectives cascaded down from the 
organisation's business plan to units, teams and individuals. An Ashrldge College 
study (Goold and Campbell 1987) demonstrated that performance pay schemes were 
used more aggressively by larger, more diverse businesses with a 'financial control' 
management sty Ie. 
In the public sector, the need for rationalisation can play an important part. Alan 
Milburn, Health Minister, explained (Timmins 1998) that there was a need to 
introduce performance pay into nurses pay because the existing system involves 
'dozens of hierarchical and segmented grades, arcane allowances and increments that 
are paid, irrespective of changes in skills, responsibilities and performance' (P14) 
In Heery's (1998) study of local government schemes, he found strong evidence that 
performance pay was being used to rectify a perceived problem of inadequate labour 
performance and to ensure employees complied with the demands of a more exacting 
and tightly delineated employment contract. The emphasis on controlled to using 
performance pay to reinforce hierarchies and facilitating line management control of 
subordinates. He reported a Borough Treasurer saying that performance pay was 
introduced because' local government used to be able to survive with passengers but 
cannot afford to any more -times have changed' and the chair of the personnel 
committee claimed there was a need to change attitudes 'so that people were rewarded 
for what they did and got the cane when they did not' (P77). 
Using performance pay also acts as a measure of the effectiveness or efficiency of the 
workforce, particularly where there are external or inter-unit comparisons. The 
strongest and the weaker performers can be readily identified; the strongest can be 
used as role models or utilised in training and the weaker employees helped to 
improve through coaching, training or discipline. The identification of weaker 
performers can take place through published league tables as in Everest Double 
Glazing (Stredwick 1997). 
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Mason and Terry (1990) reported on the introduction in the NBS ofmore detailed 
performance systems and associated payment to improve the efficiency of ancillary 
employees as part of a wider report on the use of incentive systems. The objective was 
to 'reflect attempts by management to re-establish a degree of control over work 
organisation, worker effort and reward that has been eroded by the power of shop 
floor trade unions' (PI). Further evidence of using performance pay as a means of 
gaining greater control over professional groups in the public sector has been 
provided by Sinclair et al (1995) and Fairbrother (1996). Geary (1992) took the 
control theory further by contending that the introduction of individual performance 
pay as a layer superimposed on team working was a way of dissolving dysfunctional 
solidarity which team working may have developed. 
Improving business performance was the main driving force behind the introduction 
of performance pay by NatWest Bank, according to Armstrong (1999). The scheme 
was intended to encourage greater concentration on corporate and personal objectives 
by clarifying at each level what the key objectives were, relating them to specific 
circumstances and rewarding managers according to how well they achieve them. 
Using performance pay to extend management authority was a major objective for 
one of the companies studied by Proctor et al (1993). This company used performance 
pay superficially to harmonise terms and conditions between staff and shop floor but, 
in reality, it used performance pay to remove de facto the trade union's right to 
negotiate collectively over pay. Heery's study (1998) found that there was 'a clear 
impression that performance pay was intended to force managers to take tough 
decisions, tighten up on job performance and exert more of a disciplinary role (P77). 
Performance pay is often seen to be used by management in pursuit of greater 
financial control. Kessler and Purcell (1992) describe a company that have used it to 
replace an open-ended financial commitment to one where increases were targeted at 
those 'who most deserve it' and where it provides better 'value for money'. 
Performance pay is also used to achieve better control over the pay bill and to prevent 
pay drift, (Armstrong 1999) especially where the system in use is the 'pot of gold' 
which has a finite total. 
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Recruitment and retention is a very common objective. It was an important feature of 
the late 1980s in the public sector where professionals (architects, planners, 
accountants, etc) were moving to the private sector at a time ofrapidly falling 
unemployment and where general pay increase for public sector staff could not be 
afforded. The introduction of performance pay supplements to these groups was an 
attempt to stem the tide of attrition (LACSAB 1990). The importance of recruitment 
and retention goals was clearly apparent in ManCo, one of Kessler and Purcell's 
(1992) companies being studied, where strong central guidance was provided to line 
managers urging them to allocate performance increments to occupational groups 
where there were local labour market pressures. 
Other objectives relating to control have been detailed by Hume (1995). These 
include improving quality, reducing wastage, increasing labour flexibility and 
reducing overtime. 
Cultural objectives 
Figure 3 Cultural Objectives 
CULTURAL OBJECTIVES 
+ Trust and Openness 
+ Drive and motivation 
+ Cultural change 
+ Fairness 
On the cultural side (See Figure 3), the performance pay system can feature as part of 
the overall drive to build a more open relationship with employees. Organisation 
plans can be shared, appraisal discussions can be frank within a realistic context and 
means of improving performance can be encouraged and openly evaluated. This was 
one of the main driving forces in NHS Trust managers scheme investigated by 
Dowling and Richardson. (1997) and by the food retail company in Thompson's 
(1993) study who wanted to 'encourage a culture of high performance and to 
stimulate greater employee involvement and commitment to the business' (P7). 
Moreover, because employees always have a higher motivation towards goals with 
which they agree or have had some input, the performance pay system provides the 
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opportunity for employees to have a voice in the process through the individual 
performance plan, in whatever form it is agreed. 
Another important purpose is to endeavour to produce a system that is regarded as fair 
and equitable, especially in the rewards that emerge from the process. Swabe, 1989, 
describes the financial services organisation that introduced performance pay because 
their previous service-related, union negotiated pay systems did not allow selective 
pay increases based on performance and they wanted to reward merit more 
adequately. A well thought through performance management system should provide 
a defensible framework within which the many types of rewards can be allocated, 
rather than on the basis of personal whim or prejudice. Research carried out by the 
Local Government Management Board (1996) revealed that employees who work 
under a performance management scheme have an enhanced understanding of the 
needs and requirements of their job and have a higher 'feel-good' factor in relation to 
working for their organisation compared to those organisations where no such scheme 
is in place. 
Concepts of equity were present in Proctor et al (1993) where their performance pay 
scheme was introduced at the same time as harmonised terms for white and blue­
collar employees. 
A further objective allied with fairness relates to dealing with areas of employee 
performance which produce major concerns. Employees will not take kindly to 
criticism if they are unaware of the standards expected of them. It is certainly not 
possible to engage in disciplinary proceedings on performance that will be regarded as 
fair without having such standards in place. 
Promoting the unity of interests between management and employees is a further 
significant aim (Lewis 1997). Guest (1987) stresses the integration of employees into 
the business so there is a unitary focus of interest and an effective performance 
management process under performance pay which incorporates integrated targets, 
regular feedback, robust measuring and significant differentiated rewards will support 
such an integrated approach. 
31 
Cultural change is often a significant objective. Batstone et al (1984) draws attention 
to the importance of performance pay as part of the management strategy to break 
down the Post office ideology of corporate paternalism and bureaucratic centralism. 
In their substantial Templeton research programme, Kessler and Purcell (1994) found 
that performance pay was used as one of the key levers for organisational 
transformation in a number of the organisations studied. It was related to the 
following aspects: 
• 	 Corporate culture: performance pay was introduced to promote values suggesting 
that the company was performance driven, cost conscious and flexible. 
• 	 Commitment: performance pay schemes were seen as encouraging employee 
commitment by 'locking' the individual in by relating pay to behavioural traits 
derived from Company mission statements. 
• 	 Communications: performance pay, through the performance management 
process, forces a direct relationship between line managers and their staff, 
ensuring a regular face-to-face dialogue. 
They set out further examples where performance pay was seen to have characteristics 
that may accord with the company image in terms of flexibility, dynamism, 
entrepreneurial spirit and careful allocation of resources (Kessler and Purcell 1992). 
One such example relates to a privatised utility who sees performance pay as being 
'appropriate' to a private company and another where it was seen as essential to the 
conscious design of an individually orientated organisational culture on green field 
sites. Moreover, they saw performance pay as more than simply sending messages to 
individual employees about organisational values. In three of the organisations 
studied they found management consciously attempting to weaken union power 
through performance pay. It was part of a package of measures focused upon the 
individual and designed to foster the view that employee benefits are not solely 
dependent upon union action. In a newspaper company, performance pay was 
introduced with a new communication scheme, profit sharing and a company health 
scheme as a means of undermining employee perceptions of significant union power. 
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They reported a final cultural change in using performance pay as a means of forcing 
the manager into a direct one-to-one, face-to-face relationship with their subordinates, 
ensuring managers think carefully about their decisions and can defend them. 
The cultural change scenario is repeated at Yorkshire Water (Brown and Armstrong 
1999) where the reward manager, Amanda Stainton is quoted: 
'Money is not the most important motivator in life but it is a lever for change, a 
symbol, a way to change behaviour. Without the pay linkage, the new performance 
management system would not have had the power and the priority required to really 
impact on management and behaviour in the organisation. The history was of 
managers backing away from tough decisions'(p52). 
Geary (1992) provided evidence of companies using reward processes to shape 
employees' normative orientations. At the time of appraisals and as part of reward 
objectives, it was stressed to employees the necessity of attaining high quality levels, 
to be efficient and flexible. Social criteria were also reinforced through an emphasis 
on employees' ensuring team norms are adhered to' . As he explains: 
'The reward system helped to sustain normative behaviour by showing approval. in 
the form of a merit increase, for appropriate work efforts, and by showing its 
disapproval in sanctioning poor performers' (P44). 
A further example of a cultural change is in the original Natwest Bank scheme 
(Goodswen 1988) where it is reported: 
'NatWest's culture had entered a new phase and the climate was favourable for a shift 
in emphasis from management by control to management by leadership. It is essential 
that leaders make sure that the broad picture is known, understood and reflected in 
measurable, personal objectives for those in the management team. They must 
provide individual members of those teams with personal job satisfaction through 
feedback on performance against objectives. Management leadership also requires the 
ability to discriminate in the reward given to the exceptional, compared with the 
standard performance' (P62). 
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Hume (1994) points to the use of performance pay to facilitate the introduction ofnew 
work designs and also to make managers more accountable for the assets that they 
manage. In the public sector, performance pay has been used to introduce cultural 
change. Its introduction in the NHS, as explained by Bach (1994), 'signalled the 
emerging commercial orientation of the NHS and started to challenge the traditional 
patterns ofNHS industrial relations' (P100). 
Conclusions on Objectives 
A mixture of objectives will usually apply for most organisations. Storey and Sisson 
(1998) put the two groupings of operational and cultural objectives together and call 
them ideological objectives. They recognise the change of culture required, pointing 
to the many cases reported ofperformance pay in privati sed utilities. They also 
emphasise the change in the managers' role, forcing them to manage and take tough 
decisions about their staffs pay. Thirdly, they focus on the individualisation of the 
process' the implication, at the very least, is that trade unions and collective 
bargaining will playa lesser role in pay determination' (P146). 
Managers are not always at one with the objectives set for performance pay in their 
organisations. Harris (2001) found a low commitment to performance pay processes 
that could be explained by 'a perception that these (processes) had been imposed with 
a different set of objectives to those publicly stated' (p 1190). Moreover, 'perceptions 
of fairness among the managers were frequently more closely related to those of the 
employees they supervised than the principles reflected in the systems they had to 
apply' (P1191). Managers recognised the potential for diffusion and even a distortion 
of the scheme's key objectives, particularly in its ability to deliver longer-term goals. 
Heery (1998) also found mixed objectives in what he called the 'dualism in the 
ideological underpinnings' (pg 91) where the Conservative councils had been driven 
by the desire to ensure employees 'return to contract' through being managed more 
tightly while also promoting the kind of flexible orientation and an entrepreneurial 
attitude amongst the employees. 
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An in-depth IDS survey (IDS 1999) reported that scheme objectives and detailed 
operations were becoming more complex. Multi-factor bonus schemes were 
increasingly being implemented, including a selection of customer service and quality 
components, safety and environmental goals and HR measures, alongside more 
traditional financial and output targets. This supports the proposition that schemes are 
increasingly being recognised as contingent, driven by specific organisational needs. 
The real reasons for implementing schemes may never be disclosed. Although 
Dowling and Richardson (1997) report that the reason for introducing the NHS 
Managers' scheme was said to be to reward those managers who achieve a more than 
competent standard of work, they point out that 'the true motives behind the scheme 
are not totally transparent' (P350). 
2.4.2 Outcomes for Performance pay 

In this chapter, an examination is made of the research questions, (set out in 1.6) 

concerned with the outcomes from performance pay schemes. 

Figure 4 Expected Outcomes for Performance pay 
EXPECTED OUTCOMES 
• Improved perception of Fairness 
• Greater employee motivation 
• Higher morale and employee commitment 
• Higher employee retention rate 
• Willingness to accept cultural change 
Research question 2 Performance Pay and Fairness 
'People tend to accept as fair that which is conventional or that to which they have 
grown accustomed' 
(Brown 1995) 
If employees hope that performance pay schemes, with their underpinning 
performance management system, will be seen by employees as fair and equitable 
then the research evidence to date appears to dash many of such hopes. The lack of 
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fairness is a combination of the way the scheme is constructed and the way it is 
operated in practice. 
Marsden and Richardson (1992) report a 'widespread doubt about the fairness of the 
appraisal system' (P2S). Staff considered the system to be abused and widely unfair in 
its operation. Staff were frequently denied the 'box marking' that they deserved 
because of a quota applied on high markings. Over a third of staff considered 
favouritism to influence the marks. 
The employees in Geary's (1992) study regarded management's claim to fairness as 
'shallow, ifnot utopian' (P45). In one of the companies, only 4 out of24 employees 
questioned were happy with the appraisal system. Many considered that management 
was not prepared to fund the scheme properly. Some of the supervisors responsible 
for the assessment supported this view, as they found a number of their decisions on 
ratings to be overturned in the interests, they thought, ofeconomy. In any case, they 
found objectivity in rating very difficult and many considered that giving employees 
similar increases was a way of avoiding conflict and dysfunctional individualism. 
The difficulties in objectivity were shared in Proctor et al (1993) where management's 
views on what constituted fairness were not shared on the shop floor. Moreover, the 
fact that the great majority of employees being appraised were female, whereas the 
appraisers were male led to a number of complaints of sexual discrimination, 
supporting the viewpoints expressed by the EOC (1992). 
Furthermore, objectives set were not always agreed with the employees concerned 
and were found to be unachievable, assessment grades were concentrated in the 
middle ofthe range and, even when objectives were met, next time round they were 
increased - seen as a 'Catch 22' situation. The assessments, in any, case, were carried 
out all in a rush at the same time at the end of each quarter. Furthermore, a grade 1 
assessment (called a 'nails in the hand' job) was never awarded and supervisors were 
extremely loathe to award a grade 5 or 6 because of the difficulties and implications 
this would signal. Worse still, it was apparent that grades were 'forced' in that 
supervisors' ratings would be altered by managers. 'you can't have too many 3s- you 
need some more 4s' (P67). It could be argued, however, that this is a normal process 
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of monitoring the assessments to ensure they are carried out consistently but it is not 
always seen this way by the managers and employees concerned. 
Favouritism and subjectivity were continuing themes in Lewis's (1997) research, 
including evidence of the 'old boy network', the employee's visibility, and 
congruence with the 'pet issues' of your manager (P9). 
Another criticism in this organisation was the secrecy concerning the assessments. 
Management expected employees to keep their own assessment confidential but this 
would rarely be the culture in a workplace so they nearly always leaked out. Because 
they were subject to rumour, it spread a degree of despondency and this lead, in turn, 
to a general view of dislike of the scheme. 
Less conclusive evidence either way emerges from Thompson's(1993) report where 
the mean scores measuring employee's responses to a number of statements on the 
fairness of the scheme were around the 'not sure' mark. High performers, however, 
tended to perceive performance pay in a more favourable light. 
There is some fleeting evidence that reports more positive views from employees, 
especially in the private sector. In Swabe's (1989) study, employees consider that the 
operation of the objectives system was fairer and more consistent than the previous 
arrangements, although 20% complained that the objectives were imposed rather than 
negotiated. Furthermore, 42% did not feel that their eventual performance pay rise 
reflected the performance they achieved. A similar result emerges from an employee 
survey at 'Pubco' in Kessler and Purcell (1992) where 54% of union members felt 
that the new performance pay scheme was fairer than the previous across the board, 
cost ofliving scheme (P20) and in the first Inland revenue survey (Marsden and 
Richardson 1992), where employees still agreed that, 'with all its faults, it is better to 
have perfonnance pay than not' by 49% to 44%. 
The only major survey showing a fully positive feedback on fairness were the results 
in Dowling and Richardson (1997) where the majority of the NBS managers were 
satisfied that the appraisal interviews were conducted appropriately, that the way they 
were measured was fair and that due consideration was given to the relative difficulty 
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of different objectives. However, a substantial majority recognised the influence of 
sUbjective judgements on performance pay awards and there were a number of 
anecdotal comments indicating lack of support for the method ofattributing the final 
bonus. 
Perhaps more surprisingly, in the Heery (1998) local authority survey, a majority of 
employees indicated that they believed their 0\VIl performance to have been fairly 
assessed and where objectives had been set, they have generally been relevant to the 
tasks although the outcomes were not regarded as universally fair. 
Although the general evidence is that employees have not been convinced of the 
fairness of performance pay schemes in operation, the literature shows that there have 
been notable exceptions. For this thesis, a hypothesis has been set up to examine how 
effective a performance pay scheme is in achieving a perspective of fairness among 
employees. This is as follows: 
Hypothe~is one - FAIRNESS 
That performance pay contributes to the objective ofdistributing pay increases in line 
with employee contribution. 
This thesis will test this hypothesis and will go on to identify the influences on the 
employees' perceptions and to identify which groups of employees give more support 
or rejection to this hypothesis. 
Research Question 3 Performance pay and Morale/Commitment 
From a managerial viev.rpoint, the perception that employees may be committed to 
various interests within the workplace has consistently encouraged attempts to use 
rewards as a means of strengthening identification with and loyalty to the organisation 
and the job (Guest 1987). The introduction of performance pay is often seen as further 
progress do\VIl this road. The search for employee commitment has often been a stated 
reason for the introduction of such schemes (Kinnie and Lowe 1990, ACAS 1990). 
Although referring to profit-related pay, the 1986 Green Paper (Command 1986, 
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para9) stated that 'perfonnance pay schemes should lead to a closer identification 
with the companies in which they work.' 
Kessler and Purcell (1992) set out three ways in which schemes have sought to 
generate a higher degree of commitment. Firstly, assessed pay criteria are often 
derived from corporate plans or missions. Cascading goals and values are translated 
into individualised perfonnance targets or behavioural traits and have the effect of 
locking the individual into the organisation in a highly visible and meaningful way. 
Secondly the process of performance management usually forces direct 
communication between the employee and their manager, helping to create a long­
term bond, ideally working towards a common purpose to which they are both 
committed and from which they gain, psychological, social and economic benefit. The 
third, a more controversial concept, is the way that the introduction of performance 
pay schemes has sometimes been associated with the de-recognition of the unions 
representing the employees concerned. At British Rail, for example, the Transport 
Salaried Staff Association was de-recognised when a performance pay scheme was 
introduced for middle and junior managers. (Involvement and Participation 1990). 
Other examples, including Thames Water and Amersham International, have been 
reported in Petch (1990). The idea here is to encourage employees to transfer any 
residual commitment to the union across to the organisation. 
Kessler (1995) points out how management's intentions in the area of conunitment 
have not always borne fruit. The financial constraints under which these schemes 
operate may weaken rather than strengthen commitment, especially under a 'pot of 
gold' scheme where it may be announced that little money is available at the end of 
the year or where all or most of it is awarded to the high flying departments or 
individuals. Disappointment can hit commitment hard. A second area is where the 
lack of a successful relationship with the manager in terms of the whole performance 
management and perfonnance pay allocation can lead to disappointment and cynicism 
over the whole scheme and a reduction in commitment. His final point is that 
increasing commitment, especially through helping the individual to development 
their skills and their career, is seen as a 'soft' human resources approach, while 
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perfonnance pay is seen very much as a number-crunching, control-style 'hard' 
human resources activity. The clash here may create dysfunctionalities. 
In the study in the Inland Revenue, the potential for perfonnance pay to destroy trust 
and commitment was demonstrated clearly (Marsden and Richardson 1994). The 
researchers found that over half of the line managers operating the system agreed that 
perfonnance pay had reduced staff willingness to co-operate with management and 
that it had caused jealousies between staff and discouraged team-working. Similar 
doubts were expressed in other public sector studies (Marsden and French 1998), 
although the performance pay scheme for NBS managers (Dowling and Richardson 
1997) found otherwise. There were more positive scores than negative scores from 
managers in response to the question 'Taking all aspects of the performance pay 
scheme into account, does it have either a positive or negative effect on your 
motivation to do your job well?' although a majority still indicated that it had little 
overall effect. 
Geary (1992) similarly found a questionable success in performance pay engendering 
commitment to the organisation'S goals. Many were confused by management 
preaching both the virtues of collectivism (by stressing the importance ofteam 
working skills) and individualism (by paying employees on an individual basis). They 
were also made more negative by the additional stress on flexibility (linked to the 
payment process) where increasing the range of skills was emphasised. Many 
employees felt the lost of the ability to develop and extend their core skills to become 
a highly skilled specialist expert. 
Although Guest (1998) found that 'Contrary to much of the evidence on performance 
management and performance pay, the perceptions offaimess are higher in those 
organisations that do make some attempt to link pay and performance'(p47), he also 
placed a low emphasis on the effect of reward systems in an extensive study ofwhat 
made up a positive psychological contract (Guest and Conway 1997). In their 
findings, the nature and extent of rewards simply did not score highly in the way that 
they looked at the relationship between their job, their expectations and the way those 
expectations were met by the employers. 
p 
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A different approach is taken by McAdams (1995) who investigated various aspects 
of the ownership of schemes by employees. He found that the ratings by employees of 
non-financial results (teamwork, performance-reward link) were significantly better 
when non-management employees were involved in the design and implementation of 
schemes, although it appeared that the financial results were better when they were 
not involved. He also found that where a formal employee involvement/recognition 
scheme was associated with the performance pay scheme, then the outcome showed 
higher ratings and better financial performance but not significantly so. 
Most research on morale takes place in organisations where performance pay schemes 
have been introduced. In 1978, Greene and Podsakoff published the results of a study 
where a performance pay scheme was removed from one plant and compared the 
results with a similar plant where such a scheme had not existed. The outcome was 
that morale rose in the plant where performance pay was removed. What was 
interesting, however, was that performance fell in that plant compared to the second 
plant. Once again, this indicates a degree of dysfunctional results. Employees are glad 
to see the scheme go but their performance reduces. As will be expressed on a number 
of occasions in this work, these results present serious dilemmas for management. It 
appears difficult to reconcile the twin pillars of human resource management 
achievement - a productive, yet happy workforce. 
The brief evidence on this issue indicates a lack of success of performance pay in 
engendering commitment and higher morale. To examine this issue further, a 
hypothesis has been set up as follows: 
Hypothesis two - MORALE AND COMMITMENT 
That performance pay contributes towards the objective of increasing employee 
morale and commitment 
This hypothesis will be tested and the influences on employees' perceptions on this 
issue will be identified. 
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Research Question 4 Performance pay and Motivation 
'The sight of employees sprinting away from the workplace as the factory hooter 
sounds suggests that well-motivated staff are not necessarily the norm in industry' 
(Marchington and Wilkinson 2002) 
Although this quotation arises from what could be regarded as a narrow, northern 
grime outlook, there is certainly more than a grain of truth in it. The search for ways 
to make employees work harder, smarter and more efficiently has been a quest for the 
holy grail for generations and certainly since the arrival of the large employment sites 
heralded by the industrial revolution. Early writers, such as Taylor (1911) emphasised 
the need for a major financial motivator while operating rigid employee control, task 
de-construction and limited training. Much of the underpinning support for 
performance pay schemes still rests on Taylor's instrumentality theories. 
These restrictive views were rejected half a century later by the 'Needs' school 
(Maslow 1954, Herzberg 1968) where pay itself was seen as a lower order need and 
employees were motivated more strongly by esteem, self-actualisation and 'satisfiers', 
such as recognition and achievement. These theories, in their turn, have been largely 
dismissed by subsequent researchers (Hall and Nougaim 1968, Robertson et al1992) 
as partial and unproven empirically. 
An alternative approach was taken with 'cognitive' theories that assume that 
individuals think their way through a situation and work out how they can benefit 
from particular courses of action. Vroom's (1964) expectancy theory, which identifies 
the conjunction of instrumentality, expectancy and valency as determinants of 
motivation, has been supported, if only partially, by researchers in the performance 
pay field. Schwab and Dyer (1973) using piecework production employees found a 
less than convincing correlation of 0.17 between the performance and pay valence 
outcomes. Using a laboratory setting (and the strictures that management research in 
this setting produces). Pritchard and de Leo (1973) found a contrary result in that a 
low valence setting provided the highest performance. Porter and Lawler (1968) 
found that there was a strong link between the employees' regard for pay as a satisfier 
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and the effort they put in but not, surprisingly, in the actual performance result. 
Finally, Fox et al (1993), who carried out research into the the attitudes towards pay 
and actual performance of around 400 employees in a textile factory, found that 
incentive perfonnance was moderately correlated with a valence ofpay scale which 
measured an individual's perceptions of how pay was instrumental to their self­
concept and well being. They used questions such as' The more money I earn the 
better I feel about myself and 'I think people respect me more if I earn more than 
most other people.' Interestingly, another measure, nan1ely how vital the level of pay 
was to earn necessities, did not show such a correlation. Necessity may bring 
employees to work but not necessarily to want to raise their performance to earn more 
money. 
A further dimension was added by Locke (1968, 1981) and Locke and Latham (1990) 
whose goal theory identified the crucial connection of the nature and effectiveness of 
goals in the perfonnance pay process, specifically that they should be challenging, 
accepted and feedback on achievement must be given regularly. In addition, Nemeroff 
and Wexley (1979) found subordinate participation in goal-setting significant while 
another study found that commitment to the goals by employees was found to be a 
crucial factor in performance (Erez and Zidon 1984). 
Finally, equity theory (Adams 1963, Greenberg 1987, Tyler and Bies 1990) 
emphasised the role ofprocedural and distributive justice in gaining employee support 
for performance pay processes. 
It can be seen that the reasoning behind organisations seeking to introduce 
performance pay is complex and that the motivational theory underpinning such a 
scheme is shaky. Motivation, in any case, does not automatically translate into 
performance, as pointed out by Marsden and Richardson (1992): 
'People can be highly motivated but still perform badly because of a range of 
impediments, eg poor management, inadequate training or obsolete equipment. 
Equally, people can be poorly motivated but perform well, for example if there is tight 
management. ... we treat it as a willingness or preparedness to do something, which 
means that it is a state of mind' (p 10). 
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This direction is followed by most researchers in the field who measure motivation 
not by how hard or effective employees work but by their response to a number of 
statements about themselves and their fellow employees, a practice replicated in this 
research. 
In practice, the response of employees in questions of motivation is almost universally 
danming. In the Templeton project (Kessler and Purcell 1994), employee surveys 
were carried out at two of the organisations but the response was very limited: 
'Performance pay did not seem to motivate but, at the same time, did not de-motivate; 
it did not improve or strengthen staff and line management but similarly it did not 
weaken them; it did not encourage greater teamwork but by the same token it did not 
appear to undermine it.' (Ibid p6) 
The lack ofmotivation is significant in the first Inland Revenue study (Marsden and 
Richardson 1992) where only 12% of staff reported any increase. This is confirmed 
by the supervisors and managers, known as reporting officers, where the results on the 
lack of motivational increase are very similar. Over half of the staff believed that the 
scheme had helped to undermine staff morale and caused jealousies. Interestingly, 
female staff are slightly more positive, as are staff in less senior positions, perhaps 
because they could earn more through the scheme. Long service staff were very much 
opposed to performance pay. 
Vlhen the scheme was re-visited, (Marsden and French 1997), the Inland Revenue 
employees continued to have a poor view of the motivational aspects of the 
performance pay scheme with 80% claiming that it did not motivate them. Nor did it 
give them the incentive to be more effective in their dealing with the public (69%) or 
to get their work priorities right (64%) or to show more initiative (70%). Moreover, 
these ratings were worse than the original 1991 survey. Their main reasons for these 
ratings were complaints about the performance management system in place, 
including: 
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• 	 Staff are frequently denied the performance assessments they deserve because in 
practice there is a quota on (good assessments) (78%) 
• 	 Management use the scheme to reward their favourites (57%) 
• 	 The amount of money on offer is inadequate (46%) 
A number of reasons are put forward to explain the lack of success in the motivation 
area. Using expectancy theory, Marsden and Richardson found that, although 
employees felt confident that they could change their behaviour and be able to reach 
their goals, they (45%) had no confidence that, having changed their behaviours and 
deserved their high box marking, that this would actually be awarded. Finally, the 
views on the valency of the eventual rewards were very negative. Only 17% 
considered the reward worthwhile and 71% considered them insufficient. So two of 
the three elements of the expectancy theory were not met. 
Lewis (1997) found some startling procedures that negated any positive effects of 
expectancy theory. Managers neither knew what the rewards were going to 
beforehand and they did not rate it as attractive when it arrived. The 'Pot of Gold' 
distribution system in operation made the rewards impossible to predict. It did not 
help that the differentiation in performance pay between good and poor performers 
was negligible. 
Marsden and Richardson also examined goal theory in the context of the research. 
Employees reported that performance pay has raised staff awareness of the objectives 
in staff appraisal (57%) but denied that has made supervisors set targets more clearly 
or that the goals could make them work harder as they already reached the appropriate 
standard. The researchers agreed that this is far from being a good test of goal theory 
but indicated that it explains in part the lack of motivational impact. 
Goal theory was at the heart of Dowling and Richardson's (1997) work and their 
results were more positive. Although a clear majority of respondents reported that the 
scheme had little or no effect on their motivation to do their job well, as many as 29% 
said that it increased their motivation to some degree. (P352) and they concluded that, 
on balance, the scheme has a positive motivational effect. This is an exceptional result 
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~ which may be influenced by the fact that those taking part in the scheme are 
managers, that the scheme was relatively mature so people have become more I I 
accustomed to its working and that it may have been implemented better. ~ 
I 
Their last conclusion relates to the goal elements. Managers approved ofthe fact that 
I
the scheme clarified their work roles, that they were influencing in setting their own 
specific goals, that they understood what was expected of them and felt that their 
objectives were challenging but reasonable. Their only doubts were on the adequacy 
of the support and of the feedback given. Certainly it was not the financial provisions 
of the scheme that motivated them, (p 361) but the element of recognition did playa 
part. 
A discussion on the implications of equity theory on his research takes place in 
Thompson (1993). The largest influence on procedural and distributive justice was 
found to be the relationship of the employee with their manager. The importance of 
this and its effect on motivation cannot be under-estimated: 
'This relationship underpins the operation of the performance management systems 
and our evidence would cast doubt on the competence and ability of managers in the 
surveyed organisations to effectively manage their subordinates. In such 
circumstances, the impact on performance pay is likely to be considerably weakened.' 
(P30) 
Although the field research has shown largely negative results, there are some 
exceptions. A survey of two hospitals where performance pay operated in one but not 
the other (Schnieder and Olson 1970) found that nurses were more motivated and 
satisfied with the pay relationship in the hospital where performance pay existed than 
in the hospital where it did not exist. A study by Greene (1978) of managers in 
marketing and financial divisions of a large manufacturing company found that 
performance pay increased job satisfaction. In addition, two further American 
research projects found that the relationship between performance pay and motivation 
is often in doubt (Allan and Rosenburg 1986, Heneman et al1988). 
To add further research evidence in this area an hypothesis has been set up as follows: 
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Hypothesis three - MOTIVATION I
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.That perfonnance pay contributes to the objective of motivating the work force. 
1;"',,;<':··.. ····.··,,,····,··1......•....•. 
l' .;1h,' ~The hypothesis will be tested and evidence will be gathered on what has influenced : \'-j: 
employee's opinions in this area. 
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1····.:.:: \1 Research Question 5 Performance Pay and Cultural Change ii'
.j 
I~IThe role of performance pay as a lever to change the culture of the organisation is one of the more radical claims (Schuster and Zingheim 1992). In practice, the results can 
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be very mixed. Geary (1992) stressed the importance of the performance pay scheme I(.1
in two of the organisations in assisting the internalisation of appropriate norms "'Iamongst the workplace. The reward system helped to sustain normative behaviour by 
I 
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showing approval for appropriate work efforts and showing its disapproval in fA 
sanctioning poor perfonners. The association ofperfonnance pay with increases in 
flexibility and individualisation of the wage-effort bargain allowed management to 
regain control. 
Thompson(1993) attempted to measure the cultural effect through four statements, 
predominantly based around concepts of trust and communication to which 
employees responded. The results were largely inconclusive in all three organisations 
with a mean score very close to the midpoint, although high perfonners gave more 
positive results. In the Inland Revenue scheme (Marsden and French 1998), the results 
were more clear-cut. There was manifestly a view that the system had undermined the 
integrity of a well-established perfonnance appraisal scheme and that many staff 
believed that it had caused some deterioration in the atmosphere at work. 
Lewis (1997) found that the cultural objectives of enhancing unity ofpurpose and 
employee integration set by all three finanoial companies studied were far from met. 
Employees mostly had their objectives imposed, the objectives were 'hard' and 
narrow, which Lewis saw as the 'antithesis of an approach which could have been 
used to develop resourceful employees' (P18), and the outcomes had little meaningful 
differentiation. Developing managers in the performance management process was 
non-existent. 
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IIThe dilemma faced by management as to whether to use performance pay to break 
with the past or to ensure that it did not clash with existing culture has been examined 
by Kessler and Purcell (1994): JI 
'The benefits of a cultural break were perceived to be the creation of pressure points II
forcing change, the danger being that in creating such pressure, tensions and conflicts 
may also arise. Other .. (organisations) .. saw sensitivity to the past reflected in a 
relatively 'gentle' performance pay scheme retaining many past features ofpay 
determination as facilitating the acceptance of change but running the risk of 
rendering performance pay a 'weak' managerial tool, especially in the eyes ofthe 
managers' (P7) 
In a case where a performance pay scheme was introduced on the shop floor, (Bell 
1999), the company's attempt to present individualised performance-contingent 
payments as esteem and prestige symbols was met with resistance. Employees chose 
to keep the payments secret, share them with their work mates or not accept them at 
all, which clearly indicated that they did not share the organisation's cultural values. 
They considered that individual merit payments were seen as disrupting the collective 
nature of their existing shop floor culture. 
To examine the ambition of influencing change through a performance pay scheme, a 
hypothesis has been set up as follows: 
Hypothesis four - CULTURE CHANGE 
That performance pay contributed to the objective of instilling a positive message 
about performance expectations and the achievement of company objectives which is 
recognised by the employees as a culture change. 
The impact of performance pay in this area will be examined, together with the issues 
that influence employees' opinions. 
= 
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Research Question 6 Performance pay and Retention 
We have seen that one of the key objectives of introducing performance pay is to 
recruit and retain key staff. This was especially true in the late 1980s in the public 
sector and has played a part in recent years as unemployment continues to drop and 
the labour market becomes even tighter. Evidence that this has proved effective is 
mixed. The Business Intelligence survey (Ashton 1995) found that 45% of employers 
claimed performance pay was totally or highly effective in retaining key staff while 
18% found it to be 'not at at' or 'marginally effective' in this area. A research project 
by Cowan (1978) at Blue Cross in California found that staff turnover dropped by 
over a half from 44% to 20% when performance pay was introduced. 
Thompson(1993), on the other hand, found more mixed evidence. Generally, 
employees expressed their willingness to stay with the organisation but this question 
did not relate to whether performance pay influenced this decision. When high 
performers were differentiated from the remainder of staff, there was only a 
difference in one of the three organisations (Building Society) where high performing 
staff were more likely to stay. The results in the other two organisations showed no 
difference between high and low performing staff. Certainly there was no evidence 
that poor performing staff wanted or expected to leave. 
To gather further evidence in this area, a final hypothesis has been set up as follows: 
Hypothesis five - RETENTIONJLOYALTY 
That performance pay contributed to the objective of offering a competitive salary and 
benefits package in comparison with rival companies in order to reduce stafftumover 
and attract a higher calibre of staff. 
2.4.3 Conclusions on literature search on research questions 2 to 6 
Although the bias towards introducing performance pay for operational reasons seems 
to be more prevalent than for cultural reasons, there is good evidence for both groups 
of objectives. and for employers having a mixture ofboth groups. 
There is apparent difficulty in obtaining the hoped-for sense offaimess in 
performance pay schemes, except in the rare example of research into a management­
pi 
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only scheme. The theory that the stress on individual rewards would lead to greater 
individual commitment is not supported by the limited evidence and this aim can 
cause additional tension and confusion between the emphasis on teamworking 
(collectivism) and individual effort. 
The growing expectations of the better educated and skilled workforce can create a 
confused picture in the area ofmotivation. Although expectancy theory can provide 
the framework for determining the level ofmotivation under performance pay, it is far 
from clear whether a measure ofmotivation can immediately be transferred into 
productivity levels or whether employees themselves directly translate their own 
perceptions of motivation into an objective view of a performance pay scheme. 
In terms of cultural change, there is little evidence either way from employees that the 
pay scheme can make effective cultural changes although employers are far more 
confident while the issue of recruitment and retention was similarly clouded, although 
appearing to be successful from management's viewpoint. 
, 
One major problem associated with all of these measures is the issue of a comparison. 
Employees may be dissatisfied with what they have but it may be better than the 
previous system. Not all researchers are happy to ask this question or to pUblicise the 
result where it is asked. In this latter category, there generally appears the response 
that the scheme in question is better than the one that went before which did not pay 
for performance but this is not always the case. 
The literature, although extensive in some parts, still shows considerable gaps, 
especially in relation to cultural objectives and employee perceptions of the outcomes 
of schemes. 
2.4.4 Employee Characteristics and Performance Pay 
A number of research projects have attempted to identify specific characteristics of 
employees that make them approach performance pay in a more positive or negative 
way. These studies have included differentiating opinion on the basis of gender, 
jiP 
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seniority in the organisation, membership of a trade union, length of service and 
rating level. 
In terms of gender, Marsden and Richardson (1992) found female staff to be slightly 
more positive towards performance pay. They were more willing to work harder (20% 
to 15% for men), it encouraged their initiative (29% to 24% for men) and they 
believed it sustained high perfonnance (29% to 21 % for men). On the other hand, 
they also believed that it had caused jealousies (64% to 59% for men). Whether the 
differences were statistically significant was not stated and the authors commented 
that the differences may be as much to do with grade level as gender. In other words, 
women had a lower grade level and lower grades were more positive. The second 
Inland Revenue report, Marsden and French (1998), reported that a majority of 
women did not believe that women as a group lost out under the Inland Revenue 
perfonnance pay scheme. A contrary fmding came from Brenner and Bertsch (1983) 
who found that assertiveness was an important influence in supporting performance 
pay and this fmding was less strong with females. Heery (1998) found no significant 
difference. 
Seniority in the organisation has shown some very interesting results. Marsden and 
Richardson (1992) found that grade level and support for performance pay were 
inversely correlated. Lower paid staff were not outrightly enthusiastic but their overall 
scores were higher. For example, 40% of revenue assistants considered that the 
scheme encouraged their initiative whereas only 19% ofInspectors agreed with this. 
28% of assistants were more willing to work harder whereas only 13% of inspectors 
felt so inclined. The authors could not be sure why the relationship existed but 
surmised that lower grade staff had potentially more to earn from the scheme. The 
maximum additional pay for assistants could be as much as 22% whereas it was only 
12% for senior inspectors, although such payments were extremely rare. They also 
surmised that staff in higher grades already believed they had a higher level of 
motivation, making the impact ofperformance pay more marginal. The results have 
been different when the perfonnance pay opportunities were much greater for more 
senior staff, especially for top executives. This was the finding, for example, in 
Conway and Katerberg (1987). 
I 
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Given that performance pay has been used as a vehicle to move the organisation from 
a collectivist stance towards individual contracts (Mason and Terry 1990, Proctor et al 
1993, Kessler and Purcell 1992) it would be expected that being a member of a trade 
union would influence an employee's opinion against performance pay. Surprisingly, 
this does not seem universally to be the case. In Thompson (1993) there is no 
significant (P<.01) difference in opinion except in one of the organisations and then 
only in the matter of the principle ofperformance pay. Elsewhere, all 26 measures 
showed no difference. Thompson believed that this may have been due to the 
involvement of trade unions in the design and introduction of the schemes and that all 
employees have the same desire for equity which supersede any trade union loyalty. 
This has to be balanced to a certain extent against Marsden and Richardson's (1992) 
research where all the respondents were members of trade unions and gave a fairly 
uniformly negative response. However, without the views ofnon-trade union 
members, it is unwise to draw conclusions. Heery's (1998) survey found some 
correlation between union membership and lack of belief in the effect ofperformance 
pay on motivation but the result was not significant. 
Research appears to have shown quite clearly that length of service turns people 
away from performance pay. Marsden and Richardson(1992) found a clear inverse 
correlation between service and reaction to performance pay. For example, 30% of 
staff with less than five years service agreed that performance pay made them more 
willing to work harder but this fell to 15% of staff with more than 20 years service. 
72% of staff with over 20 years service considered that performance pay caused 
jealousies between staff but this fell to 48% for staff with less than five years service. 
The assessment level appears to have a clear influence. In Marsden and Richardson's 
(1992) survey, those staff who had received a 'Box l' marking (the top level) reported 
much more positively on the scheme. 50% confmned that performance pay had led to 
sustained high performance compared to 19% who received a 'Box 3' marking and 
43% reported that it had encouraged their initiative compared to 21 % with a 'Box 3' 
marking. Perhaps this is not surprising. Most winners of races or those winning bids 
for funding regard the positive result as pretty fair, on the whole. We have seen in the 
Thompson survey that the issue is less clear with high performers and their retention 
aspirations. Heery's(1998) survey supports these findings. 
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In terms Of the public sector/private sector split, Rainey (1979) found, in his study 
of275 managers, that managers working in the public sector saw a much weaker 
relationship between performance and rewards than did employees in the private 
sector. They believed that the performance-reward relationship was constrained by 
their personnel systems. Pearce and Perry (1983) studied five federal agencies over 18 
months and concluded that, although the participants had a clearer understanding of 
the performance standards for their jobs, they did not feel that these criteria promoted 
increased performance and they also considered it less likely that high performance 
would lead to increased merit pay. Employees questioned under Reery's (1998) local 
authority survey, however, were convinced that performance pay is an appropriate 
system for public service organisations by a majority of 46% to 26% with 28% 
undecided. At the same time, they agreed with a somewhat contradictory statement 
that 'professional workers do not need performance payments to work hard' by a 
majority of 52% to 28%. It could be argued that they regarded performance pay as a 
means of rewarding and recognising employees but not to motivate them. 
Thompson (1993) found some evidence that the level of training carried out to 
prepare staff for performance pay had a small positive effect on their attitude to the 
scheme. 
Thompson also found some support for the theory that effective communication 
leads to a more positive viewpoint and that organisations that involve employees in 
the design process leads to better perceptions of the scheme (Thompson 1992) 
This research will attempt to test on a number of these employee characteristics as 
follows: 
Hypothesis eight - EMPLOYEE CHARACTERISTICS 
Sub-hypothesis 8a - Trade union membership 
That there is no difference in perception of performance pay between trade unionists 
and non-trade unionists. 
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Sub-hypothesis 8b -Gender 
That there is no difference in attitude towards performance pay between men and 
women. 
Sub-hypothesis 8e -Age 
That the age of the employee does not affect the attitude towards performance pay 
Sub-hypothesis 8d - Level ofseniority 
That the seniority of an employee does not affect the attitude towards performance 
pay. 
Sub-hypothesis 8e - Employee rating 
That the personal ratings obtained under the scheme do not influence the attitude 
towards performance pay. 
Sub-hypothesis 8f- Length ofservice 
That the length of service of the employee does not influence the attitude towards 
performance pay. 
Suh- hypothesis 8g - Position in grade scale 
That the position in the grade scale does not influence the attitude towards 
performance pay. 
2.4.5- Group Pay systems 
We have seen that criticism of individual perfonnance pay schemes have been 
widespread both from the viewpoint of the recipients and from academic research. 
From another direction, developments in the way that organisations are managed 
would appear to give support to rewarding effective teams and team-working. After 
all, de-layering and other re-structuring processes have put a much greater emphasis 
on employees working together in teams. Alongside the structural changes, co­
operation and participation have very much the buzz-words of the 1990s. According 
to Smith (1992) , whereas individualp1erit pay has been found to be a demotivator, 
team bonuses pull staff together' 
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In itself, teamworking may not lead to improved productivity and motivation. Kinnie 
and Purcell (1998) found that: 
'Introducing teams can produce benefits, but there is also a danger of creating a 
vicious circle in which repetitive and closely monitored work leads to low morale and 
poor performance. It emerges that the key to explaining team performance is the way 
in which teams are introduced and the extent to which they are supported by 
appropriate HR policies and practices' (P34). 
Team pay can take a number offonns, relating principally to the size of the team. For 
whole business units, the format can be that of profit-sharing (Vaughan-Whitehead 
1995, Hanson and Watson 1990) or gainsharing (White 1979, Hattiangadi, 1998, IRS 
1996). For smaller section of the work force, they may take the form of group or team 
incentives. The objectives from management's viewpoints for all these schemes are 
essentially to motivate employees to work more effectively and identify with the 
organisation's strategy. A subsidiary aim is to save on costs when the company 
performs less successfully. Pendleton (1999) has expressed doubts whether such aims 
have any value. Firstly, he believes that employees have developed an effective trade­
off between effort and wages in their immediate job so that no amorphous profit­
related pay scheme could influence their decisions. Secondly, the vast majority of 
employees in practice see absolutely no link between their own effort and the 
performance of the organisation as a whole, especially where it is one of some size. 
On the other hand, Vaughan-Whitehead is conclusive that 'the empirical 
evidence....confirms the positive effects of fmancial participation schemes on the 
motivation and productivity ofworkers, as well as on organisational performance and 
innovation' (P25). 
Bell and Hanson (1984) reported evidence earlier of a correlation between employees' 
positive attitudes towards identification and commitment and the use of profit-sharing 
arrangements (including share save schemes). The effect may not be too great, 
however, especially over time (Dunn et al1991). The greater effects are where there 
are three conditions. Firstly, that real participation takes place alongside financial 
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participation; secondly, that the size of the rewards are significant; thirdly, that 
employees have to feel like owners (Pendleton, et a11998). 
American literature has shown an equally mixed set of results with the most extensive 
(Blasi et al 1996) finding that 'few of these studies have individually found strong and 
statistically significant effects of employee ownership on performance' (P63). 
Microsoft has reported a potential problem with their share option arrangements as a 
decline in share value would make rapid inroads into the remuneration of their 
employees to whom share options are a very sizeable proportion. 
In a detailed chapter on this whole subject, Hyman (2000) concludes that, in respect 
of Employee share ownership plan (ESOP) or similar schemes, positive behavioural 
effects takes place only when major shareholdings are involved. With small 
shareholdings, employees may appreciate the occasional bonuses that ensue and 
watch with interest the share price rises and falls but are unlikely to change their work 
rate or behaviour. Secondly, it has proved difficult to isolate the effects of profit­
sharing type schemes from a range of other progressive and participatory initiatives. 
Combinations of such initiatives including profit sharing and ESOPS do appear to 
have a synergistic benefit and it does give employees the feeling of a 'voice' . 
Thompson (1995) found few examples ofteam pay, reporting that the scarcity was 
due to two factors. Firstly, that organisations were seeking to develop and embed 
these working practices some time before they consider linking them to pay and 
secondly, management's general approach to remuneration was so 'ad hoc' that the 
reactive approach would not consider team pay as an approach, except by chance. 
This somewhat dismissive approach was not repeated by the IPD (1996) who found 
23 organisations who linked team performance and pay, mostly in the financial 
services, high-tech and pharmaceutical industries. The schemes normally operated in 
the same way as individual performance pay schemes but some variations exist. In the 
AA, the scheme is linked closely to a recognition scheme with league tables of team 
performances and prizes for successful teams. In Dartford Council, the targets set are 
those that are, in general, over and above the teams' normal duties and often targets 
that the team devise themselves to match in with the Council's overall strategy. For 
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Lloyds Bank, the payments are made arising from the 'service challenge', linked to a 
service quality index. 
Zingheim and Shuster (1995) also have found a variety of team-based schemes, with 
team goal-based incentives being tool most frequently used. Kinnie and Lowe (1998) 
found in their studies ofteams in seven organisations, that payment decisions were 
made particUlarly difficult by the conflicting demands of rewarding group and 
individual performance. 
One of the more common features ofteam pay is that the payments are made in 
vouchers or in non-cash, such as celebratory days out or holidays, prizes that resemble 
prizes from sales contests. 
Brown (1995) explains some specific problems associated with team pay: 
• 	 The 'social loafer' or 'free-rider' phenomenon, where recalcitrant individuals 
benefit from the efforts of their colleagues. 
• 	 The development of group norms which may impede individual and corporate 
performance, as demonstrated by the treatment of 'rate-busters' in the famous 
Hawthorne experiment. 
• 	 Individual perceptions ofnot being unable to affect col1ective performance. 
Pfeffer (1998) is not so convinced about the difficulties of the 'free-rider'. He found 
evidence from Dunlop and Weill (1996) that the extent of free riding is quite modest 
and that people generally co-operate instead. He retained strong belief in peer 
pressures and the social relations employees have with their work mates. 
In the Norwich Union scheme (IDS 1996) an attempt was made to address the 'social 
loafer' problem by excluding employees whose individual rating under the continuing 
performance management system, was a 6 (unacceptable). 
Research into factors that contribute to the success of team based pay have come out 
with different results. Brown (1995) found that senior management commitment, an 
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emphasis on communications, integration with other HR activities and shorter payout 
periods were crucial. The American Productivity centre (1987) centred on clear and 
shared objectives while Cooper (1992) found that a participative management style 
and employee favourability were the crucial element. 
There is strong evidence that maintaining the traditional reward systems alongside 
new team working methods of operation can present difficulties. Johnson (1993) in 
examining 35 organisations where team working existed, found that in 60% of the 
organisations, reward systems operated on a neutral or worse basis as a form of 
support for the team working. Johnson's recommendation was for the introduction of 
small-group incentive programmes producing a uniform reward. Saunier and Hawk 
(1994) report on a food products manufacturer which had embraced total quality 
management, created highly successful self-managing teams but then found a growing 
disconnection between the employees' expanded accountabilities and the way they 
were rewarded, resulting in the de-motivation of teams and employee dissatisfaction. 
Problems also can arise where teams become competitive as they may reduce their co­
operation. This occurred with Pearl Assurance's scheme (IDS 1994) and this 
produced some friction. The solution was to move a number of staff around the teams 
but this then had an effect upon team identity. A further problem was the difficulty of 
getting staff to grasp the concept of team performance. 
'Individuals tended to look predominantly at their own performance and their award 
expectations reflected this, rather than the performance oftheir chapter or 
department' (p3 0). 
Wright (1994) explains three additional difficulties. Firstly, the question of what 
makes up the team: 
'Take a practical example of trying to define a team in a retail banking environment. 
At first sight to choose the branch as a team may seem easy - a physically distinct 
group dedicated to service of a defined customer base (the account holders at the 
branch plus walk-in customers) But then consider the processes in servicing these 
customers. Loans are subject to agreement by staff at the customer service centre; 
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standing order payments are also set up there and any problems or mistakes are 
referred for resolution by this group. Teams of this sort are often like Russian dolls, 
one team fitting inside a larger one' (P2). 
The second difficulty relates to the varying types of team. She defines five groupings 
(Task Team, Work Team, ProgrammelProject Team Partnerships and ad hoc teams) 
all of which operate in a different way and where differing incentive systems need to 
operate. A potential reward system for such team definitions are explained in Saunier 
and Hawk (1994). 
The third difficulty is ensuring that high performers in the teams are recognised which 
she suggests should take place through varying base pay in broader salary bands. 
However, this must add a degree of divisiveness within the team unless the measures 
are robust. 
Mixing in rewards for individuals and teams is not uncommon. With SunExpress's 
scheme for Telesales operatives, 70% of incentive pay is based on the individual 
performance and 30% on team performance (Carrington 1995) 
Two informative but inconclusive research projects. (Markham 1988, Ivancevich 
1983) have examined the effect of the operation ofperforrnance pay schemes at the 
work group level. 
Finally, there has been some evidence of improved employee feedback from team­
based schemes, although this is anecdotal as no empirical study of true group-based 
scheme has been identified in this research. Morris (1995) reports that many of the 
teams in the Laboratory ofAlliant Health Systems reported improvements in the 
quality of their work life, co-operation and morale. The incentive arrangement 
organised in a pilot study helped to gain the attention of other work groups and 
encouraged them to form and develop new teams. 
No research has been found of employee perceptions of any the team pay schemes, 
certainly in the UK so the total evidence is incomplete. Commentators continue to 
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point to group payment schemes as options that could help to solve many of the 
criticisms of individual perfonnance pay schemes. 
For this research, a hypothesis has been set up to consider employees' views on team 
working: 
Hypothesis six - TEAM WORKING 
That paying performance pay on an individual basis works against the concept of 
team working. 
2.4.6 Opposition to the Concept and Practice of Performance pay 
The most strident opposition to performance pay has come from three sources. The 
first is the philosophical opposition led by the American academic, Alfie Kohn 
(1993), the second from the trade union movement on both sides of the Atlantic and 
the third from a group ofmostly academics, although joined by a small group of 
practitioners, who point to the vast number ofdifficulties involved in trying to get 
schemes to work in practice. 
Philosophical opposition 
In an influential article in the Harvard Business Review, Kohn, (1993), criticised the 
reliance upon rewards in business: 
'It is difficult to overstate the extent to which most managers and the people who 
advise them believe in the redemptive power of rewards. But more striking is the 
rarely examined beliefthat people will do a better job if they have been promised 
some sort of incentive (P54). 
Kohn grants that 'bribes' as he calls them, may obtain some initial success but claims 
that this shows itself almost inevitably as just a form oftemporary compliance. 'When 
it comes to producing lasting change in attitudes and behaviour, he claims that 
rewards, just like punishment, are strikingly ineffective. Incentives, he claims, do not 
change the commitment of the individual and, without that commitment, they can be 
no lasting change. 
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He goes on to detail six reasons why rewards fail. In common with Deming (1986) 
and Herzberg (1968), he believes that pay simply is not a motivator. He bases the 
claim on all the surveys that distinguish between the answers to the question 'what do 
you care about' where pay typically comes fifth or sixth. Secondly, he considers that 
rewards are manipulative and act as a punishment to those who do not receive them. 
Employees do not like to be manipulated and employees regard it as a punitive quality 
over time. Even when employees are 'caught doing something good and rewarded', 
he regards this an environment of employees being caught and not one that is 
conducive to exploration, learning and progress. 
His third reason is in respect of the damage done to relationships between employees. 
Especially in the case of individual performance pay, everybody is pressuring the 
system for individual gain and no one is improving for collective gain. Competing for 
rewards (especially where the budget is fixed or where there is a finite list ofwinners) 
is likely to destroy co-operation between individuals. The sometimes bitter disputes 
that exist at the boundaries of sales territories are a clear example of this problem. A 
further difficulty here is the way that relationships between employees and their 
supervisors or managers can deteriorate if rewards are withheld, even for justifiable 
reasons. Moreover, where rewards are based on assessments, the employees are 
tempted to conceal any difficulties they may have in order to get a good rating, rather 
than enter into a full and frank discussion with a view to joint problem-soling and 
personal development. 
A further criticism is that managers often use rewards as a replacement for managing 
effectively. 
'Treating workers well, providing useful feedback, social support and the room for 
self-determination is the essence of good management. On the other hand, dangling a 
bonus in front of employees and waiting for the result requires much less effort' (ibid, 
p61). 
Nor do rewards, he believes, do anything to help the ethos ofrisk-taking. Much 
against the protagonists of performance pay who believe that employees will take 
risks to reach their goals, Kalm believes the opposite. Employees, he reckons, will do 
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just what they are told to do if the reward is significant. In reality, the more employees 
think about the rewards they will miss if they are unsuccessful, the less inclined they 
will be to 'play hunches, or explore other alternatives' This is an interesting concept, 
turning the whole entrepreneurial culture theory on its head. 
The final reason he gives is that intrinsic motivation is the key to success and 
progress. You cannot buy an employee's interest in their job. They must like what 
they do and the more the manager stresses what an employee can earn for higher 
performance, the less interested that employee will be in the work itself. As he 
explains, the recipient of a reward may assume 'If they have to bribe me to do this 
job, it must be something I wouldn't want to do'. 
His article leans heavily on research carried out on motivation and incentives by, 
amongst others, Rich and Larson (1987), Freedman et al (1992) and Pearce (1987). 
The article received so much attention that a series of responses appeared the same 
year in the journal (Harvard Business Review 1993). Amongst the correspondents, G. 
Bennett Stewart could not see a world without praise, gold stars or incentives, seeing 
it as communism which was tried and it didn't work. The best incentive for anybody 
is to have a share of the action In this analogy, he quoted Churchill: 
'The virtue of communism is the equal sharing of its misery and vice of capitalism is 
the unequal sharing of its blessings' (P42) 
He does, however, believe that pay should differentiate and that poor performers 
should be 'weeded out' while the best 10% ofperformers should be promoted. 
Kohn's approach was replicated five years later in another Harvard Business Review 
article by Pfeffer (1998) who concluded that individual incentive pay undermined 
performance and encourages a short-term focus. His criticism is rounded on: 
'The economic model ofhuman behaviour widely taught in business schools and held 
to be true in the popular press. This model presumes that behaviour is rational ­
driven by the best information available at the time and designed to maximise the 
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individual's self-interest. .... .Ifpay is not contingent on performance, the theory goes, 
individuals will not devote sufficient attention and energy to their jobs' (pp112-3). 
He went on to show that reality did not support that theory. He quoted the results of 
several surveys showing individual performance pay to be ineffective and that 
schemes were constantly altered leading to the conclusion by conSUlting firm William 
M. Mercer that most such schemes absorb vast amount of management time and 
resources and make everybody unhappy. A further point he made was that 
emphasising pay as the primary reward encouraged people to come for the wrong 
reasons and would be less likely to stay. 
In the UK, there has been similar, if more muted, theoretical opposition. Williamson 
(1975) showed that, under his transaction costs theory, firms rationally choose 
seniority-based pay systems because the information and systems costs of specifying 
and monitoring individual performance contracts is too high. (It must be said, 
however, that computerised control systems have moved on since 1975). Evidence of 
race and gender bias were found in a two studies (Bevan and Thompson 1991 and 
Labour Research Department 1992). Thompson (1993) reported the demotivating 
aspects of 'yet another bureaucratic system imposed by corporate personnel' and the 
same author has commented that, as trust is so difficult to create and sustain and is 
fragile by nature, then frequent changes in payment systems may play its part in 
eroding mutual trust between management and employees (Thompson, 2000). 
Beery's (1996) criticisms are three-fold. The starting point for these criticisms is that 
there is a substantial transfer of risk from the organisation to the individual employee. 
This occurs in a number of ways. Firstly, by reducing the proportion of total 
guaranteed remuneration (base pay, benefits) in favour ofperformance bonuses and 
other payments that are contingent on measures of success. Secondly, progress in pay 
does not rely so much on length of service through traditional incremental systems but 
has shown tendencies to transfer to measures of behaviour or performance on broad­
banded salary scales which are less automatic and more responsive to management 
prerogatives and judgement on performance issues. The final increase in risk is 
because the measures used often generate uncertainty in that they may be subjective 
or susceptible to influences beyond the individual employee's control. He backs up 
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his views on the transfer of risk by pointing out the increased return to shareholders 
compared to pay increases to employees during the 1980s. 
His second major criticism concerns procedural justice and the scope for inconsistent 
treatment of employees: 
'Running through the model is an emphasis on contingent pay and the need to tie 
earnings to measures of performance valued by managers. It can be argued that the 
implementation of the model is likely to be characterised by actual or perceived 
injustice, both because pay is linked to performance measures which are only partially 
subject to employee control and because of the wide latitude allowed for managerial 
judgement' (p 60). 
The third major criticism specifically refers to the reduction of employee rights under 
new pay systems. The concept that pay must be strategic, reflecting the needs of the 
business, eliminate the pluralist viewpoint ofpay as a meeting point for competing but 
equally legitimate interests. He pours scorn on the fact that performance pay can help 
foster shared interests in the workplace through their power of communicating the 
realities of the organisation's position or of motivating employees to higher 
performance. 
Collinson's(1992) major criticism concerns the way that performance pay works 
against the integrationist approach to corporate culture. The payment of individual 
bonuses was divisive and eroded the sense of collective harmony, especially the 
reinforcement of individualistic pursuit of economic interest. 
Finally, the hopelessness of achieving overall success is expressed by Brown, quoted 
in McHale (1990), who believed that 'all material rewards suffer from the law of 
diminishing returns. Trying to satisfy individuals with material rewards is like trying 
to fill a bottomless pit'. 
Trade Union Opposition 
The introduction of performance pay has often been associated with opposition, quite 
strident at times, from trade unions. (Heery 2000) Studies have shown that the 
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presence of performance pay is inversely correlated with union recognition 
(Blanchflower and Oswald 1990, Freeman 1992, GuIUligle et al1998). Reery points 
out that: 
'This (form of) payment system expresses a new 'individualism' within the 
employment relationship and represents a sharp break with earlier forms of payment 
by results, which were integral to the pluralist industrial relations tradition (P64). 
So strong was the union opposition to the proposals for introducing performance pay 
from experienced teachers that the National Union of Teachers took out a successful 
court action in 2000 against the Department of Education and employment on the 
basis that insufficient consultation had taken place before the scheme was 
implemented. This resulted in a delay in introducing the payments(Mahoney. 2000). 
One of the major criticisms levelled by Marsden and French (1998) was that 
performance pay can demoralise the performance management system and cause it to 
dysfunction. In their study of the Employment Service, they commented on the 
extensive inflation (over 30%) ofjob placement figures, on which performance pay 
partly depended, arguing that 'performance pay had caused staff to lose faith in the 
relevance and legitimacy oftheir performance targets, seeing the exercise as more of a 
numbers game than an aid to job seekers' (P13). 
Unions, however, are not always in total opposition. In Swabe's (1989) case, the 
financial services organisation had faced many years of difficulty over payment 
systems with the union and, when they introduced performance pay, they took far 
more time and trouble to convert employees to the change of system and convince 
them that the system would be inherently fair and operated in an equitable manner. 
'This is an object lesson to management about rushing change unrealistically fast and 
trying to ensure that opposition is converted .... In such a way as to blunt its 
effectiveness. A cynic might say that the union had little choice in a climate that was 
increasingly hostile to unions, which must have had a psychological effect on both 
sides ..... Thus it was a sensible investment oftime from the employer's viewpoint to 
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negotiate the new system carefully and be prepared to modify its proposals in the light 
of informed comment and criticism by the union' (P19). 
In a sense, it is not too difficult to understand the comprehensive opposition by trade 
unions when the evidence is examined of de-recognition that has occurred when a 
number of schemes have been set up. (Petch 1990) Although management would 
deny that the reduction in union power is one of the aims in establishing a 
performance pay scheme, there is an admittance in some quarters that it has helped. In 
the IPD survey (IPD 1998) it was surprising that as many as 14% of respondents 
admitted that performance pay had helped to curb trade union influence. 
Critical approaches to the realities of performance pay 
For Lewis (1991), a set of pitfalls awaits the unwary practitioner. These include the 
. . 
subversion of the intended consequences by undermining the performance 
management process, the difficulties in effectively measuring behavioural factors and 
the error of central tendency in forced choice rating schemes. 
He is especially scornful of the system ofperformance pay introduced into 
Universities in the early 1990s, which subsequently had a very short life (Lewis 
1993). Among his 'Nine Lessons - but no songs of Praise' , he points out the 
difficulties of objective measuring of academic performance, especially as very few 
managers were ever trained in the complexities ofobjective setting and measuring. He 
goes on to point out the strong effect of external factors on performance, such as the 
difficulties faced by an academic charged with attracting external funds who finds this 
almost impossible due to the sudden economic downturn. 
Murlis (1988) explains the failure of an early Civil Service performance pay scheme 
on the 'selective, secretive and ostensibly arbitrary system imposed without the 
commitment of the top civil servants who had to implement it in their 
departments.' (P28) 
To Meyer (1975), it was no surprise that many employees were dissatisfied with 
performance pay as his research showed that employees consistently rated themselves 
highly with over 75% making the self-rating in the top 25%. The reality is that a large 
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group of employees are rated in the middle and only a small number of employees get 
more than or less than the average. Those who consider themselves to be better than 
the average but are rated as average will inevitably feel aggrieved. 
Critical approaches were found by Harris (200 1) to come from the line managers who 
were responsible for operating the scheme. Despite their wide support for the 
principle ofthe scheme, they saw a lack of congruence in the objectives of the scheme 
with little time allocated to them to invest in the perfonnance management 
programme or any ownership of the system. There was a strong belief that the 
schemes were imposed with a different set of objectives to those publicly stated. 
2.4.7 Success of Performance pay 
One of the most controversial areas associated with performance pay is the discussion 
on whether the system 'works'. Measures of success can attempt to be objective 
through correlating profit improvement with the introduction or development of the 
scheme. There are a number ofmajor disadvantages in this methodology. Firstly, it 
cannot, in effect, apply in the public sector or the not-for-profit sector. Secondly, and 
more important, the profit figure arises from a vast range of influences, both from 
macro effects (boom or recession in progress, rises or falls in interest rates, etc) or 
micro effects (new product launch, entry of competitor, change in pricing policy, fire 
in factory, etc.) The direct causal effect of a pay system on profits is difficult to argu.e, 
except in a large scale longitudinal survey which attempts to eliminate these variables. 
A second method, which can be empirical or descriptive, uses recipient response. This 
takes place by surveying those employees involved in the scheme - the management, 
human resources staff and the employees concemed- where attitudinal measures take 
place to assess the success or otherwise through the eyes of the players. 
The argument put forward for this approach is that performance pay is intended to 
increase motivation and perfonnance and, unless the recipients agree that such 
improvements have taken place, then the scheme cannot be deemed successful. On the 
other hand, it can be argued that the fact that recipients see a scheme as a success or 
failure does not mean that it is. To give a crude example, a loose bonus scheme that 
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provides major increases in pay may be judged a success by those in receipt of the 
bonuses but not by the accountants. Alternatively, a tight performance pay scheme 
which manages to eliminate inefficiencies in working practices, such as high overtime 
or long breaks, may be resented by a majority of employees but may bring longer­
term successful financial results. 
This chapter examines the research in terms of the effect ofperfonnance pay on 
'bottom line' results and other management measures of success. 
Do performance pay schemes result in improved 'bottom-line'? 
'Money begets money' 
John Ray. English Proverbs 1670 
Because of the measurement difficulties indicated above, there are very few research 
reports, with the exception of some isolated American studies, where a direct 
relationship is sought between performance pay schemes and organisational 
performance except around the area of executive pay. In many ways, this is rather 
strange as the whole long-term purpose of performance pay schemes is to improve 
organisational performance so why have so few research reports emerged on a 
conventional, all-employee performance pay scheme? Certainly the measurements are 
difficult and would be surrounded by a clutch of caveats but the lack of evidence is 
still rather strange. 
A clue could be the almost complete lack of evaluation that takes place on human 
resource issues. Unlike other disciplines, such as financial investment decisions or 
marketing, there appears to be a lack of will from both the responsible HR executives 
(and, one assumes the chief executive) to carry out a detailed, empirical evaluation of 
human resource initiatives to estimate whether a specific initiative has actually 
increased profits. This, of course, applies in the reward field and especially in 
performance pay areas. It is interesting that the 1998 IPD survey reported that 75% of 
companies carried out no evaluation at all into their performance pay scheme! (IPD 
1998). One organisation that made such an attempt was detailed in Swabe (1989) 
where their objective of constraining pay costs was achieved. 
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It is, however, possible to clearly identify a failure in a scheme. BT abandoned their 
particular form ofperformance pay in 1994 because it 'threatened to undermine the 
pay bill' (Taylor 1994). In essence, performance pay was adding to the salaries of its 
managers who were already being paid above the target range in comparison with its 
competitors. 
The American field studies have produced some mixed results. Cowen (1978) found 
that the introduction of a performance pay scheme produced the outcomes of reduced 
staff turnover and improved perceptions of the organisation as a high-paying 
employer. Kopelman and Reinharth (1982) researched schemes in branch offices ofa 
large financial organisation and found that the closer the tie between pay and 
performance the greater the improvement in performance. This supports the 
consultancy view that you need a tight 'line of sight' for such schemes to be 
successful. They also found that the larger the range of possible pay increase, the 
greater the performance a year or so later. 
So it is only in the field of executive pay where a comparatively large body of 
research has been carried out on the outcomes of performance pay schemes that some 
conclusions can be drawn. One has to add that the advantage of researching in this 
area is that the information is in the public domain, thanks to stock exchange 
reporting requirements and fieldwork is therefore not necessary. A research assistant 
working in the library on company reports can 'count the beans' . 
The results in this area are, again quite cloudy. American research by Milkovich and 
Gerhart (reported in Milkovich and Milkovich 1992), where they studied the pay of 
16,000 top and middle-level managers in 200 organisations, found that a 10% increase 
in the level of performance pay was associated with a 1.5% increase in return on 
assets the following year. They also found that the percentage of pay that was variable 
was more strongly related to profitability than was the level ofbase pay. In a later 
publication (Milkovich and Bloom 1995) they went as far as to say that if 48% of 
managers were on an incentive arrangement that could lift their pay by 20%, then the 
return on assets would rise by over 7%. The conclusion was that the pay strategy had 
a strong effect upon subsequent profitability. 
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Other American research findings are far less conclusive. Gomez-Mejia and 
Wiseman (1997) have identified over 300 studies covering the previous 70 years, 
many of which relate to the performance of the Chief Operating Officer (CEO) The 
results are very mixed indeed. For example, Jensen and Murphy (1990) expressed 
disappointment at the low pay-for-performance sensitivity of the chief executive's pay 
and the performance of the organisation. In other words, no matter how well or badly 
the organisation performed, the chief executive carried on receiving high bonuses. A 
later survey by Tosi et al (1998) found that less than 5% of the chief executive's pay 
appeared to be explained by performance factors. Berlet and Cravens (1991) study of 
executive pay in 163 US companies add to the dismal fmdings as they found that the 
relationship between executive pay and company financial performance was virtually 
random. Even Milkovich had to admit that results were mixed. He found that the pay­
performance link was influenced by the degree of business risk. Surprisingly, where 
the business context was risky, performance pay link did not seem to work well 
(Milkovich and Bloom 1995). 
A UK report (Buckingham, 1998) expressed scepticism at the performance pay for 
executives. It showed that, under most long-term incentive schemes, directors can 
expect to pick up the equivalent of25% of their base salary even iftheir company 
only just manages to make it to the midway performance against comparative 
organisations. She quotes Stuart Bell, research director ofPensions Investment 
Research Consultants: 
'The fmdings .. (ofthis research) .. contrast with best practice set out in the current 
DTI consultative document on directors' remuneration which recommends that 
boardroom pay should be strongly linked to performance and should be structured in a 
way that directors have a strong motivation to perform well. Most of the current 
performance targets do not represent world class performance. Setting the 
performance thresholds at these levels tells directors that average is good enough. 
They contribute little to incentivising individuals or enhancing competitiveness.' 
(P47). 
This view is shared by many commentators from the media. A leader commenting on 
the GuardianlImbucon 2000 survey (Guardian 2000), pointed out that boardroom 
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salaries increased by 16% which was not a 'reward for exceptional individual 
performance, since the vast majority of board members share in the annual harvest' 
(PI7). The leader went on to compare Britain's boardrooms with Premiership English 
football. 'Escalating salaries irrespective of performance, a disregard for public 
opinion, an increasing number of foreign players and no women' (P 17). 
Another method ofmeasuring success is to compare performance pay with other 
management initiatives. Locke et al (1980) exan1ined the effe.ctiveness of four of the 
most commonly used productivity programmes: pay for performance, goal setting, 
participation in decision-making and job enrichment. Comparing empirical studies 
that had been conducted for each programme, they found that the largest productivity 
increases came with pay-for-performance plans. When pay was provided for good 
performance, productivity increased on average by around 23%, compared with 
between 0.5% and 17% for the other three initiatives. However, this research is 
somewhat dated and refers mostly to traditional manufacturing incentive schemes. 
Looking at the whole area of linking the existence ofperformance pay and 
organisational performance, a large American survey (CARS 1994) found that 
organisations with performance-reward plans tend to perform better than their 
competitors. In detail, they have calculated that companies earned $2.34 for every 
$1.00 spent on the performance payout. Those with a higher pay-at-risk factor 
reported higher payouts, improved team working results and a greater impact on 
workforce output. They also found, however, that introducing such schemes carried 
risks and 12% had been terminated over the three years period studied and 30% were 
altered in line with changing business requirements. 
Finally, a reminder that advocates of the 'best practice' school have, almost without 
exception, included performance pay in the list of best practices that their research has 
shown to contribute to overall high organisational performance. (Pfeffer 1994, 
Huselid 1995, Storey 1992) although they have not extracted the specific contribution 
of performance pay. 
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This mixture of results is a difficult base on which to draw conclusions. Selectivity 
will inevitably affect the outcomes but the degree ofvariation is really quite extreme 
and not easy to explain. 
Other Management Measures of Success 
Although the information from the 1998 IPD survey (IPD 1998) was not backed by 
any empirical evidence, it provides interesting information of management's 
assessment of success under a number ofcriteria. This is reproduced as Table 5 
Table 5 1998 IPD survey 
Answers in response to question: What effect do you think your system ofperformance 
pay has had on the following: 
Effect on: Improves No change Worsens 
Employee Performance 74 26 0 
Delivering a clear message about the 69 27 4 
importance of organisational performance 
Rewarding employees in a way they think 57 29 14 
is fair 
Your ability to identify and get rid of 52 46 2 
poor performers 
Facilitating change in your organisation 41 54 5 
Employee commitment/loyalty 41 53 6 
Employee willingness to stay with your 35 60 5 
organisation 
Encouraging employees to suggest 28 68 5 
improvements and innovation 
Effective team working 28 59 13 
Curbing trade union influence on pay 14 84 3 
decisions 
IPD 1998, p4 
This management response is clear in a number of areas. Performance has improved 
in most cases and has not declined in any. The communication process is similarly 
clear cut. Elsewhere, however, it could be regarded as somewhat disappointing, given 
the nature of the survey (It is not certain whether the survey was anonymous - this 
could influence the degree of support for their own scheme registered by the 
respondent.) For example, one would have expected a very high response to the 
question on identifying poor performers as this is a major objective of most schemes. 
It is also a less than convincing response on facilitating change, despite the positive 
72 
response on communicating the importance of organisational perfonnance. Loyalty 
and retention reports are luke-wann while the issue of the conflict between individual 
and team working is set out in stark relief. When these results are broken down into 
public and private sector organisations, the public sector clearly shows a poorer result. 
In the area of the employer's perception of the employee's perception offaimess (It is 
not clear on what they base this information) 21 % ofpublic sector respondents 
believe that a deterioration has taken place compared to only 10% in the private 
sector. Similarly, perfonnance improvement overall is less in the public sector as is 
the encouragement of employees to suggest improvements and innovations (P6). 
On the other side of the coin, only 10% of all respondents are planning to abandon 
their scheme altogether, indicating that, for 90%, it must contain value to the 
organisation in some form or other. Again, one must stress that this was a response 
from HR practitioners who will have a considerable interest in the success of their 
current scheme. 
Overall, the research evidence of the returns to an organisation for investing in a 
performance pay scheme is equivocal. On the positive side, performance pay schemes 
in America have consistently given a fair relationship between employees' 
performance and their pay. (Daley 1987, Schay 1988). A number of studies have also 
shown that performance pay schemes are positively related to employees' satisfaction 
with payor their job. (Miceli and Near 1988, Bullock 1983) This must be put 
alongside most of the examples already given in some detail ofUK research where 
most employees have either a negative or neutral opinion of the value of the 
performance pay scheme. 
This chapter has examined research on the success or otherwise of performance pay 
schemes. In general, the conclusions from organisations is that they are successful. 
That is why most ofthem continue, sometimes with major revisions. However, 
schemes that have been abandoned are rarely reported or researched. \Vhere they are 
reported, such as a scheme in a Midlands Local authority (Stredwick 1997), the 
reason for its abandonment was the reduction of funds available when the recession 
took hold, rather than an inherent fault in the scheme itself. Certainly the management 
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views reported in the IPD research indicate considerable success for the organisation. 
Objective measures, as pointed out at the beginning, are more difficult to obtain. 
2.5 Conclusions on Literature Search 
The literature search has examined a wide range of issues relating to performance pay 
and the research questions. It has been made clear that there are varied and ambitious 
objectives for performance pay schemes, drawing on motivation and human resource 
theories. The measures of success, however, are difficult to justify and few 
organisations attempt to carry out an effective evaluation. 
Schemes are opposed from a variety of standpoints, including both practical and 
philosophical. A set of hypotheses has been developed from this model that cover the 
outcomes of performance pay which are summarised in Table 6. They deal with the 
issues of fairness, morale and commitment, motivation, cultural change, retention, 
employee characteristics and team working. The next chapter covers the methodology 
involved in attempting to test these hypotheses. 
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Table 6 Research Questions and Hypotheses 
Research Questions Hypotheses 
\\!hat are the reasons for No hypothesis 
organisations to introduce 
performance pay 
Does the introduction of Hypothesis one - FAIRNESS 
performance pay lead to a fairer That performance pay contributes to the objective ofdistributing 
system afpay distribution pay increases in line with employee contribution. 
Does performance pay increase Hypothesis two - MORALE AND COMMITMENT 
the level of employee morale in That performance pay contributes towards the objective of 
the organisation and thereby the increasing employee morale and commitment 
commitment of employees 
Does performance pay help to Hypothesis three - MOTIVATION 
motivate the workforce towards a 
higher level of performance and 
productivity 
That performance pay contributes to the objective ofmotivating 
the work force 
Does performance pay help to Hypothesis four ­ CULTURE CHANGE 
change the culture of the That performance pay contributes to the objective of instilling a 
organisation so that it becomes positive message about performance expectations and the 
more geared to improving achievement of company objectives which is recognised by the 
performance employees as a culture change 
Does performance pay assist in Hypothesis five - RETENTIONILOY AL TY 
retaining employees That performance pay contributes to the objective of offering a 
competitive salary and benefits package in comparison with rival 
companies in order to reduce staff turnover and attract a higher 
calibre of staff. 
Does performance pay, paid Hypothesis six - TEAM WORKING 
individually, harm or hinder team That paying performance pay on an individual basis works against 
working the concept of team working. 
Hypothesis seven - EXPECTATIONS AND REALITIES 
That experience of operating a performance pay scheme has a 
negative effect upon employees' perceptions ofthe scheme, 
compared with their expectations at the time when a scheme is 
introduced. 
Is it possible to identify Hypothesis eight - EMPLOYEE CHARACTERISTICS 
employees by specific 
characteristics who may be more Sub-hypothesis 8a ­ Trade union membership 
positive or negative towards That there is no difference in perception of performance pay 
performance pay between trade unionists and non-trade unionists. 
Sub-hypothesis 8b -Gender 
That there is no difference in attitude towards performance pay 
between men and women. 
Sub-hypothesis Be -Age 
That the age of the employee does not affect the attitude towards 
performance pay 
Sub-hypothesis 8d - Level ofseniority 
That the seniority of an employee does not affect the attitude 
towards performance pay. 
Sub-hypothesis 8e ­ Employee rating 
That the personal ratings obtained under the scheme do not 
influence the attitude towards performance pay. 
Sub-hypothesis Bf­ Length ofservice 
That the length of service of the employee does not influence the 
attitude towards performance pay. 
Sub- hypothesis Bg ­ Position in grade scale 
That the position in the grade scale does not influence the attitude 
towards performance pay. 
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CHAPTER 3 METHODOLOGY 
3.1 APPROACH TO CURRENT RESEARCH PROJECT 
The research method chosen was positivist-related with a single case study examined 
on a longitudinal basis, supported by evidence gathered from two additional case 
studies. The difficulties in adopting a positivist approach were recognised, such as 
low validity (Hussey and Hussey 1997), the doubts over causality (Milkovich and 
Milkovich 1992) and the problem of isolating variables (Heery and Warhurst 1994). 
However, the method was preferred over a phenomenological study which would lack 
empirical evidence, and which is liable to have selective findings, while often 
gathered together in a haphazard fashion to give credence to a fixed viewpoint. 
Data was obtained chiefly through an employee survey. The author accepted the 
viewpoint ofArrowsmith et al (2001) that: 
'Some may think that such surveys are a dubious basis for evaluation, generating as 
they do subjective attitude data rather than objective performance data. This is, 
however, a widely used procedure ........ and until there are objective measures of 

performance it seems to be the best that can be done' (p116) 
The organisation chosen for this thesis matched the portrait of a large organisation 
faced by the modem challenges of rapidly changing technologies, shorter cycle times 
and ever-demanding customers as detailed in the introduction to this thesis. This 
ensures that the research was relevant and topical. It would also fill the gap of a UK 
longitudinal survey in this subject area which is currently lacking. 
The primary research was supported by two cases where the organisation's 
underpinning philosophy and strategy on reward management was examined to 
understand better the reasons for the introduction of performance pay. The 
combination of these methods ensured a degree of triangulation. 
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In the case of Telecoms, infonnation in addition to the questionnaires was gathered 
through a selection of sources. Two extended interviews were held with the personnel 
Director, principally concerning the initiation of the performance pay scheme and the 
reasons the scheme in question was chosen. Twelve discussions took place with the 
Human Resources Manager and with the Human Resources Officer concerning the 
operation of the scheme and the organisation scenario. Meetings took place with a 
further 14 employees involved in the scheme; two ofwhom were managers, three 
were supervisors and the remainder a mix ofadministrative and installation 
employees. They were chosen at random by the human resource manager and took 
place in the period between the two questionnaires. These meetings varied in length 
from ten minutes to 45 minutes It was not intended that the interviews would yield 
empirical evidence but the aim was to achieve greater understanding of the differing 
viewpoints of the participants. The interviews took place in private. There were a 
number of opportunities provided on the questionnaires for employees to give their 
personal views. The fact that they did so in strong measure indicates the strength of 
feeling from many employees. One can almost hear them talking when reading their 
comments. 
A different methodological approach is made in the two prongs of the research. The 
next two chapters show how each approach took place. 
3.2 Methodology Specifics - Telecoms 
Choice of organisation 
In the introduction, six major changes that had a considerable affect upon modem 
organisations were described and it would be appropriate to choose an organisation 
for closer study which mirrored such changes. Telecoms was chosen for this reason. 
In terms of globalisation, it was jointly owned by British and German multinational 
companies and worked in a global market place. Telecommunication technologies 
have been subject to increasingly fast movements and the cycle times for systems 
have become much shorter. In fact, the organisation can be said to work on the 
leading edge of technology. Due to the competitive market place, customers can truly 
be said to be 'ever-demanding' as will be seen in the chapter dealing with the 
introduction to the organisation, where the requirements for installation and operation 
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were becoming increasingly tight. The organisation had, shortly before the research 
began, introduced a set of infonnal 'competencies' arising from their corporate values 
and were introducing substantial changes in the way that employees operated, such as 
annualised hours. 
Moreover, Telecoms appeared to have an integrated approach to business strategy, 
human resource management and reward management. There was also a clear line of 
sight between business strategy and the introduction of the perfonnance pay scheme. 
Access for a longitudinal study with two questionnaires was available. 
For all these reasons, Telecoms fitted the research requirements for the study 
Methods of testing the Hypotheses 
The methodology took courses of action. This involved the design and analysis of two 
completed questionnaires, which are set out in Appendix A and B. They were issued 
to a stratified sample of employees within one organisation based in Luton. 
Stratification was chosen as a sampling method to ensure that the sample was more 
closely representative of the population rather than using a simple random method, 
given that questionnaires could not be issued to all 1000 or employees, for reasons of 
cost, ability to process and organisation access (Rosenfeld et a11993). In the view of 
Gihari et al (1995) 
, Stratified random sampling can give higher precision with the same sample sizes or, 
alternatively, the same precision with a smaller sample. Stratified sampling can give 
separate results for each structure and it simplifies data collection' (P67). 
The starting point for the design ofthe questionnaire was that constructed by 
Thompson (1993) in his survey ofperfonnance pay in three maj or organisations. The 
aim was that results from the questionnaire would allow direct comparisons for a 
number of substantial sections. The comparisons are explained in the chapter on 
Findings. However, upon insistence of the human resource director ofTelecoms, the 
questions all had to be fonnulated in a positive way, unlike Thompson's, where a 
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number of the questions were of the reverse type. This change could have influenced 
the response style of the sample. A response style, according to Klimoski (1991) is: 
, .. the tendency by a respondent to choose a certain response category regardless of 
the item's content. Acquiescence response styles are characterised by persons who 
indicate a positive response to all statements in the scale. Sometimes the yea-sayers 
are distinguished from the nay-sayers who indicate a negative response to all 
questions' (p145). 
The most frequently recommended way to minimise this response set is to word some 
items positively and to word others negatively (Converse and Presser 1986). This 
supposedly forces the respondents to read all the items to discern their negative­
positive nature and, hopefully, their content. However, work by Schmitt and Stults 
(1985) drew attention to the fact that this practice may not work as intended in that the 
random reversing of questions can cause confusion and boredom resulting in 
contradictory returns, especially where the questionnaire is long and complex. 
There is no doubt that having all questions phrased in a positive or negative way 
provides ease of response for the recipients. It may, of course, provide a degree of 
polarisation, especially in the more negative of the responses. Klimoski (1991) 
recommends that the most effective way of avoiding or minimising this type of 
response bias is to maintain the motivation by keeping the questionnaire short and 
relevant. 
A second difference between the questionnaires was that there were more questions 
included relating to the effect ofperformance pay on team working. 
Both questionnaires followed the prescriptions of Czaja and Blair (1996) based on the 
work ofDillon (1978) in terms of, amongst others, logical progression, clear and 
unambiguous questions, free from jargon, avoiding 'leading' questions and 
appropriate length. 
The questionnaire was piloted with two groups of students at Luton Business School 
in. One was a group of Human Resource students and another was a group of 
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Diploma in Management Studies students. This pilot led to a change in wording for a 
number of questions, a reduction in the total number of questions and a change in 
order of some of the chapters, together with a few minor modifications. 
It would have been preferable to carry out a pilot at another establishment, as 
recommended by Yin (1994) who considers that 'the pilot case study can be so 
important that more resources may be devoted to this phase of the research than to the 
collection of data from any of the actual cases' (P74). 
The first part of the study was carried out in 1994and consisted of a 3-part 
questionnaire (see Appendix 1) issued to 20% of the Telecoms employees covering 
the whole country (excluding the sales force) This had a return rate of 55% giving 105 
usable questionnaires. The stratified sample matched the Company's employee 
structure. The first section asked for ratings and views on the briefing on the new 
performance pay scheme by management. In the second section, a 7 point Lickert 
scale was used to ask employees the extent to which they agreed with a list of 
statements (ranging from strongly agree - rank 1 to strongly disagree - rank 7) 
concerning their expectations of the scheme. The third section identified personal 
characteristics of the respondents, such as age, union membership and job grade. 
The second part of this longitudinal study was carried out in 1995 after the scheme 
had been operating for approximately a year and the first payments had been 
announced. It consisted of a questionnaire (see Appendix 2) with a similar structure, 
again issued to 20% of the employees. The samples were not identical employees but 
the analysis of their characteristics was almost identical in the form of a matched 
sample. The return rate was slightly higher at 58%, giving 119 usable questionnaires. 
The first chapter of the questionnaire asked for ratings and views on the following 
areas: 
(a) The performance management system that underpinned the performance pay 
scheme. 
(b) The outcomes for the individuals including the ratings and salary increases. 
(c) The method of communication of the outcomes. 
80 
The second section dealt with the matching set of questions on the Lickert scale as in 

the first questionnaire with expectations changed to realities. Two additional aspects 

of employee's perceptions were investigated in this second questionnaire. Firstly, a 

question was asked dealing with the option of returning to the old salary structure. 

Secondly, the questions on team working were made slightly more pointed and 

specific. The third section repeated the personal characteristics identification method. 

Opportunities were given to the respondents to comment in various chapters on 

particular aspects or on the scheme in general. A very large number of comments 

were made and few questionnaires were received without one comment or another. 

The questions were grouped into several scales (details are shown in chapter 3.3) 

relating to the hypotheses. They followed, in general, Thompson's divisions although 

there were some adjustments, which took into account the views of the organisation 

and the need to keep the questionnaire length within reasonable bounds. 

Additional gathering of evidence 

Alongside testing these hypotheses, additional important areas investigated included: 

+ 	Employees' detailed perception of the scheme itself, of the method of introduction 
and of the performance management system that underpinned the payment scheme 
+ 	The effect of age, sex, job level, union membership, length of service and 

satisfaction with briefing on the employees' perception of the scheme and its 

effectiveness. 

A1l of these investigations add to the limited UK research evidence in these areas. 
3.3 Reliability Analysis 
The questions in the main body of the questionnaires were grouped into clusters of 
items dealing with similar issues relevant to the specific hypotheses and a Reliability 
analysis (using SPSS) was conducted to generate a statistic on each scale. This is 
called the alpha coefficient, which is a measure of the internal consistency of the 
scale. It is generally recommended that a scale should have an alpha coefficient of 0.7 
or greater if it is to be used in comparing groups of respondents (Thompson 1993). 
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The scales used and the alpha coefficient for the combined answers from both 
questionnaires are shown in Table 7 with appropriate comments on each scale results. 
Table 7 Reliability analysis 
Scale 1 FAIRNESS ALPHA- 0.91 
Before Mter 
Q14 Q19 1 believe that the performance standards against which I will be (I 
am) measured are relevant to my job 
Q17 Q22 Performance pay will be (has been) implemented fairly in my 
department 
Q25 Q30 My Performance pay targets are objective and measurable 
Q26 Q31 The performance measures under which I will be (I have been) 
assessed are realistic and achievable. 
Q32 The Job Grading exercise was carried out fairly 
Q35 Q40 My manager will know (knows) enough about my work to give me 
an accurate assessment. 
Notes 
• 	 Question 32 was only asked in the 'before' questionnaire. The justification for this 
action was that it, if it were to be asked in the second questionnaire, it would be 
some time distant in the employee's memory (around 18 months). In retrospect, 
this could be regarded as an error. Major decisions, such as job grading, probably 
do not fade from employees' minds and it would have been interesting to examine 
if, in retrospect, the perceptions of fairness in regard to the job grading exercise 
improved or deteriorated over time. 
• 	 The Alpha coefficient of 0.91 showed a very high degree of reliability 
Scale 2 Relationship with Manager Alpha = 0.81 
Before After 
QI0 Q15 I am confident that my manager will take (has taken) the Objective 
setting very seriously 
Qll Q16 My manager is good at giving me feedback on my performance 
Q20 Q25 My performance pay targets are objective and measurable (My 
manager has measured my performance effectively) 
Q31 Q36 1 expect to receive (1 receive) regular feedback from my manager 
concerning my progress towards agreed targets and objectives 
Notes 
• 	 The Alpha Coefficient at 0.81 showed a high degree of reliability. 
• 	 With questions 31136 excluded, the figure would have risen to 0.85 indicating the 
wide variety of response on the issue ofregular feedback and the major 
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differences between what was expected and the reality of the first years' 
operation. 
Scale 3 Motivation Alpha = 0.93 
Before After 
Q7 Q12 	 Performance pay will give me (has given me) a greater incentive to 
get my work priorities right 
Q8 Q13 Performance pay will give me (has given me) the incentive to work 
beyond the immediate requirements of the job 
Q13 Q18 Performance pay will raise (has raised) motivation in general 
Q16 Q21 Performance pay will increase (increases) the quality of 
employees' work 
Q23 Q28 Performance pay will encourage (has encouraged) me to give a 
sustained performance at work 
Q29 Q34 Performance pay will raise (has raised) my motivation at work 
Q30 Q35 Performance pay will help (has helped) employees' morale in 
general 
Notes 
• Another high alpha coefficient at 0.93 indicates a very high degree of reliability 
consistent across all the questions 
Scale 4 Culture Change Alpha = 0.60 
Before After 
Q21 Q26 Performance pay will help (has helped) to change the culture of 
the Company for the better 
Q27 Q32 Performance pay will stimulate (has stimulated) more discussion 
between managers and employees regarding performance 
Note 
• This is a poor alpha coefficient indicating a low degree of reliability. The fact that 
there were only two questions asked can have an effect on the reliability 
especially if they approach the subject from different viewpoints. The fust 
question (21126)is a direct question on culture but the second one (27/32) is 
directed at the communication issue. It can be argued that the improvement in 
communication processes so that it becomes freer and more open is a strong 
indicator of a changed culture. This is certainly what the company is hoping and 
expecting. However, such an improvement in the context of a performance 
management process can also be regarded as a function on the individual 
relationships with managers and this may dilute the response in terms of a cultural 
83 
change. In other words, Q27/32 could have been included in Scale 2 instead. 
(Interestingly, the mean scores for this question are almost exactly the mean 
overall score for the Relationship with Manager scale) It has to be said that the 
reliability score does throw some doubts on conclusions that could be drawn over 
Hypothesis 4 concerning cultural changes. 
Scale 5 Scale of Payment 
Before After 
19 24 I believe that the financial incentive of PERFORMANCE PAY is 
too small to motivate employees 
Note 
It As this was a single item, an Alpha cannot be calculated. 
Scale 6 Satisfaction with Pay 
Before After 
18 23 My existing pay is a fair reward for the work I do 
Note 
• 	 As this was a single item, an Alpha cannot be calculated. 
Scale 7 Principle of Performance pay Alpha = 0.59 
Before After 
9 14 (I have found that) The principle of relating pay to performance is 
a good one 
34 39 Performance pay will mean (has meant) that good work is 
recognised and rewarded 
Note 
• 	 Only two questions came in this scale, the same as in the Thompson (1993) 
questionnaire. The first question is very clear and to the point. The second was 
inserted as a reflection of the principle without stating it. In retrospect, the second 
question refers more to the practical implications of performance pay and what it 
has meant in that particular organisation, rather than talking about the principle in 
isolation. For an individual, whether one holds a principle or not is influenced by 
the experience of the implications of operating that principle in practice, but it is 
still possible to remain steadfast on a principle although realising that it may not 
:1 
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be appropriate in practice. This would explain the variations in the answers on this 
scale and the poor alpha result. 
Scale 8 Team working Alpha = 0.61 
Before After 
12 17 It will be easier to work together with other employees if we 
receive the same rewards under performance pay (The perfonnance 
of the team would improve ifwe were all paid an identical sum of 
money under perfonnance pay rather than different individual 
payments) 
15 20 It is important that performance pay rewards my individual 
contribution 
22 27 There is no clash between performance pay rewarding me as an 
individual and getting me to work together with the rest ofthe 
team. 
24 29 It is important that performance pay rewards good teamworking as 
one of its objectives 
28 33 Performance pay will foster (has fostered) good working 
relationships with other members of the department team. 
33 38 Performance pay will help (has helped) the department to work 
together as a team 
Note 
The alpha result provides some apparent lack of reliability. This is partly because of 
the contradictions in employees' attitudes towards teamworking and pay that will be 
explored later and partly because of the insertion of statement 15/20. It could be 
argued that this statement should have been phrased in the negative fonn in the sense 
that paying for the individual contribution is the opposite of paying for the team 
contribution. If it had phrased in the negative format (It is not important that my 
individual contribution is recognised), then it is highly likely that the result would 
have be an average score in the region of 4.00, although this is conjecture. With such 
a result, the Alpha score for this scale would have risen to 0.70.An alternative 
approach is to treat this question as a reverse one and calculate the Alpha score 
appropriately. Taking this approach, the Alpha score calculates as 0.69. The alpha 
score here reflects the apparent contradictions and also the variety of conflicting 
responses from individuals, some ofwhom are in favour of both individual 
performance pay and team working - a circle that is difficult to square. These aspects 
are discussed further in the analysis ofresults. 
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3.4 Methodology Specifics -Case studies of Merck, Sharp and Dohme and David 
Webster Group 
As the ancillary part of this research, studies were made of organisations that operated 
different types of performance pay schemes. These organisations were chosen as they 
operated in different sectors, and provided a variety of performance pay schemes. The 
first organisation was faced by the changes detailed in the introduction ­
globalisation, ever-demanding customers, changing technology and shorter cycles, 
new competencies and changing employee methods ofoperation. In the case of David 
Webster group, globalisation and shorter cycles did not apply but the other facets 
were present. 
The information for these case studies came from a number of sources. The author 
had worked as Head of Personnel for the David Webster group from 1989 to 1992 and 
was deeply involved in the reward strategy. Information on the performance pay 
scheme was gathered during this period through many meetings with street lighting 
operators, their supervisors and managers of the 13 depots. Observations took place 
on more than 20 occasions during this time, the author spending a total of five 
complete days assisting the crew as part ofhis orientation programme. The author 
attended negotiating meetings with representatives of the operatives on five 
occasions. He also helped to set up training for new operators on the workings of the 
performance pay scheme, especially when new contracts were won and schemes 
appropriate set up. The updated information for the publication was obtained through 
a series of interviews with the Chairman (David Webster) and the Managing Director, 
supported by documentation over a number ofyears. 
In the case of Merck, Sharp and Dohrne, the data was gathered through a series of six 
interviews with the Human Resources Director and the Manager, Compensation and 
Benefits, supported by a considerable amount of internal documentation. 
The main area examined in this part of the research relates to the objectives of 
introducing performance pay. Multiple case designs have distinct advantages in 
comparison with single-case designs (Yin 1994). The evidence from multiple cases is 
often considered more compelling and the overall study is therefore regarded as being 
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more robust. The benefits of the replication of results are also recognised (Hersen & 
Barlow 1976). 
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CHAPTER 4 - FINDINGS 1 Objectives of Performance Pay - Cases 
Findings have been divided into two sections. The first part (Chapter four) examines 
the reasons why organisations have introduced performance pay. Here, the main case 
study, Telecoms, has been augmented with two further studies, namely Merck, Sharp 
and Dohrne and David Webster Ltd. The reason for choosing these organisations will 
be given first followed by a short background to each of these organisations in 4.2 to 
4.4. The chapter will conclude with an analysis relating to research question one, the 
objectives of performance pay. The subject of the second part of the findings (Chapter 
five) is an analysis of the quantitative data from Telecoms addressing the research 
questions two to eight. 
4.1 Justification for choosing these Cases 
Each of these cases has a strong bearing on the introduction and operation of 
performance pay as part of a coherent reward strategy. The Merck, Sharp and Dohme 
case shows how the traditional job-evaluated salary structure for managers had to 
change to a more flexible system, incorporating broader salary bands and where 
performance had a far greater influence on salary determination. Here, the influence 
of 'New Pay' (Shuster and Zingheim 1992) thinking was evident. In the David 
Webster case, the introduction ofnew styles and systems of performance pay is at the 
heart of their human resources strategy and, in fact, has a considerable influence on 
their profitability and ability to win work from the public sector. For Telecoms, the 
introduction of performance pay was part of a raft of human resource initiatives 
introduced to support the organisation's drive to successfully meet the demands ofa 
rapidly expanding market in telecommunication services. 
The cases chosen operate in the manufacturing sector (Merck, Sharp and Dohme) and 
in the service sector (David Webster and Telecoms) while the latter organisation 
represents the SME sector compared with the larger operations ofthe former two 
organisations. Taking the three case studies together gives a broad and varied view of 
the role ofperformance pay and has supported the concept ofmultiple sources of 
evidence (Yin 1994). 
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The first two cases have been the subject of published articles and the full text has 
been set out in Appendices 5 and 6. 
4.2 Background to the cases 
4.2.1 Merck, Sharp and Dohme 
Merck, Sharp and Dohme Ltd is a wholly-owned subsidiary of the US based 
company, which is one of the world's leading pharmaceutical companies operating in 
every major market throughout the world with a very strong market position in 
Europe. There are around 1,500 UK employees in a number of sites with the Head 
Office based in the Home counties. It is not unionised, although joint consultative 
committees discuss points ofmutual interest. 
In view of the huge sums invested in research and development, centralised control is 
more common in the pharmaceutical industry and this has been reflected in company 
policy on reward management. Together with training/development, Merck,Sharp and 
Dohme has always regarded reward systems as key areas ofhuman resources and has 
put them at the heart of their integrated corporate systems. Employee appraisal, job 
evaluation and pay detennination mechanisms are established at the US headquarters 
and cascaded through the various subsidiaries world-wide. Therefore, managers 
operating in, say, France have been appraised and rewarded under the same system as 
in the UK. 
For over 20 years until the mid 1990s, the main determinant of salary levels was the 
Hay job evaluation scheme but successive audits of the scheme's operations in the 
early 1990s showed that difficulties related to the application of the scheme had 
begun to surface. There were two main problems. Firstly, it was becoming 
increasingly difficult to align the scheme successfully across America and Europe. 
During the 1990s, the economic circumstances in America had been markedly 
different from Europe. Their recession had been earlier and was not so deep as that 
occurring in Europe. Even within Europe at that time, economic circumstances varied 
greatly between, say Britain, where unemployment had been rising steeply for two 
years, and Germany where their steep rise had yet to begin. These differences, 
accentuated by currency fluctuations, were reflected in the job market and the salaries 
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required to attract the right calibre individuals. Itwas becoming impossible to 
encompass all of these varying cases in one all-embracing scheme. 
Allied with this problem in the operational and administrative grades was the problem 
ofwork flexibility. As employees' jobs were increasingly being stretched due to 
reduced headcount, team working, mechanisation and computerisation, the rigidity of 
the Hay evaluation scheme was placing strains on work patterns. There was also a 
growing demand for re-evaluation ofjobs which was proving unsettling. 
The final problem was the growing difficulties of switching jobs. The era of de­
layering had started (although on a low-key basis) and some employees whose jobs 
had been redefined or re-engineered, were being offered alternative jobs. More 
commonly, employees developing their careers were considering and being offered 
jobs seen as 'lateral' moves by the company. In a number of cases, employees were 
refusing jobs that carried fewer Hay points (say, from 588 to 571) even though the 
salary and other benefits were identical or even better. The rigidity of the Hay scheme 
became a barrier. Problems with international transfers between America and Europe 
or within Europe came into the same category. When the market pressures were added 
to these problems then it became impossible to operate an efficient salary structure 
inside a narrow banded scheme 
The outcome was the replacement of the centralised Hay scheme with a much looser 
and locally determined broad-banded salary structure in 1994. Rather than salaries 
being increased due to service or job design changes, the movement of an individual's 
salary up the salary band became determined by the performance of the individual, as 
measured by a new performance management system. This emphasised the adoption 
of company-specific skills and competencies as well as the achievement of individual 
objectives. 
Additional incentives that have been put in place are an annual bonus, arising from a 
'pot of gold', a system described in chapter 2.3.4. The amount of money available was 
determined by the Board, in line with the overall organisational performance. The 
sum of money was then cascaded down to the operating companies and units and 
distributed according to the individual's performance, based on the ratings provided 
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by the performance management scheme. The employee guide to this scheme makes 
it clear that the criteria for bonus distribution within one unit may be different from 
another unit because each will have different business requirements. 
The second incentive method is that of stock options, an area which has been 
discussed only in passing (Section 2.4.5) in this research. The organisation saw this 
method as one that increases the employees' commitment to the organisation which 
will apply as long as the stock continues to rise in value over the medium and long 
term. They 'align individual employees more closely with the company's corporate 
goals no matter how far removed they may feel that their contribution to these goals 
may be' (MSD 1994, p8). 
The case demonstrates a major switch from a traditional reward policy to one that is 
geared to rewarding performance. 
4.2.2 David Webster Ltd 
David Webster Ltd was founded in the early 1960s as a street lighting contractor in a 
buy-out by David Webster from a family connected building contracting business. Its 
early years were spent erecting new street lighting units for a number of Councils but, 
in 1966, the company won the first contract awarded to a private contractor to 
maintain the entire street lighting for a local authority (Hatfield District Council) 
which was extended soon after to the whole of Hertfordshire. 
By the time the Compulsory Competitive Tendering (CCT) legislation was passed in 
the 1980s, the company had grown to 200 employees with a turnover in excess of £10 
million. CCT provided the opportunity to tender for contracts on a nation-wide basis 
and a number of substantial contracts were won, doubling the size of the organisation 
by the early 1990s. 
From very early days David Webster had realised that the traditional local authority 
pay system operating prior to the introduction of CCT was inappropriate for his 
method of operation. Under the local authority system, terms and conditions were 
negotiated nationally by local authority unions to cover a wide range of employees in 
a variety of services. In the interests of equity, employees working in street cleaning, 
91 
cemeteries, grounds landscaping, etc. would be on the same conditions and their pay 
would be detennined by the national grading system. Hours of work, breaks, 
allowances and manning levels were closely prescribed. Overtime was endemic. 
Supervising the work and verifying the reasons given for poor perfonnance was not 
easy, as the operatives were spread over a wide area and often without communication 
to their base. Bonus schemes were occasionally tried by some authorities but were 
generally unsuccessful due to slack targets arising from tough union negotiations, 
disputes over allowances and the causes of delays and faults, the attraction of 
overtime vis-a.-vis bonuses and artificial bonus ceilings. 
Schemes were therefore difficult to agree, difficult to operate fairly, open to 
manipulation and unlikely to motivate. It was clear to David Webster that a system 
where lighting operatives were working on fixed hours, to a flat wage, with a fall back 
overtime system and a closely defined job met only the requirements of the routine, 
predictable operations of a closed community. It did not fit the requirements of the 
flexible, profit-seeking, CCT environment in which David Webster worked. 
A new perfonnance pay scheme was implemented in the late 1970s to remedy these 
faults. This gave the opportunity to earn very high perfonnance pay but basic rates 
were reduced and fixed hours of work, overtime and allowances were abandoned. 
Individuals and teams earned bonuses by reducing the time and cost of carrying out 
work. They can achieve this by organising their time and energy more effectively 
A summary of the differences between the David Webster Ltd scheme and a typical 
local authority arrangement is shown in Table 8. 
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Table 8 

Comparing traditional Local Authority terms and conditions with David 

Webster scheme 

TRADITIONAL WORKING PRACTICES DAVID WEBSTER SCHEME 
Fixed hours of work No fixed hours 
Fixed loading and unloading times No loading or unloading times 
Fixed breaks No fixed breaks 
Two men teams Team size to fit job requirement 
High basic wage Low basic wage 
No bonus scheme Bonus scheme a key factor 
Overtime endemic No overtime 
No movement between contracts Movement between contracts as required 
No penalties for poor quality Penalties for quality 
Generous sick pay Limited sick pay 
Involvement limited Involvement crucial 
Just ajob More like a small business 
4.2.3 Telecoms 
Telecoms is a major player in the sales and service of communication technology, 
including telephone, fax, voice data and video-conferencing both in the UK and 
abroad dealing with around 40,000 customers. 1200 staff were at the time employed 
throughout the UK with the Head Office in the Home Counties. It was jointly owned 
by two multinational publicly quoted companies. 
The company was formed as a result of a number of mergers over the last 10 years 
and, by 1994, had the experience and expertise of a number ofcompanies brought 
under one name but with very different styles and cultures. At that time, it recognised 
that morale amongst employees was low. This came about for a number of reasons: 
+ 	Resulting from the mergers was a series of redundancy exercises, some of which 
were compulsory leaving a strong element of survivor syndrome 
+ 	 In 1993, the company appointed a new Managing Director who implemented a 
number of significant strategic directional changes, unsettling employees , 
particularly those with long service. 
+ 	The recession had taken its toll in the business area resulting in the company 
posting a loss in 1992 and 1993. Pay increases in these years were minimal. 
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• 	 During the period of the mergers, there had been some informal and unpredictable 
rationalising of terms and conditions where some long-standing benefits had been 
removed in what was regarded as an arbitrary fashion. 
Recognising this situation, the Board instituted a set of fundamental changes in the 
human resources area, enshrined in a new set ofvalues easily recognisable in human 
resource management terms. 
* The customer comes first 
* Total commitment to quality 
* Empowerment and responsibility 
* Teamwork makes a winning team 
* Communication is open and honest 
* Recognition and reward for individual merit 
To drive these values home, a number of initiatives were implemented. Customer 
Care courses were undertaken for all staff. Sales and service support staff were 
interchanged so a mutual understanding of their needs were achieved. BS5700 
accreditation company-wide was achieved. Company communications were 
overhauled to improve the system of direct communication. Employee attitude 
surveys were instigated. A further reduction in managerial/supervisory jobs took place 
associated with the creation of empowered work-teams who would take over some of 
the plarming and quality roles previously undertaken by managers and supervisors. 
In view of the losses incurred in previous years and the increasingly global 
competitive nature of their business, the overall improvement in employee 
performance was seen as the most major priority. An effective pay system was seen as 
the reinforcer of this concept which would need at its heart firstly, a revamped job 
evaluation scheme encompassing all employees, secondly, a revised and robust 
performance management scheme based on the new values and finally a form of 
performance pay. The job evaluation process took place during the early part of 1994 
and integrated a set of overlapping and contradictory grading structures in the pre­
merged companies into one broad-banded nine grade structure covering all employees 
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below board level. Allowing for appeals (which were few) this was introduced by the 
middle of 1994 with general acceptance. 
The objectives that the executive management team (including the head ofhuman 
resources) set for the performance management system and performance pay when 
formally introducing the scheme were as follows: 
Objective 1 To distribute pay increases in line with employee contribution 
Objective 2 To increase employee morale and commitment 
Objective3 To motivate the work force by letting them have influence over 
their achievement of targets and thereby having an influence on 
their financial rewards. 
Objective 4 To instil a positive message about performance expectations and 
the achievement of company objectives for the good of all 
thereby making employees feel more secure with the company. 
Objective 5 To focus attention on increased company results and profits. 
Objective 6 To offer a competitive salary and benefits package in comparison 
with rival companies in order to reduce staff turnover and attract 
a higher calibre of staff. 
4.3 Case studies and the Objectives of Performance pay 
4.3.1 Introduction 
Each of the case studies has utilised reward strategies to help the organisation to 
achieve its business objectives, including the need to encourage behaviours such as 
increased flexibility, acceptance ofmore risk and becoming more customer-oriented. 
Both Merck, Sharp and Dohme and David Webster Ltd. have moved away from well­
established 'best practice' job evaluation systems to more fluid contingent pay 
systems which provide a better 'fit' for the organisational needs. 
4.3.2 Operational Objectives 
Control 
In the case of David Webster Ltd, one of the major aims of introducing the bonus 
d" 
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scheme was to produce tight individual control over the employees. In a typical local 
authority scheme, work would be allocated to the employees, but they could produce 
any number of excuses why that work was not completed, such as bad weather, 
difficult environment or the complexity of the jobs. The more the jobs were strung 
out, the more opportunities for overtime presented themselves. It was not easy for 
management to counter their claims by detailed inspection ofeach of the jobs without 
excessive costs and time, as the jobs could stretch over 150 miles in a day. 
Having a bonus payment for each job allowed increased control to be operated. 
Moreover, if work was claimed that was not, in fact, carried out (such as cleaning and 
basic maintenance) then this became a more serious offence under the incentive 
scheme. Employees were, clearly, obtaining money (bonus) dishonestly and would be 
dismissed. Without a performance pay scheme, if work was claimed by the operative 
that had not actually been carried out, it could be regarded more as a clerical error and 
would be likely to be forgiven more easily. Experience showed that the number of 
complaints from customers over work charged by David Webster Ltd that had not 
been carried out dropped substantially once the bonus scheme was introduced. It was 
simply not worth the risk to the employee to get their facts wrong or to make 
fraudulent claims. 
Employees do not always take kindly to methods of control. In their summary of 
research into real work practices, Noon and Blyton (1997) have analysed the four 
main methods employed by alienated employees to regulate the work practices and 
reassert control over their working day. The research described in these 'survival 
strategies' (p 140) are divided into 'Making out' (manipulating he incentive scheme, 
taking unofficial rests, see Burawoy 1979), Fiddling (petty pilfering, inventing 
expenses and cheating in incentive schemes - See Mars, 1982, for his imaginative 
typography of Donkeys, Wolves, Hawkes and Vultures in this context), Joking (with 
colleagues and against management, see Spradley and Mann 1975) and Sabotage 
(stopping assembly lines, damaging stock, ensuring the need for additional re-work 
and overtime, see Taylor and Walton 1971). 
One notable element of detail at Merck, Sharp and Dohme is the control exercised 

through the underpinning performance management scheme where there is a 'fixed 
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distribution' of ratings. Managers have to divide employees into a 'TF' group (top 
five per cent), 'TQ' (top quartile), and 'LF' (lower five per cent). This system 
identifies and differentiates the weaker performers, providing information that may 
not be forthcoming without such forced choice, given management's known 
preference towards the centralist tendency. The element of control is that the 
organisation can use such information in decision-taking for such areas as transfers, 
redundancy and career planning. 
Communication 
F or all three organisations, the performance pay system provided a vehicle for 
communicating the organisation's strategic intent. At David Webster Ltd, this is 
demonstrated in the whole process of contract awarding and operation. The awarding 
of contracts was subject to intense competition and the prices and systems of 
operation were unique to each local authority contract. When contracts are won, the 
performance pay system was adjusted to the needs of that contract and the prices 
agreed for specific tasks with the authority, such as lamp erection, cleaning and basic 
maintenance. This was then communicated to the employees within the short window 
of time available (2-4 weeks) between the contract success announcement and the 
commencement of the contract. The communication process was intense and involved 
a certain degree ofminor negotiation over detail. To the employees, the needs of the 
contract were of considerable interest as it needed to operate well from the start to 
create a base firm base for winning the renewal after two to six years and because it 
provided the base for the construction oftheir potential earnings. The link between the 
performance pay scheme and the organisation's objectives of operating effectively 
and retaining the contract was therefore quite clear. 
Within Merck, Sharp and Dohme, the communication ofthe reward strategy and the 
specific incentive arrangements were part and parcel of the communication of a 
revised global strategy. From thinking globally and acting globally, the transition has 
moved to thinking globally and acting more locally. The importance of this revision is 
demonstrated in the production of a communication document called the 'Reward 
handbook', which sets out the reasoning behind the reward strategy and how it 
operates in detail. The workings of the incentive packages are clearly shown in the 
document, where the emphasis on linking individual reward to team and 
s 
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organisational performance is clearly communicated. 
For Telecoms, there was a clear indication oftop-down communication by focusing 
attention on increased company results and profits (objective five) and by ensuring 
that the new values are embedded in the performance management system. 
Recruiting and retaining employees 
For Merck, Sharp and Dohme, the changeover in their reward strategy, especially the 
move to broad-banding, was made to ensure an improved career development path for 
employees and to try to stop them moving on. The performance pay element plays a 
part here, if perhaps of less importance. Firstly, the effect of stock options makes 
them work as a form of 'golden handcuffs' as the options can, of course, only be 
exercised by employees, not ex-employees. Secondly, the annual payment based on 
organisational performance has a marginal effect in stopping employees leaving 
during the year, although there has been a certain exit of employees after the bonuses 
have been announced and paid. The organisation was clearly aware of these 
considerations: 
'By providing a competitive compensation opportunity compared to other companies. 
MSD aims to attract the best available talent ....... and keep the good people we have' 
Pay, Bonus and Stock Options: an Employee Guide (1994) p6. 
Certainly for David Webster Ltd, the operation of the bonus scheme is seen as a 
device to encourage employees to join and to stay. Where contracts are won from 
existing Local Authority Direct Work forces, those employees have the right under 
TUPE (Transfer of Undertakings Protection of employees regulations) to be offered a 
position with David Webster Ltd on their existing terms and conditions which cannot 
be altered for some months. The policy ofDavid Webster Ltd is to offer such 
employees the choice to continue under existing conditions, (which tend to be the 
traditional terms or those agreed by national agreement) or to transfer to the David 
Webster Ltd scheme of working. The Chief Executive provided information to the 
effect that 85% of such employees agreed to change over within three months of 
transferring to David Webster Ltd, even to the extent oflosing out on the Local 
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Authority Pension Scheme. 
Evidence also came from the human resources director at Telecoms that the objective 
of recruitment and retention of key staff (objective six) was a vital element in the 
highly competitive world of bidding for trained telecommunication staff. 
Effectiveness 
The direct relationship between a performance pay scheme and the effective 
achievement of corporate objectives is shown to its best effects in David Webster Ltd 
in that the performance pay scheme is so directly linked to the prices agreed and 
systems operated under local authority contracts. If performance rises, employees 
receive more money, the overheads are covered quicker and the profit margins on the 
contracts rise - the connection is a very direct one. 
Table 9 Summary of Research questions - OperationalObjectives 
Merck, Sharp and David Webster Telecoms 
Dohme Ltd 
Control Slight element in Strong feature No espoused 
PM system overall intention 
Communication Medium feature of Strong feature for Clear intention to 
overall employees to use perfonnance 
communication understand pay through 
programme organisation's cascaded targets 
strategy arising out of the 
organisation's 
results 
Recruit and Medium element, Medium element, Clearly articulated 
Retain especially retention especially where 
TUPE applies 
Effectiveness Slight element, Very strong feature Small element 
strong at senior overall 
level 
The summary shown in Table 9 indicates that the specific objectives of performance 
pay schemes apply at a particularly strong level with the David Webster scheme while 
less so with the other two organisations. 
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4.3.3 Cultural Objectives 
Trust and Openness 
The clearest indication of the objective of improving trust and openness shows itself 
in the David Webster Ltd scheme. Under the performance pay scheme, employees 
have been given the freedom to start and finish work when they like, take breaks 
when they like and, within limits, follow the work route of their own choosing. In 
return, they are obligated to look after their vehicle carefully, including keeping it 
presentable at all times, and report on their work claims with meticulous accuracy. 
Where that trust is found to be broken, for example, where false claims have been 
made are treated with the utmost severity. 
The 0 bj ective of improving openness is similarly indicated by the sharing of the facts 
on contracts that have been won and by a reasonable degree of financial openness 
through the publication of the organisation's profit and loss account, despite being a 
private organisation. 
The 'pot of gold' annual bonus system at Merck, Sharp and Dohme has provided the 
background for a more open approach to sharing organisational performance, 
especially as the distribution is in line with unit and team performance. The move 
onto broad-banding, although only loosely connected with the bonus arrangement, has 
the intention of leading to fewer confrontational appeals against grading while the 
enhanced performance management process intended greater discussions between 
managers and their employees as to where their performance could or should be 
leading them. 
Drive and motivation 
There is no doubt that increased drive and motivation was the key objective behind 
the David Webster Ltd scheme. As described in the background information, the 
concept has been to encourage employees to work smarter and more efficiently, to 
overcome problems and build successful relationships with the client local authority. 
In effect, the objective was for employees to see themselves as mini-contractors, 
running their own business in their own area with the drive and energy shown by such 
entrepreneurial ambitions. 
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Merck, Sharp and Dohme's aim was more long term in this area. 'Rewarding 
perfonnance through our compensation programme encourages all employees to 
contribute at a high level and to continuously enhance their ability to do so through 
developing knowledge and skills' (MSD 1994, p6). They did not expect immediate 
changes in attitude or drive but an evolutionary approach reflecting the subtle changes 
occurring in the pharmaceutical industry as the pace of drug development increases 
and the industry consolidates. 
The intention of using rewards to encourage motivation was articulated from the early 
announcement of the scheme. Where the market had become highly competitive, it 
became vital for employees to be motivated to overcome any contractual difficulties 
and meet, or exceed, customer needs. The generation of the specific values on 
customer care and quality and the rewarding of achievements in these competencies 
were linked specifically to the concept of improving overall motivation. 
Cultural Change 
Through all three cases runs the stream of attempting to engage employees in the 
cultural change process. The cultural change at David Webster Ltd. from a traditional 
Local Authority culture to an entrepreneurial private sector culture has been set out 
earlier. The payment system plays an absolutely crucial part in such a change, 
encouraging employees to think and act differently. One contract, namely the 
maintenance of lighting for London Docklands, stands out to epitomise this 
fundamental change. The contract was won on the basis ofwork being carried out by 
four operators working out of an established small depot in Ilford. The plan was to 
transfer two experienced operators, who lived close to the Docklands, onto the 
contract a recruit a further two operators. In the first couple of weeks, the two 
operators offered to try to carry out all the contract work themselves, keeping the 
specialist vehicle in a secure unit close to their homes and returning to the depot to 
. stock up once or twice a week. 
They had calculated the benefits they could achieve under the perfonnance pay 
scheme to work in this way, even though they knew it would involve working 60 or 
more hours a week, with a typical summer day commencing at 4.00am and finishing 
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at 8.00pm. This way of working was accepted by management on a three months trial 
basis with very careful monitoring of quality standards and, when it proved successful 
to both the client and the organisation, it was allowed to continue indefinitely. The 
two operators earned in excess of £40,000 in the first year and the contract was run at 
a healthy profit. The two operators, not surprising, opted out of the 48 hours 
maximum working under the Working Time Directive. They adopted the behaviours 
of entrepreneurs of small businesses - looking for viable short-cuts, testing the quality 
standards of the client and backtracking very quickly when they realised that they had 
gone too far and never missing a day's work, getting their families to help with the 
paper work at weekends. 
One of the biggest elements of cultural change emphasised in the Merck, Sharp and 
Dohme scheme is the change from expectation of automatic salary increase to one of 
risk-sharing. 'Employees share the positive results of the best years and also the 
leaner times when results are not so strong ....Salary increases aren't automatic: they 
must be earned and they do not automatically occur with every review' (MSD 1994, 
pl-2). Alongside this, is the switch from the conventionally rooted Hay Job evaluation 
scheme to Broad-banding where the degree of salary increase is increasingly related 
to performance, not the job title that an employee possesses. 'The fully trained ... 
employee may not only be performing competently but adding additional value and 
going beyond what the position requires and their pay should reflect this' (Ibid, p3) 
In the changes in reward systems at Telecoms was associated with a raft of other HR 
initiatives which attempted to change the culture towards one of achievement and 
performance. 
Fairness 
The concept of fairness does not appear at the forefront of the Merck, Sharp and 
Dohme system. The word is not mentioned in their employee guide, except in the 
concept of the difficulties in calculating a 'fair reward' for teams that may be 
international in membership and go across different profit centres. Nor did the word 
resonate in discussions with senior HR executives. Their concern with moving away 
from the traditional Hay job evaluation, which had always stressed the internal equity, 
and moving more towards market comparisons and salary stances would lead to a 
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playing down of the idea of 'fairness'. They were aware that the awarding of bonuses, 
especially the decisions on who would be awarded stock options, could never be 
regarded as universally fair. 
For David Webster, Ltd., the fairness of the scheme has been stressed in the context of 
allowing high perfonners to earn more money, rather than the fairness of the detail. In 
fact, many arguments have taken place at meetings with scheme representatives on 
some of the scheme details and their fairness, to which he author has had access. For 
example, whether allowances should be given for the erection or servicing of lamp 
posts on footpaths where their vehicle has no access. Posts and materials have to be 
carried by hand, sometimes over 100 yards and work has to be carried out from 
ladders. The jobs take longer and are more awkward and tiring. Management's 
responses have generally been related to the prices agreed with the authority and, in 
many cases, these jobs are not differentiated in the contracts so the answer has been 
negative. They recognise this is unfair but point out that other simple work will make 
up for these exceptions. They would also try to share such work around where 
possible. Holding back claims for allowances is also an important strategic objective 
because negotiators at most levels realise that the acceptance of allowances on one 
issue generally lead to further claims on other issues. 
Paying in line with employee contribution was the one of the central values for 
Telecoms and this was interpreted by management as a fairer way of rewarding 
employees than by reference to their job or service. 
A summary of the findings relating to cultural objectives is shown in Table 10. 
Table 10 Summary ofResearch questions - Cultural Objectives 
Merck, Sharp and David Webster Ltd Telecoms 
Dohme 
Trust and Moderate Important element in Some element through 
Openness association sharing contractual devolvement of target setting 
information 
Drive and Long-term intention Vital element in scheme Clearly articulated 
Motivation 
Cultural change Important element- Vital element in change Present - allied to other HR 
move to risk- from local authority initiatives 
sharing culture. 
Fairness Little or no Important as a generally Interpreted as paying in line 
emphasis concept to reward high with employee contribution 
performers 
d 
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CHAPTER 5 - FINDINGS- 2 TELECOMS 
5.1 Addressing Research Questions 2-8 Outcomes of Performance Pay 
This chapter examines the quantitative research carried out at Telecoms in the light of 
the research questions 2-8. Firstly the details of the performance pay scheme is set 
out, including the operation of the performance management scheme and the 
conversion ofperforrnance into pay outcomes. The results of the questionnaire are 
then explained and their relation to the research questions and hypotheses. 
5.2 Telecoms' Performance Management Scheme 
We have seen throughout the literature review that the performance management 
process underpins the whole performance pay system. Performance management 
schemes usually fall into one of two camps; they are either those based on the 
achievement of a set of objectives, measurable or subjective; alternatively, they are 
behaviourally based, measuring competencies (Hartle 1995). This is often 
conceptualised into a debate over whether the organisation should be measuring 
inputs (competencies) or outputs (objectives). 
Outputs have a longer history and a clearer 'raison d'etre' steeped in goal theory. We 
have seen in the literature survey that researchers, starting from Locke (1968) have 
concluded that, under the right conditions, the setting of goals leads to the 
improvement of performance. This assumes that the right conditions have been met, 
including the acceptability of the goals and the tmderlying commitment of the 
employees. This result is principally achieved because the goals: 
• direct the attention of the employee to what needs to be achieved 
• mobilise the effort put in by the employee 
• increase the persistence of the employee in their desire to reach their goal 
• influence them to think carefully about the right strategies to be employed. 
Objectives, however, can be beset with problems (Armstrong 1999). Amongst other 
difficulties, they encourage a narrow focus, they can reduce co-operation, they are 
often difficult to define and measure accurately and it is difficult to decide whether 
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they should be over and above an employee's normal job or simply extracted from 
their normal work requirements. 
Competencies have had a shorter life but have increasingly been incorporated into 
performance management frameworks to encourage employees to adopt the 
behaviours required by the organisation, which should lead to higher performance. 
They have been increasingly adopted in the service sector where the importance of 
social skills (dealing with clients, caring for people, customer oriented activities) is 
paramount. As Thompson (2000) explains: 
'The growing significance of these attributes has given rise to the term 'aesthetic 
labour' to describe these forms of service sector employment. Furthermore, because 
these skills are not conventional, there have been problems in describing and 
understanding their development. This has given rise to a greater interest in 
competencies and the measurement of softer skills through competency-based 
approaches' (P141). 
These competencies become even more important as the concept of 'jobs' changes. It 
has moved into the analysis of work processes and associated skills, where the focus 
is on what employees need to be able to do in order to make the work processes as a 
whole perform smoothly, rather than an individual's job description. (Lawler 1994) 
Since the early 1990s, mixed models ofperformance management combining 
objectives and competencies have emerged. According to Hartle (1995) they 
'represent a more powerful and longer-lasting approach to performance management 
by assessing and rewarding what employees actually do and how they do it.' (P 105) 
The scheme chosen by Telecoms aimed to incorporate the best ofboth types of 
scheme by being a mixed model. 
Concerning objectives, all employees agreed a set ofobjectives (maximum of 5) with 
their managers prior to the start of the review period based on required performance 
improvement or revenue targets. These are sometimes referred to as 'Hard targets'. 
Some of the objectives may refer to team results. It was the responsibility of the 
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management of each unit to ensure that all objectives were complementary both in 
ternlS of the unit's targets but also in relation to the target of any other unit where 
there is an operational or support lin1e At the end of the review period, achievement 
of the objectives were measured and a percentage rating produced indicating the 
extent to which objectives were achieved. For example, an employee whose 
objectives were assessed as 85% completed would have a rating of 85. 
Concerning competencies, the scheme established a mechanism to measure an 
employee's 'contribution', often referred to as the 'Soft targets'. This was based on a 
set of five 'values', namely those referring to the customers' needs, quality, 
empowerment, teamwork and communication. An example ofthe rating system 
(Appendix 3) sets out the series of definitions that indicate the possible performance 
levels that can be achieved. The Manager decided which series best describes the 
employee concerned on the scale of 1-5. The rating from the five values is totalled 
and then multiplied by four to give a rating out of a maximum 100. 
In bringing together the two measures, It was recognised that the achievement of 
objectives is vital in higher graded positions but less so in lower grades. For this 
reason, there was weighting between the two measures, shown in Table 11. 
Table 11 WEIGHTING OF ASSESSMENT RATINGS 
Grade Rating for Objectives Rating for Contribution 
1-3 25% 75% 
4-6 75% 25% 
7-9 85% 15% 
Grades 1-3 were the lower grades, often with high exposure to customers, so 
competencies (which Telecoms called 'contribution') had a higher weighting. For 
management grades 7-9, the achievement of results is paramount so objectives have 
much higher weighting. An example of a fmal rating for a grade 2 employee with a 
rating of 60 for objectives and 80 for contribution would be: 
Objectives: 25% of 60 = 15 
Contribution: 75% Of 80 = 60 
Final rating = 75 
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Effective feedback was considered a key feature and managers were instructed to 
carry this out at three stages. Firstly, at the start of the review period; secondly, to 
agree objectives after 6 months, where progress would be reviewed and a plan 
established for any actions necessary to assist in improving results and, finally, at the 
end of the period when all the measurement and assessment has taken place so a full 
discussion of the outcomes can take place with the employee. 
Consultation with the unions took place in July 1994 and Managers were briefed 
shortly after. All managers were given a refresher course in Effective Objective 
Setting. They were responsible for briefing their own staff by October 1st with the use 
of a briefing pack. The period of operation of the scheme began in August 1994 and 
the implementation of the first payment under performance pay took place in April 
1995. 
5.3 Conversion of Performance into Pay 

Salary determination in the first year of operation took effect through the Salary 

Review Matrix (Table 12) where salary increases ranged from zero (low performers) 

to 8% for high performers on the lower 25% of their pay band. 

Table 12 Salary Review Matrix - Telecoms 
Pay increases awarded at end of first year of performance pay scheme operation 
POSITION IN PAY BAND 
RATING Base to 25% 25%-50% 50%-75% 75% to top 
limit 
86-100 6-8% 4-6% 2-4% Note 1 
71-85 4-6% 2-4% 0-2% Zero 
56-70 2-4% 0-2% Zero Zero 
41-55 0-2% Zero Zero Zero 
0-41 Zero Zero Zero Zero 
Note 1 Hlgh performmg employees at the top of theII scale recelve an mcrease equal to the average 
percentage cost of the review. 
The underpinning philosophy of the pay matrix was to take account not only of the 
performance of the employee over the current year but also their existing salary in 
their grade. A pay grade, for example, could start at £12,000 and rise to £18,000. An 
employee's position on this grade had traditionally been determined by their service 
on an incremental basis and they could rise to the top of the scale within a period of 
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six to 10 years. In the late 1980s, however, the automatic nature of the progression 
had been blurred with authority given to the line manager for the pay increase to be 
withheld if performance was considered to be insufficient to warrant a further move 
up the scale. This could be especially in the light of the position and performance of 
colleagues carrying out the same or similar jobs. At the same time, employees whose 
performance had been considered especially good could be awarded a double 
increment. It was the uncertain, non-transparent and subjective nature of such 
decisions taken by local managers that influenced the move to introduce a well­
documented, more objective performance pay scheme. There had been a number of 
complaints concerning the distributive justice of such an arrangement where 
employees appeared to have been given pem1anent awards based on flimsy evidence. 
There was also a smaller number of cases of awards being withheld, especially for 
employees in the higher position in their grade, for reasons they did not accept. 
In constructing the matrix, the strong view held was that employees in the upper part 
of their grade, who were already being paid as high performers, should only receive 
an increase if they maintained that level of performance. A payment in excess of the 
'going rate' which would move them further up the grade (the grade boundaries 
would be increased by the going rate, of course, at the time of each general salary 
review) could only be justified by performance in excess of that currently warranting 
their position. 
For example, take an employee in the grade where salaries ranged from £12,000 to 
£ 18,000, whose salary was £13,000. This would put them in the Base to 25% bracket 
in their grade. Their position indicated that they were currently performing below 
average, perhaps because oflack of experience or their age. Let us assume that their 
performance rating' at the end of the year was 75. The resulting pay increase award 
would be between 4% and 6%, which would be above the average increase and move 
them up the grade. Another employee in that grade who was earning £17,000 (in the 
bracket 75% to top limit) on the same performance rating of75 would not receive a 
pay increase at all. That is because their current salary position indicated that of a top 
performer whereas the actual performance of 75 did not. 
J 
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This system meant, in effect, that two employees rated at the same perfonnance 
would receive widely varying pay increases. Although fully justified in the minds of 
the scheme creators and fully understood by most of the managers operating the 
scheme, this system still subsequently caused some negative reactions when salary 
increases were announced, as the 'Findings' chapter will indicate. 
At the end of the first year of operation, when all the ratings were carried out and the 
moderation process by HR staff and senior management completed, the average rating 
was calculated as 81 and the average pay increase was 3.3%. 
5.4 The way the questionnaire findings are set out 
There are a number of elements to the research findings. The first one deals with the 
question of how the realities of the scheme match up with employees' expectations 
(Hypothesis 7). This is dealt with in section 5.5. The second element examines the 
employees' perception on the first year's working of the scheme and how they met the 
objectives set by the organisation, which is where the hypotheses 1 to 6 are tested. 
This is covered in Section 5.6. The analysis of the principle ofperfonnance pay is 
covered in 5.7 while the consideration of whether perfonnance pay should be 
abandoned is dealt with in 5.8. The examination of whether employees' perceptions 
vary with the characteristics of the groups, (hypotheses 8) such as the sex, age, job 
role and whether employees are members ofa union or not, is covered in 5.9. 
The statistical results are set out in the following way. Table 13 is a summary of the 
Lickert seven point scale questions divided into a set of groups representing the 
hypotheses to be tested. 
The groups consist of: 
• Fairness/ Relationship with Manager Hypothesis 1 
• Motivation/commitment Hypothesis 2 and 3 
• Cultural change Hypothesis 4 
• Retention and loyalty Hypothesis 5 
• Team working Hypothesis 6 
d 
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Table 13 Results from questionnaires, before and after- Telecoms 
Question Scales Question numbers Mean scores 
Before After Before After 
Scale 1 Fairness 14 19 4.58 3.65 
17 22 4.60 4.06 
25 30 3.96 3.61 
26 31 4.36 3.54 
32 4.53 
35 40 4.34 3.69 
Fairness :Average 4.39 3.70 
Scale 2. Relationship with 10 15 3.35 3.22 
Manager 
11 16 4.26 4.10 
20 25 4.21 3.87 
31 36 2.98 4.69 
Relationship average 3.70 3.82 
Scale 3. Motivation 7 12 4.49 4.42 
8 13 4.66 4.79 
13 18 5.00 4.84 
16 21 4.88 4.35 
23 28 4.40 4.34 
30 35 5.49 5.20 
29 34 5.03 4.66 
Motivation Average 4.89 4.66 
Scale 4.Performance Pay and 21 26 4.93 4.92 
Cultural Change 
27 32 3.80 3.76 
Cultural Change Average 4.36 4.34 
Scale 5 Scale of Payment 19 24 3.70* 3.16* 
Scale 6. Satisfaction with Pay 18 23 4.93 4.56 
Scale 7. Principle of Performance 9 14 3.49 3.48 
Pay 
34 39 4.53 4.30 
Principle Average 4.01 3.85 
Scale 8. Teamwork 12 17 3.92 4.24 
15 20 2.47 2.25 
22 27 4.09 3.32 
24 29 2.80 2.48 
28 33 4.92 4.63 
33 38 4.76 4.48 
9. Return to previous system 37 4.12 
Table 13 shows a summary ofthe comparison of the results!! before!! Performance 
pay was introduced with" after". Except where indicated by a * , the lower the 
mean score, the more positive the response to Performance pay. Where means 
are below the midpoint score of 4 this indicates some degree of support for the 
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scheme and where they are above a score of 4, this indicates a degree of 
opposition. Other tables referring to specific questions are incorporated in the 
following text. 
Where specific questions are referred to, they are indicated by the number on the first 
questionnaire followed by the number on the second questionnaire, i.e. (20/25). Table 
13 has been is inserted at this point as a reference summary of the results of the 
questionnaire. 
5.5. Hypothesis 7 Expectations and Realties 
That experience ofoperating a performance pay scheme has a negative effect upon 
employees' perceptions of the scheme, compared with their expectations at the time 
when a scheme is introduced. 
In the scenario where a company has a new product to sell to its employees, it must 
take care that it balances the need to convince with enthusiasm and the danger of 
falsely raising hopes. A company that effectively oversells the benefits will, as with 
any other product in the commercial world, be faced with dissatisfied and angry 
customers. Dashed high hopes can easily lead to reduced morale. 
There is no doubt that the recent history ofmergers, redundancies, the effects of the 
recession and the lack of current profitability had taken its toll with respect to morale 
in the organisation. Expectations of the scheme were not high. The initial response 
from the first questionnaire was dispiriting with average scores for "Motivation", 
"Culture change" and "Fairness" well over the midpoint of 4. 
The change by the time of the second questionnaire was significant. In particular, in 
the case of "Fairness'" the average had reduced from 4.39 to 3.70 reflecting 
substantial improvements in the ratings allied to the operation of the performance 
management scheme (setting objectives, measuring results, accuracy, etc.) Some of 
the initial doubt is this area seems to have been dispelled. The training that took place 
for managers would have influenced this situation. Good examples here were 
Q14/Q17 (1 believe that the performance standards against which I will be measured 
are relevant to my job), which improved from 4.58 to 3.65 and Q26/31 (The 
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performance measures under which I will be assessed are realistic and achievable) 
which improved from 4.36 to 3.54. Relevance, realism and achievability are key 
features of good objectives as Locke (1968) has made clear. Similarly, Q35/Q40 
improved results showed that the managers knew more about their employees' work 
than they expected. 
The improvements in practice were further supported by the overall reaction to their 
own ratings on the performance management scheme as set out in Table 14. 
Table 14 
Employees' reaction to their own rating under the performance management scheme 
(Questionnaire 2) 
Very fair Fair Uncertain Unfair Very unfair N average 
Score 1 2 3 4 5 
Q4 Contribution 15 50 30 7 4 106 2.39 
Q5 Objectives 12 59 22 13 3 109 2.4~ 
Ql Overall 16 51 30 12 7 116 2.50 
Over 50% of the respondents regarded the ratings as fair or very fair compared to less 
than 20% who regarded them as unfair. The particular question on interim feedback 
(Q 31/36), (part of the 'Relationship' scale) however, showed the reverse trend with a 
major swing from 2.98 to 4.69. This indicated a deep disappointment with the degree 
of feedback from that expected when the scheme started. There were other 
improvements but these were not so dramatic. Motivation improved from 4.89 to 
4.66, Pay satisfaction from 4.93 to 4.56, Principle of performance pay from 4.01 to 
3.85 while Culture change altered little. 
By only examining the movement of the ratings (the absolute values will be examined 
in the next sections), it appears that employees have been rather pleased with the 
scheme in reality. It has not been as bad as they feared. 
A further question is whether the operation ofthe scheme has created any tendencies 
towards polarisation. In other words, has it produced stronger views as to both pro- or 
anti the scheme. This would show up in the level of standard deviation as set out in 
Table 15. 
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Table 15 Standard Deviations for scales - before and after questionnaires 
Scale Before After questionnaire 
questionnaire 
Fairness 1.67 1.53 
Relation 1.40 1.46 
Motivation 1.38 1.40 
Cultural change 1.28 1.45 
Scale of payment 1.74 1.65 ' 
(reverse) 
Pay satisfaction 1.74 1.74 
Principle 1.64 1.51 
The results offer little inclination towards polarisation. Rises have occurred under 
cultural change where experience of the scheme may have influenc'ed employees to 
believe more strongly that performance pay either does assist such changes or does 
not. On the other hand, standard deviation for 'Fairness' has declined indicating that 
there is less clarity in employees' views. When this is considered alongside a more 
positive score overall, it would indicate that the more strongly held views of a number 
of negative employees may have mellowed. However, as will be seen later, this 
appears to be contradicted by the cluster analysis. 
It can be concluded, then that the results ofthe two questionnaires do not support 
hypothesis seven. Employees have an improved perception ofthe scheme after it has 
operatedfor one year. The Hypothesis is rejected.. 
5.6 Addressing the Individual Hypotheses on Outcomes 
5.6.1 Hypothesis 1- Fairness 
That performance pay contributes to the objective ofdistributing pay increases in 
line with employee contribution. 
Performance pay has often been identified by its promoters as a 'Fairer' way of 
rewarding employees, replacing a 'rate for the job' which reflects in no way the effort, 
interest, competence or, ultimately, the contribution of the employee. It has also been 
the basis of much criticism from trade unions, as set out in the literature survey, such 
as the NUT's campaign against performance pay in education. 
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Fairness, in Equity theory terms, is a matter of acting in accordance with the 
principles of distributive and procedural justice. It has been argued by Jacques (1961) 
that it should go a stage further and be seen to be fair in accordance with the 'felt-fair' 
principle. His theory was based on four assumptions: 
• 	 That there is an unrecognised standard of fair payment for any level of work. 
• 	 Unconscious knowledge of the standard is shared amongst the population at work. 
• 	 To be felt fair, it must be believed that pay matches the level of work and the 
capacity of individuals to do it. 
• 	 People feel that pay is unfair when they receive less than they deserve by 
comparison with their fellow employees. 
Jacques's work was based very much on an industrial setting where much of the work 
was similar and where comparisons could be easier than in an administrative or 
service environment, such as Telecoms. So, although agreement on the assumptions is 
not difficult, identifying such matters as an 'unrecognised standard' and 'unconscious 
knowledge' is far from easy in a specific situation. 
The fairness test will depend on the result of a number of factors for each individual. 
In this research, the evidence has been divided into two parts. Firstly, the ratings 
given to the 'fairness' and 'manager' questions by employees. The result overall in 
the Telecoms research (see Table 16) combining the 'Fairness' and 'Manager' 
questions gives a positive result by the end of the first year (3.82) but scarcely one of 
resounding enthusiasm. It matches the results obtained in the Thompson (1993) 
survey closely. It was a little more positive on 'Fairness' and less on 'Manager'. 
In the case of the 'manager' questions, it was the poor result from Q31136 (concerning 
the expectation of regular feedback from the manager),which moved from 2.98 to 
4.69, that greatly influenced the result. This feedback did not take place as expected 
and, without such feedback, much of the real value of a performance management 
scheme is taken away. If this had matched the expectation before the scheme began, 
then the 'manager' scorings in total would have looked respectable and an 
improvement on Thompson's. This indicates the variable nature of the training 
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Table 16 Scales for Fairness and Relation with Manager 
Question Scales Question numbers Mean scores 
Before After Before After 
Scale 1 Fairness 14 19 4.58 3.65 
17 22 4.60 4.06 
25 30 3.96 3.61 
26 31 4.36 3.54 
32 4.53 
35 40 4.34 3.69 
Fairness :Average 4.39 3.70 
Scale 2. Relationship with 10 15 3.35 3.22 
Manager 
11 16 4.26 4.10 
20 25 4.21 3.87 
31 36 2.98 4.69 
Relationship average 3.70 3.82 
process where managers did not appear to grasp the vital nature of this point. Nor are 
the managers particularly good in giving the feedback (Qlll16) when it eventually 
happens. Here, the score stays slightly negative, improving only from 4.26 to 4.10. As 
Peters and Waterman (1982) have commented, 'managers would prefer to go to the 
dentist than take an appraisal interview' (P82). Yet appraising employees is a key 
managerial skill, combining planning, communication and personal relationships and 
one that should be constantly practised. The outcome for the statement 'my manager 
takes my objective setting seriously (QI0115), was good,where the score finished at 
3.22. Employees were still not convinced overall that performance pay would be 
operated fairly in their department (Q 17IQ22). Even after the first payments, the score 
only reached 4.02. 
It is worth pointing out at this juncture that the employees' satisfaction ratings on the 
procedures and outcomes after the first year of operating was very highly correlated 
with their scorings on the Fairness scale as is shown in Table 17. 
How are these two aspects connected? Let us take the case of one of the 'positive' 
employees where satisfaction ratings are high and who considers the scheme to be a 
fair one. In their case, the scheme could have genuinely motivated them throughout 
the period to the extent that they worked harder (or smarter). This was noted by their 
manager, who assessed their performance and gave them a high rating in both the 
• 
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objectives and contribution factors. The employee was told in the correct way and all 
this made the employee very satisfied. The ratings on the questionnaire were then 
made accordingly. 
Table 17 Correlation between satisfaction ratings on procedures and outcomes 
and scorings on the Fairness scale. 
Fairness Manager 
Q 1 Overall reaction to combined rating .634** .468** 
Q4 Satisfaction with contribution rating .543** .528** 
Q6 Satisfaction with objectives rating .540** .486** 
Q7 Satisfaction with salary outcome .544** .460** 
Q8 Satisfaction with way informed of salary .415** .403** 
outcome 
** Slgmficant at 0.05 level 
A second possibility was that the employee may not have had an especially positive 
reaction to the fairness of the scheme in the first year but continued to carry out their 
job efficiently. Their manager will have noted their performance and given them a 
high rating. The employee, being happy with the results, may have looked back over 
the year and decided, in retrospect, that the scheme was actually a fair one. 
lfthe example of a 'negative' employee is taken, then the situation is reversed. The 
employee does not feel happy with the fairness of the scheme, does not take any 
action to improve their performance and subsequently does not get good rating (or 
ratings sufficient for them to achieve the pay increase they were looking for). They 
are therefore dissatisfied with the ratings they have achieved and respond accordingly 
on the questionnaire. 
The effect on 'relation' works in the same way, although it is interesting to see that 
the correlations here, although still at the .01** level ofsignificance, are somewhat 
lower than those for fairness. Itmay well be that the perception of the immediate 
connection between their relationship with their manager and the final ratings and 
salary outcome may have been blurred. This could have occurred because of the 
manager's decision being overruled or adjusted in some way or because the salary 
decision was clearly taken out of the hands ofthe manager. 
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Further discussion on the distinctions between positive and negative employees is 

given in section 5.9 relating to characteristics of employees. 

The second part of this current section examines the employees' view on the 

performance management scheme that underpins the whole scheme. The 

performance management scheme attempts to ensure that the judgements reached on 

an employee's performance are fundamentally fair and reasonable. In this part, three 

measures have been chosen. Firstly, there are the structural issues. Is the scheme a 

feasible one that can produce a fair result? Does the scheme take the right assessment 

factors into account? Does it give the right weighting? Do the rules allow for details 

like allowances for external factors that can affect the outcome but are outside ofthe 

individual's control? Will the assessment process be threatening to employees' self­

esteem when they find they are not rated 'outstanding' as they expect to be? (Fletcher 

1993). 

Secondly, there are the procedural issues. How do lleam about the scheme? Can I 

have my questions dealt with effectively and courteously? Is there sufficient time to 

consult me on areas like objectives? Can I take part in their creation? How willI hear 

about the results? Will there be time to discuss them and the pay implications? 

Thirdly, there are the relationship issues. How knowledgeable and sympathetic is my 

Manager? Is he/she competent to operate the scheme correctly? Will they want to? 

Do I trust them to carry out a fair assessment? Will my department colleagues help me 

to achieve my objectives? WillI help them? Will other departments continue to be co­

operative? Where does teamwork fit in? 

These three measures examine the many criticisms made of performance management 

schemes in general and especially those where the outcome generated is a pay 

mcrease. 

Most of these issues have been faced in the British and Irish performance pay 

schemes. In Proctor et aI, (1993) the way management and the shop floor considered 

the scheme in terms of equity was very different. Management believed that pay 

should be distributed on the basis of a judgement of the employee's performance 
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while many employees followed the traditional trade union view that 'ifwe are all 
doing the same type of work, we should all be rewarded the same' (p 69). Many 
considered that the judgement ofan employee's contribution in a complex 
manufacturing environment was not easy and often unfair. 
An analysis of the additional comments made help to identify where the scheme fails 
in this area is shown in Table 18. These have been divided into Positive, Neutral and 
Critical comments. Positive comments praise the scheme and some examples of 
Neutral comments are: 
• 	 'This is a fair assessment for managers but not for more junior staff.' 
• 	 'Is it fully understood that the customer can be internal as well as external?' 
The 'Critical' comments have been sub-divided into structural, procedural and 
relationship. The structural issues are those that relate to the nature and detail ofthe 
performance management scheme itself. The procedural issues centre round the way 
the scheme worked in practice while the relationship issues concentrate on the 
comments made about the employee's relationship with their manager. 
Table 18 

Employees' comments on Performance Management aspects 

Mter Questionnaire 

Positive Neutral Critical 
Structural Procedural Relationship Total 
General comments on Contribution 8 6 8 2 2 12 
Customer comes first 10 12 5 1 - 6 
Commitment to quality 
Empowerment and responsibility 
Teamwork makes a winning team 
Communication is open and honest 
Objective setting 
Objective assessments 
Total 
6 
6 
8 
6 
16 
11 
71 
10 
6 
12 
1 
15 
17 
79 
5 
5 
4 
9 
8 
5 
47 
1 
-
-
4 
16 
8 
34 
-
1 
-
3 
4 
3 
13 
6 
6 
4 
16 
28 
16 
94 
The structural criticisms relating to the Contribution area start with the design, 
consistency and interpretation of the contribution grid (see example in appendix 3) 
• 	 'Categories are all too vague - impossible to objectively rate against the 
descriptions' 
Total 
26 
28 
22 
18 
24 
23 
59 
44 
244 
, 
I 
.1 
11'
" 
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• 	 'All areas are too rigid and not flexible enough. Not everybody is exposed to the 
customer base to allow good communication.' 
These are common criticisms of competence based schemes which try to ensure 
consistency by squeezing every employee onto the same matrix of competencies. 
Either some jobs resolutely refuse to fit in or the matrix becomes too general for 
meaningful assessment. Taking the middle path can bring the fudge of compromise or 
it can be the very narrow path that actually works. 
Further criticisms are directed at the difficulty in getting level 5, which is the highest 
rating: 
• 	 'Not personalised enough - impossible to achieve level 5' 
• 	 'The statement contains a "walk on water" clause - this is unfair. Nobody is 
actually right first time every time. ' 
The interpretation in these areas were carried out by the local managers and level 5s 
were achieved in a number of areas but it was reported to the author by the Head of 
Personnel than many mangers, despite training, found this the most difficult area. 
They wanted to identify their high-fliers but often found that the descriptions set out 
in Level 5 did not match precisely their achievements. Often, advice was requested on 
employees who, in the opinion of the manager, fell between level 4 and 5. The 
answer, in general terms, was for a member of the HR department to go through the 
entire set of ratings with the manager to help produce a consistent set of ratings which 
were neither too high as a whole or too low, taking into account the overall 
performance of that particular department. Most managers did not ask for this advice 
but the monitoring process at the end of the cycle teased out some specific 
departments where the average ratings appeared too high or too low and discussion 
took place (ifrather rushed) to monitor and remedy this situation. Mostly, it was 
reported that the discussion and decisions were amicably held although a few isolated 
areas on on-going dispute occurred right up to the last minute before the 
announcements took place. 
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The empowerment of managers is often associated with the HR1v1 approach, rather 
than the Personnel approach (Storey 1992). In this example, the tensions produced by 
this empowerment are clear. Managers may know best the performance of their staff 
but they would inevitably fmd it difficult to judge their staff in comparison with the 
performance of staff in other departments. Monitoring by a central function can help 
to ease this process, especially when accompanied by skilled counselling and a 
modicum of hard data relating to the department's performance, but the final decision 
will inevitably involve an injection of politics which ignores objectivity. 
Other comments were more generally directed at the contribution element: 
• 	 'Contribution part is fairly meaningless - must be more objective to assure 
fairness. At the very least, the score description should be reviewed to make them 
easier to relate to individuals.' 
The structural criticisms relating to Objectives are more familiar. Three thoughtful 
criticisms are made in relation to the types of objectives: 
• 	 'Targets are too specific to individuals and often conflict with those set in other 
areas. More harmonious targets should be agreed at the top and elements cascaded 
down to individuals. Also, everybody should have company and department 
targets, not just individual ones.' 
• 	 'Use of readily measurable and quantifiable objectives limits choice of possible 
objectives. The result is to fail to give a rounded view of performance and distort 
motivation of staff to pay-related aspects. Measures need to widen assessment.' 
• 	 'I frequently come across ridiculous targets for employees which pay lip service to 
the scheme and gain little respect for the individual. Managers should be made 
aware that these objectives should be meaningful to both the business and the 
employee.' 
Although the theory of objective setting directs attention on objectives being 
measurable and appropriate to the individual, these comments show the other side of 
the coin. If they are too individual, then tensions can be created with the other parts of 
at 
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the jigsaw - other departments and the company strategy overall. The limit on the 
number of objectives may mean the well-rounded view of perfonnance is obstructed. 
On the other hand, a wholly objective measure, attendance, which could be applied to 
everybody evenly, comes under attack: 
• 	 'Do not include sickness record as an objective - no-one enjoys being ill!' 
Another difficulty lies in the nature of the obj ectives. Should they be outside of an 
employee's nonnal work-load or targets added on? One employee is sure of the 
answer: 
• 	 'In searching for objectives which are clearly measurable, the main job functions 
often have to be left out of the assessment.' 
The dilemma is always present. Does one set objectives that are at the heart of the 
overall performance of the employee but are, in reality, the job of that person already, 
thereby paying twice over? Or does one use objectives as a 'top-up' which may cause 
direction and effort to be diverted to less important issues? This is not an easy case to 
answer. 
Criticisms of the structure of schemes have been widespread in the literature. Lewis 
(1991) questioned how one is objectively to measure 'creating a good impression' in 
the Barc1ays Bank scheme of that time. He added: 
'The more the performance pay system depends upon the behaviour rather than output 
assessment .... The more riddled with subjectivity it becomes, with all that that means 
in terms of subversion of the intended consequences' (p15). 
There are numerous procedural criticisms relating to the way that the scheme was 
operated. At the start of the scheme, the briefing was rated as poor or very poor by 
25% of the sample (see Table 19), although the overall mean gave a slightly higher 
rating than fair. Six employees claimed not to be briefed at all. Of the written 
---..­
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criticisms, there were six examples of information only sent in the post and a further 
case of a 10-minute briefing in the Manager's car. One extended comment was: 
• 'Don't have briefings to 50 people at a time. Don't add it on to other briefings. 
Have better handouts. Be prepared for questions before they are asked. Don't try 
to treat people as if they are part of a voluntary process when the procedure is 
being imposed without question.' 
Table 19 Briefing at the start of the scheme Questionnaire 1, Question 3 
Rating Excellent 1 Good 1 Fair Poor Very Poor 
N= 5 \26 141 23 4 
Mean score = 2.95 
\ 
1 
Mean ratings under all of the scales were far more positive for those that were briefed 
than for those who were not as shown in Table 20. 
Table 20 
Rating scores in relation to whether briefing took place. Questionnaire 1 
Scale Briefed = 1 N Mean Standard 
Not briefed = 2 Deviation 
Relation 1 96 3.67 1.36 
2 6 4.20 1.51 
Fairness 1 96 4.38 1.68 
2 5 4.96 1.59 
Motivation 1 98 4.87 1.37 
2 6 5.02 1.45 
Culture 1 98 4.31 1.27 
2 6 5.08 1.31 
Pay 1 98 5.01 1.84 
satisfaction 2 6 5.50 1.01 
Principal 1 99 3.98 1.64 
2 5 4.70 1.68 
Scale pay 1 96 3.63 1.79 
(reverse) 2 6 2.66 1.21 
The differences were severe for all scales except motivation although they were not 
significant due, partly, to the small number of employees who were not briefed. 
Another complaint concerned the lack of full information provided about the 
individual objectives: 
= 
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+ 	 'Objectives should be explained FULLY. I lost 20% because at no time had it 
been mentioned that the work had to be produced on a specific day each month.' 
There were 8 complaints of objectives being imposed, rather than discussed and 4 of 
unrealistic or unobtainable objectives being agreed. There were a similar number of 
examples of employees being told of their ratings without discussion or explanation. 
The complaints of relationship were quite few in total, which speaks well for the 
hierarchical structure. Decisions 'based on conjecture and guesswork' or 'very much 
an individual personal opinion than an evaluation of actual goals' were examples 
together with the more frequent cry (12) of objectives being changed too often. 
One more perceptive comment was: 
+ 	 'Different managers set differently difficult targets, i.e. some people only have to 
do their normal job to earn their performance pay, others have to really achieve. It 
is not a level playing field. Samples should be taken across the board and checked 
for consistency.' 
Overall, however, the lack of specific criticisms together with the scattered 
expressions of praise would indicate a fairly general degree of satisfaction with the 
competence of the manager and their fair approach. This result is, in many ways, 
unusual. 
Many critics of performance pay centre on the inability of managers to make 
reasonable judgements. Alimo-Metcalfe (1994) reporting on American research 
showed that: 
• 	 Raters (managers, mostly) are less willing/likely to differentiate between the 
performance of individuals when the purpose is salary or promotion decisions. 
• 	 Raters are more likely to manipulate ratings when political influences are 

operating in the organisation. 

• 	 Raters give higher ratings to those they like. 
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• 	 Raters' moods affect ratings. 
Worse still, there is evidence that ratings can be discriminatory against women 
(Bevan and Thompson 1991), ethnic minorities (EOC 1991) and, recently, men as 
well (Rana 2000). 
Some final comments by employees castigated the whole scheme: 
• 	 'Performance pay destroys quality and instigates quantity.' 
.. 	 'Performance pay encourages people to pass responsibility to anyone else unless it 
positively affects their performance pay.' 
These both mirrored findings by Murlis(l992) who drew evidence mostly from public 
sector schemes. The latter criticisms points to the dysfunctional nature of performance 
pay in that it creates tunnel vision where employees concentrate only on those aspects 
of the job linked to the possible payment to the neglect ofother aspects oftheir work. 
(Kessler and Purcell 1992) 
It can be concluded, therefore, that the results do not support hypothesis one. 
Employees are mildly positive but not significantly so. They are not convinced that 
the performance pay scheme operates fairly so that pay is distributed in line with an 
employee's contribution. 
So why are the overall ratings for the scale questions on Fairness not higher? We will 
return to this in the chapter relating to Interpretation and Discussion 
5.6.2 Hypotheses two and three - MORALE AND CO:MMITMENTI 
MOTIVATION 
That performance pay contributes towards the objective ofincreasing employee 
morale and commitment 
That performance pay contributes to the objective ofmotivating the workforce. 
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Morale, commitment and motivation are inter-linked concepts. The degree of an 
employee's commitment can be gauged by the level of motivation demonstrated. 
Similarly, the overall morale of a workforce is normally translated into a measure of 
collective motivation. The questions under these two hypotheses are mostly centred 
on the motivation issue but one directly deals with morale (Q30/35). 
Commitment has been conceptualised as a framework with three major components 
(Allen and Meyer 1990). The first they call affective commitment which involves the 
idea of wanting to remain with the organisation because of positive work experiences. 
The second is named continuance commitment, which involves the idea ofneeding to 
remain with the organisation because of a lack of alternative employment 
opportunities and accumulated investment. In the context of the telecommunication 
industry of the mid-1990s, the alternative opportunities were starting to expand 
rapidly so this form of commitment was not easy for an organisation to develop. 
Accumulated investments are the way of describing pension schemes and share 
options but can also apply to the position in the salary scale achieved through having 
their high performance recognised. 
The final component they call normative commitment, which involves the idea of 
feeling one ought to remain with the organisation because it espouses the personal 
norms and values that an individual employee holds themselves. This factor, of 
course, links with the nature of the organisation's culture. There is also a strong link 
to concepts of equity. Morris et al (1993), for example, in their longitudinal study of 
highly educated UK males in their first five years of employment found that levels of 
commitment (and hence turnover) were significantly linked to low initial expectations 
and perceptions of fairness. 
Performance pay can have an effect on all three of these components. The positive 
work experiences can arise from the efficient and stimulating effect of objective 
setting and completion and the development of individual competencies involved in a 
performance pay scheme increasing an individual's affective commitment. The 
investments explained above in the way that a performance pay scheme affects pay 
levels and recognition may also be influential, especially if they have been developed 
over time which will increase their continuance commitment. Finally, working within 
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an organisation driven by the principle of rewarding high perfonners in a fair and 
generous way may increase their nonnative commitment. 
As measured by the Motivation set of questions, this is the area ofleast success shown 
by this research (see Table 21). The overall figure may have improved during the first 
year of the scheme from 4.89 to 4.61 but this scarcely represents, on the surface, a 
satisfied work force motivated by perfonnance pay. We have seen that Kohn.(1993) 
has strongly expressed the view that perfonnance pay rewards only motivate people to 
go after rewards at the expense of interest in their job and quality of their work and 
this result could indicate some truth in his view. 
Table21 Motivation Scale 
Question Scales Question numbers Mean scores 
Before After Before After 
Scale 3. Motivation 7 12 4.49 4.42 
8 13 4.66 4.79 
13 18 5.00 4.84 
16 21 4.88 4.35 
23 28 4.40 4.34 
30 35 5.49 5.20 
29 34 5.03 4.66 
Motivation Average 4.89 4.66 
In their general comments, a number of employees have taken up this point. A good 
example was: 
• 	 'Motivation and incentive I already had. Teamwork is unavoidable in my job so 
perfonnance pay has not affected any part of my performance. It has motivated 
people not to do anything against performance pay interests, making people less 
co-operative with other people and departments. Some people will even be 
underhand to get good results. I think goal-setting and motivation is very 
necessary - this is not the way -it is the cause of low morale within the 
organisation. ' 
w 
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The use ofperformance pay to focus the attention of individuals and teams on 
improving performance has not universal acceptance. One employee described the 
changes that he saw: 
• 	 'Performance pay threatens and intimidates and does the opposite to motivate. 
Team meetings have an atmosphere of competitive causing unpleasant de­
motivation. The friendly, smiling atmosphere is rapidly being squeezed out, I am 
sorry to say.' 
For others, performance pay was not a deciding factor in their own performance: 
• 	 'Although I got a decent performance pay rating and increase, I worked as hard as 
1 could anyway. No-one had a morale boost with a high overall rating but a low 
rating was quite bad.' 
The previous discussion on failings in the performance management scheme 
demonstrated that all employees did not have influence over their target, nor over 
their financial rewards. Nor do the same motivators work for everybody. Baron 
(1993) found that managers are likely to be motivated by power, responsibility and 
fear of failure while non-managers by convenient, secure working conditions and 
material reward. 
The scale dealing with the Scale of Payment (see Table 22) had resonance with 
Vroom's (1964) expectancy theory. Vroom stresses the importance ofthe valency of 
the rewards. The response to Q19/24 ' I believe that the financial incentive of 
performance pay is too small to motivate employees' had a modicum of agreement on 
the first questionnaire at a mean of 3.70. 
Table 22 Scale 5 Scale of Payments 
Question Scales I Question numbers 1 Mean scores 
I Before 1After 1Before I After 
\ Scale 5 Scale of Payment I 19 I 3.70* \3.16* 
zd 
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However, the experience ofperformance pay converted a larger number of 
respondents, so that the mean score on the second questionnaire was 3.14 indicating a 
much greater agreement to the statement. Only 27 respondents out of 116 gave a score 
of 5,6 or 7, indicating any degree of disagreement with the statement. With a small 
valency, it is not too unexpected that the motivation effect was not too great. 
Table 23, Correlation between questions on satisfaction with process and 
outcomes and scoring on Scale of payment scale. Questionnaire 2 
Scale of 
payment 
(reverse 
scale) 
Q 1 Reaction to combined ratings -.151 
Q4 Reaction to contribution ratings -.117 
Q6 Reaction to objectives ratings -.243* 
Q7 Satisfaction with salary arising from performance pay -.518** 
** SIgmficant at 0.05 level. 
* Significant at 0.1 level 
Table 23 shows the correlation between the Scale of payment and the employees' 
satisfaction with the processes and outcomes. There was a high level of negative 
correlation between the respondents' level of satisfaction with their salary arising 
from the performance pay scheme and their views on the scale of payment, significant 
at 0.01 **. As this question was a reverse question, those with high satisfaction with 
their salary regarded the payouts as sufficient (in other words, they tended to disagree 
with the statement) and those who were dissatisfied did not. This level of correlation 
did not stretch to the respondents' reactions to their ratings, however. Those satisfied 
with their ratings may have been less happy with the conversion into salary and 
therefore believe that the pot ofmoney available was insufficient. In other words, they 
did not value the rewards. 
The dissatisfaction voiced by a good number of respondents over the process of 
perfonnance management also has a bearing on expectancy theory. A number of the 
comments given indicate the low level of instrumentality (the degree to which the 
desired goals can be achieved as a direct result of the individual's behaviour): 
• 'No consideration given to issues beyond our control' 
• 'Little consideration given to genuine illness' 
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• 	 'Consideration was not given for urgent works that might change objectives' 
Similarly, there were also comments reflecting the lack ofexpectancy (the 
individual's belief concerning the likelihood that a particular act 'good performance' 
will be followed by a particular outcome 'high ratings and a good salary increase'): 
• 	 'Different managers set differently difficult targets, i.e. some people have to do 
their normal job to earn their performance pay, others have to really achieve. It is 
not a level playing field.' 
• 	 'Use of readily measurable and quantifiable objectives limits choice of possible 
objectives. The result is to fail to give rounded view of performance and distort 
motivation of staff to pay-related aspects.' 
• 	 'As a support person rather than an engineer, it is difficult for my manager to get 
me the financial recognition he thinks I deserve.' 
• 	 'Despite a very high mark, I did not receive a good financial reward. ' 
It can be seen, then, that employees who have believed that the ratings have been 
carried out fairly under a fair procedure give a high response to the questions on 
motivation. They consider that procedural justice has taken place. This is supported 
by the correlation results show in Table 24 between Questions 1,4,6 and 7 and the 
score on motivation. 
Table 24= Correlation between questions on satisfaction with process and 
outcomes and scoring on Motivation Scale. 
Motive 
Q 1 Reaction to combined ratings 	 .444** 
Q4 Reaction to contribution ratings 	 .449** 
Q6 Reaction to objectives ratings 	 .388** 
Q7 Satisfaction with salary arising from performance pay .413** 
** SIgmficant at 0.05 level. 
In each case, there is a highly significant correlation between the scoring on 
motivation questions motivation and the reactions to the various outcomes in terms of 
fairness and satisfaction. Those who have reacted positively to the outcomes also rate 
highly the effect of the performance pay on motivation. Those who see the result 
poorly, react negatively to the motivating effect ofperformance pay. 
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The previous chapter took a detailed look at the respondents' view on the 
performance management system. The views on the setting, monitoring and 
assessment of the objectives part has a strong bearing on Goal Theory (Locke and 
Latham 1990). These researchers have shown that for goals to be successful, they 
need to be challenging, accepted by the employee, there must be an element of 
participation in the goal-setting process and the employee must get valued feedback. 
Respondents made it clear that these conditions were not always met and this affected 
the motivation score: 
• 	 'Although I received a pay award which was classed as performance pay, I am not 
aware of how this was achieved as I did not have an agreed performance pay plan 
with my manager. Without a plan, there is no review therefore I have no idea as to 
how these were assessed in my particular case. I wish I did.' (motivation score of 
5.5) 
• 	 'There is a lack of effort to define appropriate objectives (it all seems rather 
difficult) This leads to over-simplified objectives that are easy to measure but do 
not necessarily relate to key tasks in a joblrole.' (motivation score of 4.8) 
• 	 'No support is given to achieving objectives after setting (motivation score of 
4.2)' 
• 	 'It was not made clear to me who set the objectives (motivation score of4.9)' 
• 	 'Should be a two-way process between manager and participant. (motivation score 
of4.8)' 
• 	 'The objectives were set without any input from me (motivation score of 5.1)' 
Returning to the overall scores arising from both questionnaires, although motivation 
and morale are not synonymous, there is a clear connection. It is argued that well 
motivated employees work harder and produce a better performance leading to higher 
organisational achievement which, in tum, leads to higher morale. In this research, 
then, although the motivation score has improved slightly between the two 
questionnaires, it is clear that performance pay as an aid to improving motivation, 
morale and commitment has not been very unsuccessful. 
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As a result, hypotheses two and three must be rejected. Performance pay has not 
increased morale and commitment, nor has it contributed towards increasing 
motivation. 
5.6.3 Hypothesis four - CULTURE CHANGE 
That peiformance pay contributes to the objective ofinstilling a positive message 
about peiformance expectations and the achievement ofcompany objectives which 
is recognised by the employees as a culture change. 
We have seen that the strong messages sent by pay systems are utilised by a number 
of organisations to implement organisational change. In the CBI/Hay survey (1995), 
over a quarter of the respondents used pay policy to help drive and support 
organisational change. The IPD research (IPD 1998) has shown that 41 % of 
organisations believe that performance pay has had a positive effect upon the change 
process while only 5% reported the effect was negative. Thompson, (2000) is not 
convinced, however, believing that 'the evidence seems to suggest that the impact of 
these changes has been predominantly negative' (P146). 
In any case, there are some researchers who doubt whether any embedded culture can 
be changed. It has been argued that this path is so dangerous that it should not be 
attempted because it can lead to unintentional consequences (Ackroyd and Crowdy 
1990). Many researchers have observed that a major reason for the failure of 
organisational change efforts is that they ignore the relative strength of the culture as a 
whole and of influential sub-cultures (Deal and Kennedy 1982, Di Tomaso 1987). 
Others propose that culture can only be changed as a secondary process after 
employees' behaviour has been modified (Kilman 1982). Given these research-based 
results, therefore, this particular organisational objective has a hard task ahead of it. 
This objective is primarily centred on using the changed organisational values to exert 
a leverage to changing the culture as a whole. The thinking is that employees who 
know and understand the raft of company and individual objectives and who 
successfully work towards them will have greater job security than those who work in 
conflict with those objectives. Comments from employees indicate that the Values 
that the company was emphasising had considerable support but their implementation 
BtU Z< 
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was seen as patchy and the relationship with security was a non-sequitur. Security in 
any form, however, is rarely present in the workplace today. Added to the 
redundancies before the scheme began, there was a further small downsizing exercise 
before the end of 1995 that would have influenced the response to these questions. 
Table 25 Scale for Culture Change 
Question Scales I Question numbers Mean scores 
IhBne'f,~or-e---'I~Af~te-r-----hB~e~f,~or-e----~IA~ft~e-r--~ 
Scale 4.PERFORMANCE 21 26 4.93 4.92 
PAY and Cultural Change 
27 32 3.80 3.76 
Cultural Change Average 4.36 4.34 
Only two questions were asked in this section and we have seen that the reliability 
measure here is not strong. There are also conflicting results from these questions as 
shown in Table 25. The direct question about whether there had been a culture change 
for the better CQ21/26) produced a resounding 'no' scoring 4.92, the second worst 
score of all. In fact, there was not one single employee who strongly agreed with the 
statement that 'performance pay has helped to change the culture of the organisation 
for the better'. However, another more detailed aspect of culture - how performance 
pay may have improved communication by stimulating more discussion between 
managers and employees (Q27/32) obtained a more respectable 3.76 and 11 
employees strongly agreed this statement. Compared to the IMS survey (Thompson 
1993), the results overall are a little worse. 
It is clear that the outcomes from the performance management process had an 
influence on the ratings under this chapter, as shown by the correlation results in 
Table 26 
Table 26 Correlation between questions on satisfaction with process and 
outcomes and scoring on Culture Scale. After Questionnaire 
Culture 
Q 1 Reaction to combined ratings .465** 
Q4 Reaction to contribution ratings .489** 
Q6 Reaction to objectives ratings .472** 
Q7 Satisfaction with salary arising from performance pay .478** 
** Slgmficant at 0.05 level 
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Employees satisfied with their ratings, salary increase and the process overall were 
more likely to give more positive scores for the effect on the organisation's culture 
through the introduction of performance pay. Those dissatisfied were more likely to 
give negative scores. 
The variety of scores overall was demonstrated in the comments given in the second 
questionnaire. A number indicated that the organisation had made progress in the area 
of communication: 
• 	 'Communication is open and honest' - this is necessary and exists, 1 think, in 
practice. ' 
• 	 'Communication is improving' 
There was no doubt as to the importance of good communication in the minds of 
some employees: 
• 	 'Without open and honest communication you will lose' 
• 	 'Must be No. 1 to achieve commitment and your goals' 
On the other hand, many employees saw this area as one of increasing weakness and 
produced very critical comments: 
• 	 'Supervisors/Managers really don't like to hear 'open and honest' communication 
- my manager takes it personally.' 
• 	 '1 do not trust what little I hear from my peers.' 
• 	 'Communication is open and honest until it reaches middle and senior 

management. Then I think it breaks down.' 

• 	 'It depends on who is open and honest. Management make you doubtful. ' 
There is a further complication in that the definition of effective communication or 
any cultural change is dependent on the personal constructs that individuals have built 
up over a period oftime (Kelly 1955, quoted in Hayes 1997). Kelly explains that: 
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'Someone whose experience has led them to develop personal constructs which imply 
that managers will always look for ways of getting their pound of flesh at the expense 
of the work force is not going to change their mind overnight' (P43). 
So one person may be satisfied to exist within a culture where communication takes 
place on a 'need to know' basis, whereas another (perhaps with either a less trusting 
personality or with a genuine interest in a much wider field of activity within the 
organisation), may believe in a full and frank exchange of information. 
Two strong views expressed in this light were: 
• 'Rubbish! No feedback from department managers - too many secrets' 
• 'Important personal discussions imposed in isolation from one's colleagues.' 
Taking the overall results, therefore, it is clear that this Hypothesis must be 
rejected. Employees do not consider that performance pay has led them to accept 
the cultural change indicated by acceptance ofthe company's performance 
expectations and achievement ofcompany objectives. 
However, it has to be added that, despite the views of the employees, there has been 
some indication of accepted change through behavioural alterations brought about 
through the perfonnance management scheme. This is explored further in chapter 6 
which deals with Interpretation. 
5.6.4 Hypothesis five - RETENTIONILOY ALTY 
That performance pay contributes to the objective ofoffering a competitive salary 
and benefits package ilt comparison with rival companies ilt order to reduce staff 
turnover and attract a lzigher calibre ofstaff. 
Towards the end ofthe 1980s, at the height of the previous economic boom, the 
tightness of the labour market for skilled employees was a significant factor in the 
introduction ofperformance pay, particularly in the public sector and privatised 
industries (Murlis 1992). This was associated with the movement away from 
centralised bargaining to give employers the freedom to offer better rates for high 
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performers without having to jack up the entire pay spines or grading system with its 
consequent very high cost. The onset of recession and the leaner 1990s has generally 
reduced this necessity, so the inclusion of this objective is as much about insurance 
against the return ofthese more prosperous times plus the need to plug gaps in very 
specific skills areas. 
There were limits in testing this objective. The most cornmon method is to inquire as 
to respondents' intentions of staying with the company. There are always doubts 
about the truth of these answers, even with anonymous questionnaires, as they deal 
with a very sensitive issue in times of redundancy. For that reason, such a question 
was not asked. The only question asked in this area, therefore, dealt with pay 
satisfaction (Q18/23) shown in Table 27. 
Table 27· Satisfaction with pay 
Question Scales Question numbers Mean scores 
Before IAfter Before \ Afterl J I 
Scale 6. Satisfaction with 18 23 4.93 4.56 

Pay 

Again the result was rather unsatisfactory at 4.56, although improving from the 
expectation questionnaire (4.93). This result compared with a slightly better 4.2 in the 
Thompson survey. It could be argued, therefore, that performance pay has brought a 
lesser degree of pay satisfaction. 
A considerable doubt arises, however when considering the result of another question. 
Examining the results to question 7 shown in Table 28 in the 'after' questionnaire ­
'How satisfied are you with the outcome relating to your salary arising from 
performance pay', the results were: 
Table 28 Satisfaction with salary increase - 'after' questionnaire 
Score (5) Very (4) (3) (2) (1) Very Mean Score 
unsatisfied Unsatisfied Neutral Satisfied Satisfied 
N= 10 28 28 39 10 2.90 
The response to this question, on balance, was that employees were on the marginally 
satisfied side of neutral. There was not the fairly strong indication of overall 
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dissatisfaction with their current salary reported in Q23. The two questions, however, 
are not entirely identical. You can be pleased that you have a reasonable pay increase 
but that you are still some distance from where you hope to be and this appeared to be 
the current situation. 
A further question was asked as to how satisfied the respondents were regarding the 
way they were informed about their salary (Q8) shown in Table 29: 
Table 29 Satisfaction with method of communication- 'after' questionnaire 
Score (5) Very (4) (3) (2) (1) Very Mean Score 
unsatisfied Unsatisfied Neutral Satisfied Satisfied 
N- 9 32 23 39 11 2.90 
This produced almost identical results, which is, in many ways, more worrying as this 
is another area where a substantial minority is not satisfied with a procedural issue. 
There were 52 written comments in this chapter (QI0), the highest for any question 
giving the opportunity to comment and only 9 of which were complimentary or 
neutral. Of the remaining 43 who were critical of the procedural aspects of salary 
notification, 7 respondents reported that they were informed of the result in the post, 
there were 5 complaints of delays, a further 5 told of rushed meetings (5 minutes, 15 
minutes were examples), and 8 were unsure ofhow the calculations were made with 
insufficient or no information and questions unanswered. 4 felt that their manager had 
not sufficient experience of them to make the judgements, 4 considered the appeal 
procedure but felt that they were discouraged from using it by management's 
approach. An example of the latter is: 
+ 'My manager advised me ofmy salary. Said it was a case of 'take it or go to 
appeal within 3 days', 2 of those days being over a weekend. 1 was advised that 
the outcome of the appeal would not change. A case of 'take it or leave the 
company.' 
All personnel managers are aware of the difficulties associated with salary/ratings 
notification. Resources equivalent to a 'Desert Storm' operation are required in 
practice to ensure everybody gets told, on the right day around the same time, the 
right information and in the right way. Judging the level of this as a priority often 
136 
A£1 ¥ 
demonstrates the attitude gap betwe~n management and employees. To an average 
employee, it is often regarded as the most important event of the year and one 
expected with considerable uncertainty and anxiety, especially if their interim 
feedback is somewhat sparse. To managers, on the other hand, delaying the 
notification by a few hours or a day is not significant, allocating enough time for each 
person (especially in a downsized, large team environment) is difficult with other 
deadlines and crises with which to cope. Moreover, having all the information to 
discuss the fine detail for each employee takes too much preparation time. The nature 
of this gap can explain how employees, as a whole, can feel neutral on this point. 
Neutrality is probably not sufficient to improve motivation or change culture. 
A further influence on the pay satisfaction issue was the level of performance pay 
payment. Was the carrot ultimately big enough? We have seen that the actual rating 
for Q.19/24 '1 believe the financial incentive of performance pay is too small to 
motivate employees' was 3.16 showing a considerable level of agreement (reverse 
question). This was down from the 3.70 rating on the first questionnaire, indicating 
that experience had blunted what effect it may initially had carried. 
In times of low inflation, the range of payments will inevitably be quite small. The 
difference between an outstanding performance and a poor performance was, in 
theory, 8%, as was shown in the pay matrix.(Table 12) but there were few at the 
extremes of zero or 8% and most were in the ratings in between, where the difference 
will be in the order of 1 % or, at most, 2%. As one respondent put it: 
• 'A lot of effort for £300 gross!' 
The connection between loyalty and satisfaction with the outcomes is indicated by the 
correlation between pay satisfaction and responses to individual ratings and salaries 
under performance pay in the 'after' questionnaire as shown in Table 30. 
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Table 30 Correlation between questions on satisfaction with process and 
outcomes and scoring on Pay satisfaction Scale. 
Pay 
satisfac 
tion 
Q 1 Reaction to combined ratings .450** 
Q4 Reaction to contribution ratings .422** 
Q6 Reaction to objectives ratings 
.391 ** 
Q7 Satisfaction with salary arising from performance pay .440** 
**Slgmficant at 0.05 level 
These are significant correlations, but less than those that have occurred with the other 
scales. It is strange that the correlation against Q7 is not higher. This could, however, 
be explained by the fact that respondents could be distinguishing between their 
current overall salary (which may be disappointing) and the level of increase under 
the performance pay scheme, which could have pleased them, but still leaves their 
salary at a level that they do not find satisfactory. 
Summing up, it calt be concluded that hypothesis five is not proven. There is no 
evidence that the scheme has helped retentiolt or loyalty. Employees are ltot 
satisfied with their pay levels but were more positive about the performance pay 
outcomes at the end ofthe first year ofoperation thalt when they started the 
scheme. 
5.6.5 Hypothesis six - PERFORMANCE PAY AND TEAM WORKING 
That paying performance pay on an individual basis works against the concept of 
team working. 
Human Resource Management theory is presented as a unified and consistent set of 
propositions and actions (Storey 1992). Within those tenets is at least one major 
contradiction. This is that individual employees must be rewarded for their individual 
contribution towards meeting organisational objectives (chiefly through performance 
pay), yet they must also be part of empowered work-teams involved and committed to 
achieve group objectives. Doing both can prove tricky as loyalties are divided. 
Tensions arise with attempts to develop a collective identity around team working and 
then to discriminate between individual employee's contributions (Geary 1 992, Lewis 
1991). 
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On the other hand, there is some limited American evidence that successful team 
incentives can yield very effective results. Pritchard, Jones and Roth (1988) found in a 
number of companies that substantial productivity gains were achieved by group 
schemes, although most of these gains were attributed to the goal-setting and the 
feedback, not the incentive itself. Organisations may attempt to square this circle by 
assessing the 'team-player' qualities as part of the set of competencies and this 
scheme is one in point. But do they make an integrated and coherent scheme? 
The negative effects of performance pay schemes on team working emerge from this 
study, as shown in Table l3 (PI09). Performance Pay has not fostered good working 
relationships with other members ofthe department team (Q28/23) with a rating on 
the second questionnaire of 4.63, showing little improvement from 4.92. Nor does it 
seemed to have helped the department to work together as a team CQ33/38) with a 
rating of 4.48, improving from 4.76. This supports the findings ofRobinson (1992) 
whose research into performance pay perceptions in a large pharmaceutical company 
found that 82 per cent of employees considered that the scheme did not encourage 
teamwork. Hypothesis six is clearly supported by these findings. 
One employee commented: 
• 	 'The scheme should be scrapped. For teams it is bad as the good carry the bad. For 
individuals, too much focus on aspects of own job prevents teamwork and without 
teamwork there cannot be any synergy.' 
Should individual payments be replaced completely by group payments? Employees 
certainly consider that team working should be rewarded as shown in the answers 
from Q24/29 where the ratings improved from 2.80 to 2.48. This may be regarded as 
support for the rating of team working as part of the contribution element or a clear 
statement in favour of some form of team-based payment. On the other hand, there is 
a very strong view that performance pay should reward an individual's contribution 
(QI5/20) where the rating is a very strong 2.25. So the view seems to be that both 
individuals and teams should be rewarded. Q22/27 indicates support for this idea by 
showing that employees tend to consider that there no clash with rewarding 
individuals and getting them to work together with the rest of the team, a view which 
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has gained substantially with experience of the scheme. The measure here moved 
from an uncertain 4.09 to a more positive 3.32. 
\Vhen it comes to the practical implications, however, doubt seems to creep in. With 
team-based pay, the implication is that employees all should receive the same 
payment. This is not found by employees to be the solution to the problem. In answer 
to the question as to whether the team would work together better if all members 
received the same payment (Q12117) the rating was very indecisive, moving from 
3.92 to 4.24. If anything, experience of the scheme worked against the concept of 
equal payments. 
So the consensus appears to be that both individuals and teams should be rewarded. 
As one respondent commented: 
• 	 'Teamwork and individual contribution to the business should be treated equally 
as circumstances change all the time and business fluctuates.' 
To run a scheme with both individual and team payments is possible. Many sales 
incentive schemes work on this basis. However, it does produce additional 
complications and not everybody would agree to this arrangement as one respondent 
commented: 
• 	 'Teamwork in relation to performance pay will only work if everybody in the 
team is prepared to pull together and not if an individual is working for 
themselves. Therefore performance pay should be as a team or individually based 
i 
- not both. My view is that we should work together and support each other. ' I 
I 
\r 
Although the findings support hypothesis six, the answers give a rather unclear 
I 	 lead as to how the difficUlty should be resolved. Direct replacement ofindividual 
payments with group payments would not be popular while paying directly for both 
team and individual contribution would create complications, which may make the 
scheme even more unwieldy. 
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A summary of the outcomes of the research for Hypotheses one to seven is shown in 
Table 31 
Table 31 Summary of outcomes for hypotheses one to seven 
Hypothesis one - FAIRNESS Hypothesis not proven. Employees 
That performance pay contributes to the very mildly positive but not 
objective of distributing pay increases in line significantly so. Problems due mostly 
with employee contribution to difficulties with performance 
management scheme 
Hypothesis two - MORALE AND Hypothesis rejected. Employees 
COMMITMENT believe that perfornlance pay does not 
That performance pay contributes towards the increase morale or commitment. 
objective of increasing employee morale and Again, difficulties with nature of 
commitment scheme and way it is implemented. 
Hypothesis three - MOTIVATION Hypothesis rejected .. Employees do 
That performance pay contributes to the not believe that performance pay 
objective ofmotivating the work force increases motivation. 
Hypothesis four - CULTURE CHANGE Hypothesis rejected. Negative 
That performance pay contributes to the perception by employees although 
objective of instilling a positive message some indications of accepted change 
about performance expectations and the thrcmgh behavioural alterations 
achievement of company objectives which is brought about through performance 
recognised by the employees as a culture management scheme 
change 
Hypothesis five - Hypothesis not proven. Employees 
RETENTIONILOYALTY not satisfied with pay levels but 
That performance pay contributes to the positive about performance pay 
objective of offering a competitive salary and increases at end of first year 
benefits package in comparison to rival 
companies in order to reduce staff turnover 
and attract a higher calibre of staff 
Hypothesis six Hypothesis proven. 
That paying performance pay on an individual 
basis works against the concept ofteam 
working 
Hypothesis seven Hypothesis rejected. Employee 
That experience of operating a performance ratings of scheme have improved 
pay scheme has a negative effect upon after one year of operation. 
employees' perception of the scheme 
compared with their expectations at the time 
when the scheme is introduced 
5.7 Principle of Performance pay 
Other surveys have supported the proposition that employees agree in principle to 
performance pay, including the Templeton survey (Kessler and Purcell 1994), where 
I 
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there was very strong support, Thompson's 1MS survey (1993) and the Inland revenue 
survey (Marsden and Richardson 1992) where 57% agreed with the principle. 
This survey is no exception. Support for the principle in Q9114 was 3.49 altering 
marginally to 3.48 in the second questionnaire. A further question (Q27/32) relating 
to good work being recognised and rewarded received much less support (4.53 to 
4.30) but answers could well have been influenced by procedural issues. Employees 
in Telecoms have a clear view that there is nothing wrong with performance pay in 
principle. Their difficulty is in the implications and changing work practices of such 
schemes and the way this particular scheme operates in practice. 
As with the other scales, there is a strong connection between employee satisfaction 
with the process and salary outcomes arising from the performance management 
scheme and their scorings on the principle questions as shown in Table 32 
Table 32 Correlation between questions on satisfaction with process and 
outcomes and scoring on Principle Scale. After Questionnaire 
Principle 
Ql Reaction to combined ratings .582** 
Q4 Reaction to contribution ratings .479** 
Q6 Reaction to objectives ratings .503** 
Q7 Satisfaction with salary arising from performance pay .555** 
** slgmficant at 0.05 level 
The outcomes clearly reinforce their views on the principle. As shown later in the 
section on employee characteristics, the largest change between the two 
questionnaires took place among the female respondents where the mean score moved 
from a less than convincing 3.86 to a much more authoritative 2.82. For males, the 
mean score actually became more negative, moving from 4.09 to 4.31. 
An example here is a respondent who gave a score of 6 on this question, quoting: 
• 	 'I think performance pay could work if management took it seriously and worked 
in co-operation with staff rather than against them' (male, grade 7, non-trade 
unionist) 
cd 
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A similar view coming from a different direction came from a respondent who gave a 
score of 5 to this question: 
I 
I 
I 
! 
~ 
It 	 'Performance pay is a good idea but the way it has been introduced has caused an 
enormous increase in parochialism, with both individuals (sometimes) and 
individual departments (often) refusing to accept o'Ntlership or give help with 
t 
problems that may adversely impact on their performance pay targets.' (male, 
grade 7, non trade unionist)' \ 
I 
! 
For some, however, the principle remains even when the practice is faulty. Two 
respondents, scoring 2 and 1 respectively insisted that: 
• 	 In principle the scheme is an excellent idea and, to my mind, has increased 
motivation. However, I am concerned by its implementation in many areas of the 
business'. (female grade 8, non trade unionist) 
• 	 Performance pay must be a good idea in principle. However, the practical 
application of the scheme in the areas visible to me is, if anything, 
counterproductive'. (male, grade 7, non-trade unionist) 
The findings, therefore, indicate a reasonably strong support for the principle of 
performance pay. In other words, employees consider that payments should 
differentiate on the basis of the performance of the employee. This is despite the fact 
that they do not consider the scheme much of a success. 
5.8 Should performance pay be abandoned? 
The 1998 IPD report indicated that around 23% of organisations had dropped their 
performance pay scheme since 1990. In commenting on these findings, IDS (1998) 
found this to be a striking revelation because it was a far larger number than any 
previous survey had revealed. It pointed, they said, to one unavoidable conclusion: 
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'There has been a great deal of flux over the past few years. May organisations 
adopted a new system, found it unsatisfactory and moved on, often reverting to their 
old approach - or a modified version of it.' (P8) 
However, it has to be said that fewer than 10% of organisations were planning to 
abandon their performance pay schemes altogether. Radical change was a preferred 
option, indicated by 30% of respondents to the IDS survey. 
The analysis for Q37 (l would prefer to return to the old salary system) provides one 
of the most interesting answers because it is a question that has not been asked 
specifically in previous studies. The answer is uncertain at 4.12.(This is a reverse 
question) Despite all the criticism and poor ratings on Motivation, Pay satisfaction 
and Culture change, employees very marginally indicated a preference to stay with 
the scheme. They are certainly not marching with banners for it to be liquidated. 
A little reported finding ofthe Marsden and Richardson (1991) study was that 
employees gave a neutral response to the statement 'for all its faults, it is better to 
have Performance pay than not' which indicates a similar attitude. 
This is all the more striking, taking into account the overall negative response. So 
employees believe, on balance, that the scheme should not be abandoned. 
5.9 Analysis by employee characteristics \ 
, The questionnaires in Appendix 2 set out the complete rating response on each of the 
I 
, 
questions. An analysis has been made to differentiate employee characteristics by 
their ratings. The sub-hypotheses to be tested were as follows: 
I 
t 
5.9.1 Hypothesis eight - EMPLOYEE CHARACTERISTICS 
I Sub-hypothesis 8a - Trade union membership 
That there is no difference in perception ofperformance pay between trade unionists 
t and non-trade unionists. 
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Sub-hypothesis 8b -Gender 
That there is no difference in attitude towards performance pay between men and 
women. 
Sub-hypothesis 8e - Age 
That the age of the employee does not affect hislher attitude towards performance pay 
Sub-hypothesis 8d - Level ofseniority 
That the seniority of an employee does not affect hislher attitude towards performance 
pay. 
Sub-hypothesis 8e - Employee rating 
That the personal ratings obtained under the scheme do not influence the attitude of an 
employee towards performance pay. 
Sub-hypothesis 8f- Length ofservice 
That the length of service of the employee does not influence hislher attitude towards 
performance pay. 
Sub- hypothesis 8g - Position in grade scale 
That the position in the grade scale does not influence hislher attitude towards 
performance pay. 
The literature review detailed the research evidence concerning the attitudes of groups 
with common characteristics towards performance pay. In the Templeton project 
(Kessler and Purcell 1994), for example, younger and short serving employees were 
generally more positive about performance pay than older and longer serving 
employees. Women tended. to be more enthusiastic than men. 
In the current research, a statistical analysis was carried out to identify whether the 
characteristics of age, gender, length of service, union membership and job grade 
appeared to influence the responses. In the case of age and trade union membership, 
T -tests were carried out to distinguish significant differences between the responses 
for males against females and for union members as against non-union members. The 
results are show in Tables 33-34. In the case of the other characteristics, correlation 
analysis was carried out to identify if responses moved in line with age, length of 
service andjob grade. The results are shown in Table 35-36. 
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5.9.2 Trade union membership 
Table 33 Union responses T Test -'Before' questionnaire 
Means Standard deviation 
Union Non-Union Union Non-union 
n=34 n=66 
Fairness 5.01 *** 4.07*** 1.65 1.63 
Relation 3.85 3.60 1.18 1.49 
Motivation 5.02 4.78 1.53 1.30 
Principle 4.50** 3.77** 1.77 1.53 
Culture 4.57 4.20 1.32 1.27 
Scale of payment 3.82 3.53 2.08 1.61 (Reverse question) 
Pay satisfaction 5.71 *** 4.62*** 1.60 1.82 
(T-test P< .05 = *, P<.OI = ** P< .001 = ***) 
Table 34 Union responses T test-'After' questionnaire 
Means Standard deviation 
Union Non-Union Union Non-union 
n=36 n=76 
Fairness 4.46*** 3.32*** 1.67 1.45 
Relation 4.24 3.84 1.34 1.58 
Motivation 4.94* 4.43* 1.37 1.50 
Principle 4.58*** 3.52*** 1.56 1.52 
Culture 4.75** 4.14** 1.38 1.53 
Scale of payment 2.75* 3.39* 1.72 1.63 
(Reverse question) 

Pay satisfaction 4.97* 4.34* 1.64 1.88 

(T-test P< .05 = *, P<.Ol = ** P< .001 = ***) 

The results show a clear significant difference between the responses of trade 
union and non-trade union employees in both questionnaires with a more 
negative attitude shown by trade union members. The null hypothesis 8a was 
thus rejected. 
The effect became stronger after the scheme had been operating for a year. The 
second questionnaire showed the differences to be significant in all but one of the 
scales. The differences were especially strong in the scales for Fairness and Principle 
emphasising that there is a philosophical opposition to the concept ofperformance 
pay among trade union members. The one exception is with the scale ofpayment 
question (reversed) where trade union members in the before questionnaire had a 
greater degree of belief that the level of payment would be sufficient to motivate. 
However, by the time of the second questionnaire, this had been reversed. Here, the 
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effect was dramatic with the mean score dropping from 3.82 to 2.75 whereas for non­
trade unionists, the drop was much less (from 3.53 to 3.39). The disillusionment for 
trade unionists was quite severe. 
It might have been expected that the beliefs of trade unionists would have been 
consistent, reflected in low standard deviation scores. -This was not actually the case. 
The level of standard deviation varied across the scales for both trade unionists and 
non-trade unionists. Despite trade unionists having strong views on Fairness and 
Principle, there was a surprisingly high variation in views reflected in a standard 
deviation greater than that for non-trade unionists. In their relations with their 
manager (Relation scale), however, non-trade unionists had a much greater variety of 
VIews. 
The result concerning trade union membership varies with both the Templeton project 
and the Thompson survey where no such differences were found between union and 
non-union membership. 
5.9.3 Gender 
Table 35 Responses by Gender - 'Before' questionnaire 
Mean Standard deviation 
Malen=69 Female n =32 Male Female 
Fairness 4.62* 3.95* 1.72 1.50 
Relation 3.92** 3.20** 1.34 1.37 
Motivation 5.17*** 4.21 *** 1.34 1.25 
Principle 4.09 3.86 1.67 1.58 
Culture 4.40 4.18 1.24 1.37 
Scale of payment 3.65 3.53 1.74 1.85 
(Reverse question) 
Pay satisfaction 5.17 4.65 1.75 1.91 
(T-test. P< .05 = *, P<.Ol = ** P< .001 = ***) 
In the first questionnaire (Table 35) there are some clear significant differences 
between the attitudes ofmales and females overall towards how they expect the 
scheme to work but the picture is mixed. Their views on the principle of the scheme 
are similar, and their views as to whether the scheme will alter the organisation's 
culture only vary slightly. On the other hand, in the scale on Fairness, Relationship 
with their Manager and Motivation there are significant differences, especially on 
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whether the scheme will motivate. Interestingly, satisfaction with their existing pay 
shows much less difference with both genders indicating little satisfaction. 
Table 36 Responses by Gender T test - 'After' questionnaire 
Mean Standard deviation 
Male n = 83 Female n =31 Male Female 
Fairness 3.99*** 2.97*** 1.68 1.10 
Relation 4.12*** 3.16*** 1.43 1.56 
Motivation 4.92*** 3.83*** 1.45 1.28 
Principle 4.31 *** 2.82*** 1.65 0.99 
Culture 4.58*** 3.75*** 1.47 1.43 
Scale of payment 2.96*** 3.71*** 1.65 1.65 
(Reverse question) 
Pay satisfaction 4.90*** 3.68*** 1.75 1.72 
(T-test P< .05 = *, P<.O 1 = ** P< .001 = ***) 
By the time of the second questionnaire (Table 36), the gender difference has 
extended considerably. The female group shows much more positive (lower, except in 
the reversed scale ofpayment scale) scores on all of the scales. This is very marked 
on 'principle' (from 3.86 to 2.82) and 'fairness' (from 3.95 to 2.97). The satisfaction 
of the female group with their pay has also markedly improved (from 4.65 to 3.68) 
whereas for males this is much less so (from 5.17 to 4.90). In each case, the 
differences between male and female perceptions produce some highly 
significant differences (at the .001 level). The null hypothesis 8b was thus 
rejected. 
A further development has occurred over the 'scale ofpayment' scale. In this reversed 
scoring, males have changed their viewpoint markedly from 3.65 to 2.96 indicating 
that the experience of the scheme has proved to them that the actual level of payments 
under the scheme is insufficient to motivate employees. For females, on the other 
hand, experience has made their views move marginally in the opposite direction 
(from 3.53 to 3.71) getting close to a neutral stance. They still believe that payments 
are insufficient but only marginally so. 
Interestingly, the views offemales have also become more coherent than those of 
males, as indicated by the standard deviations. In the 'before' questionnaire, the level 
of deviations were split almost evenly between males and females. Males were 
considerably higher for 'fairness' and marginally higher for motivation and 'principle' 
while females were higher for 'culture', scale of payment ' and 'pay satisfaction'. By 
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the time of the second questionnaire, standard deviations for males were greater in 
five cases with females only higher in 'relation' and equality in 'scale of payment' 
The views of females over 'fairness' and 'principle' had markedly become more 
coherent with a reduction in standard deviations from, respectively, 1.50 to 1.10 and 
1.58 to 0.99. This was a further indication that females, as a whole, had found the 
scheme to be fair and that it served to increase their perceptions that it was a good 
principle. That is not to say that the experience had made them regard the scheme as 
much of a motivator. They still had wide views on this with no change in the standard 
deviation. Nor did they consistently think it had changed the culture. The standard 
deviation had actually risen here. 
Overall, then, it can be said that the data supports findings that female employees are 
more positive towards performance pay. In itself, this is a significant finding in that it 
appears to counter the prevailing stereotype that females are generally opposed to the 
competitive element involved in perfonnance payor the distinct ratings that label 
employees under a performance pay system and that females would prefer that team 
working is given greater emphasis. The demographic structure of the organisation is 
that the vast majority of females work in the administrative chapter and have not yet 
permeated the technical or installation departments. This would appear to be 
discriminative in itself but does not seem to have influenced the responses. There 
were no responses that would indicate any sense ofgender discrimination. 
5.9.4 Age 
Tables 37 and 38 show that age has a positive relationship with most of the scale 
variables indicating that the older employees are, the more negative their views of 
performance pay. A significant correlation occurs for the joint questionnaires against 
the scales for Fairness, Motivation, Culture and Principle. However, the effect carries 
only a limited degree of significance. The highest correlation overall occurs with the 
principle of performance pay where the significance is at the .01 (**) level. The level 
of significance slips the more practical implications come into play. For example, it 
becomes almost non-existent on the scale of relationship with manager and pay 
satisfaction indicating that age, here, is an irrelevant factor. 
- -
Table 37 - Correlations comparing employee characteristics - joint questionnaire 
Age Grade Personal Rating Length of service Position in grade scale 
N= 219 211 62 217 215 
Fairness .146* -.037 -.137 .115 ..047 
Relation .054 .130 -.033 .045 .112 
Motivation .142* .123 -.040 .115 .186** 
Culture .194* -.055 .014 .076 .105 
Scale (rev) -.025 .099 -.033 -.044 -.074 
Pay satisfaction -.027 -.073 -.078 -.029 -.074 
Principle .221 ** .019 -.176 .199** .147* 
---- -~~----. - - -_ .. -_.. -
*Significant at 0.1 level 
"Significant at 0.05 level 
Table 38 - Correlations comparing employee characteristics - before and after questionnaires 
Age Grade Personal Rating Length of service Position in grade scale 
Before (q36) After (Q4I) Before (Q38) After (Q43) Before Atler(Q44) Before (Q39) After (Q45) Before (Q41) After (Q47) 
N= 102 112 98 III 62 101 III 110 
Fairness .221* .156 -.050 .014 N/a -.137 .106 .194* -.051 .137 
Relation .078 .005 .112 .128 N/a -.033 -.004 .057 .085 .144 
Motivation .232* .099 .098 .161 N/a -.040 .090 .163 .141 .226* 
Culture .313* .108 -.009 -.089 N/a .014 .078 .076 .134 0.83 
Scale of payment(rev) .071 -.063 .1I2 .117 N/a -.033 -.106 .040 -.088 -.069 , 
Pay satisfaction .029 -.037 -.051 -.070 N/a -.078 -.073 0.38 -.233* .073 I 
Principle .231 * .231 * -.093 .048 N/a -.176 .110 .294** .149 -.069 I 
.­
+>­
*Significant at 0.1 level \0 
"Significant at 0.05 level 
j~.. -­
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The correlation has reduced at the time ofthe second questionnaire where only the 
scale of principle remains significant. In other words, experience of the scheme 
reduces the effect of the age of the employee. The result in the case of 'Motivation' 
and 'Culture' has dropped sharply. Taken overall, age appears on the surface to be 
only a limited indicator where performance pay is concerned. The Null 
hypothesis 8c is not proven. 
5.9.5 Employee Grade 
It could be expected that employees who are on higher grades would be expected to 
be more positive towards performance pay. Performance pay is a management 
invention and those employees closer to management grades would be expected to 
give it more enthusiasm. Tables 37 and 38 show no support for this hypothesis and 
the Nun hypothesis 8d is proven. There is a small tendency, in fact, for negative 
views to increase with the level of grade (a positive correlation), as appeared more 
strongly in the Marsden and Richardson (1991) research. The highest results were 
against the scales for 'motivation' and 'relation with manager'. The higher the grade, 
the more likely employees are to believe the scheme will not motivate them and have 
less confidence that their manager will take the scheme seriously. However, this effect 
in this research is only slight and not significant. Nor is there any substantial 
difference between the 'before' and 'after' results. 
5.9.6 Personal Rating 
In question 44 of the second questionnaire, respondents were asked to identify their 
overall rating. Only around 55% decided to complete this entry for reasons that were 
not clear. However, there was sufficient data to test the hypothesis. 
It could be expected that employees who have good ratings would be more positive 
towards the scheme and vice versa, as found by Marsden and Richardson (1991). The 
evidence shown in Tables 37 and 38 provides little support for this. Although the 
correlations are generally negative, indicating that those with low ratings gave 
higher (more negative) responses, none of them are significant. The Null 
hypothesis is not proven. Only the scale of 'fairness' and 'principle' approaches a 
substantial score. Due to the lower percentage of responses here, it is difficult to draw 
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a sure conclusion that the level ofpersonal rating has no effect on employee 
perceptions of the scheme. 
5.9.7 Length of Service 
Questions 39 (Q1) and 45 (Q2) asked employees to give their length of service. The 
correlation analysis with responses on the performance pay scheme showed a mix set 
of figures as shown on Tables 37 and 38. Taking both questionnaires together, there 
was a strong correlation of service with a lack ofbelief in the 'principle' of 
performance pay. Otherwise, although there was a generally positive correlation, it 
was not at a significant level. The Null hypothesis 8e was not proven. Employees 
with longer service, therefore, would gravitate towards having negative views of 
performance pay, but not significantly negative. This generally supported findings in 
the Marsden and Richardson (1991) research. 
Looking at the two questionnaires separately, this tendency towards a negative view 
of performance pay has accentuated from the first to the second questionnaire. The 
movement has been especially strong as regards the 'principle' scale and the 
'Fairness' scale to the extent that 'fairness' correlation reaches a significant level 
(0.05) and 'motivation' is not far off. However, taking all the results together, the 

position cannot be said to be clear-cut. 

An interesting change is the movement on the 'scale of payment' (reverse) where the 
correlation has changed from being negative to being positive. As this is a reverse 
question it would indicate that experience of the scheme for, say, long-serving 
employees, has changed their views from considering that payments under the scheme 
may be insufficient to the view that they probably may be sufficient. However, the 
movement is comparatively small. This is difficult to explain. 
5.9.8 Position in Grade Scale 
The final characteristic investigated was the position ofthe employee's in their salary 
scale for their particular grade. Position on the scale in this organisation has 
traditionally been determined by service so employees move up their scale through 
annual or bi-annual increments. However, in recent years, a number of the 

organisations that merged or were taken over to make up the current Telecoms 
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organisation, used the employees' performance as an influence in salary 
determination. The position at the time of the research was, therefore, mixed. If salary 
was determined by service, then one would expect the length of service results to be 
replicated. If it was determined by performance, then one would tend to expect that 
employees on the top of the scale to be positive about performance pay, shown as a 
negative correlation. 
The actual results shown on Tables 37 and 38 were mixed, with most reflecting a 
similarity with those for length of service. Two major differences were apparent. 
There was a high degree of positive correlation on the motivation scale, which 
appeared to indicate that employees on the higher part of the scale did not believe that 
the scheme motivated while those on the lower part believed that it did motivate. As 
the level of salary increase depended in part on the employee's current position on the 
scale (see salary review matrix Table 12) then these findings give support to the use 
of such a matrix. The thinking behind the matrix is that employees at the top of the 
scale should be the top performers whereas those at the bottom ofthe scale are 
employees whose performance has room to improve. Therefore, if one of the latter 
receives a high rating reflecting high performance, then they deserve to receive a 
higher increase than average and move up the scale. On the other hand, if an 
employee at the top of the scale performs well, this merely reinforces their position as 
a high performer on a higher salary and their pay increase should be average. If any 
employee in this latter group performs badly, they should not receive any increase 
which would cause them to drop down the scale. 
There is considerable discussion in reward circles as to the appropriate use of such a 
matrix. There is no doubt that it may motivate those on the lower part of salary scales 
(as appears to be the case in this research). It does leave a difficulty, however, in 
motivating those on the top of their scale, especially as many regard being placed at 
the top of the scale to be a reward for previous past performance which cannot be 
taken away. It is one of the classic 'Kohn's punishments' to say to this group that the 
best they can do with a high performance in the salary period is to receive an average 
salary increase, whereas anything less will mean a lower than average salary increase. 
The author has found that experienced reward practitioners are less than convinced as 
to this explanation at a number of specialist reward course he has run for the 
... 
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Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development. In practice, good performers at the 
top of their scale are often paid a supplementary bonus that is not added to their salary 
in recognition of continuing high performance. 
The second difference was the movement between the first and second questionnaire 
in the response to principle. In the 'before' questionnaire, there was a significant 
(.05*) correlation recorded indicating that employees at the higher end ofthe scale 
disagreed with the principle of performance pay and vice versa. By the time of the 
second questionnaire, this had been reversed to leave a slight negative (not 
significant) correlation. This could be regarded as something of a culture change. As 
employees at the top of the scale increasingly realise that their salary determination 
becomes more reliant upon their performance, then they may come to believe in the 
principle a little more. In the case of those at the bottom ofthe scale, the experience of 
disappointment of some of them will reduce their belief in the principle of 
performance pay. The two factors may act to cancel themselves out, leaving a more or 
less neutral situation recorded in this research. 
Overall, perceptions towards performance pay are not correlated with position 
on the grade scale so the Null hypothesis is proven. 
5.10 Summary ofthe hypotheses associated with employee characteristics 
A summary of the hypothesis tested is set out in Table 39: 

The overall findings of this section will be discussed further in chapter 6. 

5.11 Cluster Analysis 
The results in the analysis of characteristics were generally neutral, with few clear 
features that may influence employees' perception ofthe subject. Trade unionists 
generally opposed performance pay while women were in favour. For the other 
characteristics, no significant pointers emerged by taking either both 'before' and 
'after' separately or as one group. However, an analysis of the results showed that 
standard deviations in many of the areas were quite high reflecting a wide variety of 
.. _---­-_.". 
154 
views. Despite the overall improvement shown in the second questionnaire, there was 
also a sense from some of the 'after' respondents that the scheme had not in any way 
Table 39 Summary of the Outcomes of the Employee Characteristics Hypotheses 
Sub-hypothesis Sa - Trade union 
membership 
That there is no difference in perception of 
performance pay between trade unionists and 
non-trade unionists. 
Suh-hypothesis 8h -Gender 
That there is no difference in attitude towards 
performance pay between men and women. 
Suh-hypothesis 8e - Age 
That the age of the employee does not affect 
the attitude towards performance pay 
Sub-hypothesis 8d - Level ofseniority 
That the seniority of an employee does not 
affect the attitude towards performance pay. 
Sub-hypothesis 8e - Employee rating 
That the personal ratings obtained under the 
scheme do not influence the attitude towards 
perfonnance pay. 
Sub-hypothesis 8f- Length ofservice 
That the length of service of the employee 
does not influence the attitude towards 
performance pay. 
Sub- hypothesis 8g - Position in grade scale 
That the position in the grade scale does not 
influence the attitude towards performance 
pay. 
Null hypothesis rejected. Significant 
association between trade union 
membership and negative perception 
ofperfonnance pay. 
Null hypothesis rejected. Significant 
difference between perceptions by 
female (positive) and male (neutral to 
negative) 
Null hypothesis not proven. 
Differences associated with age but 
not significant. 
Nun hypothesis supported. Minor 
negative association between age and 
perception ofperformance pay 
Null hypothesis not proven. 
Evidence of association between 
level ofemployee rating and 
perception of performance pay but 
not significant. 
Null hypothesis not proven. 
Evidence of association between 
length of service and lack of belief in 
performance pay but not significant. 
Null hypothesis supported. No 
association shown between position 
on grade scale and perception of 
performance pay. 
convinced them of the benefits of performance pay as some of the conunents recorded 
earlier signify. 
For this reason, Cluster analysis was carried out to try to identify ifgroups of 
employees who had positive or negative views of the scheme had any similar 
characteristics. Cluster analysis was utilised to sort employee responses into a number 
of homogenous groups (Saunders 1999). This is an interdependence method where the 
relationships between objects and subjects are explored without a dependent variable 
being identified. SSPS provides a technique for identifying the employees whose 
responses draw them into groups reflecting their overall attitude towards the 
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performance pay scheme. Previous research, as shown in the literature survey, 
identified attitudes towards performance pay by way of characteristics but no research 
has been identified where groups that are strongly for or against performance are 
identified and analysed to see if they have any characteristics in common. 
This analysis was carried out with both sets of questioIUlaires. In both analyses, three 
sets of employees were identified. In the first questionnaire (,before') the clusters 
were not very clearly delineated and no detailed analysis has been carried out for the 
benefit of this dissertation. In the second questionnaire, however, after employees had 
experience of operating within the workings of a performance pay scheme, there were 
three groups who had a high degree of separation. These groups are shown in 
Appendix 9 and a note accompanies the chart identifying how the choices of clusters 
were made. The results of this separation will provide the basis of this cluster analysis 
and show some interesting insights into the research findings. 
'After' Questionnaire 
The first group, totalling 16 employees, was strongly negative against the scheme. 
The second (middle) group, 63 strong, had views that did not vary too widely from 
the overall means. The third group, totalling 30 employees, was generally positive 
towards the scheme. The two groups at the extremes will be the subject of further 
discussion and analysis. 
The way the three group's opinions varies is shown in Table 40 which summaries the 
means and standard deviations for each of the questions. This shows clearly the 
degree of cohesiveness in respect of a number of scales. In the Positive cluster, for 
example, the standard deviations are nearly all close to 1.00 in the first seven scales. 
In the majority of the questions making up the Fairness and Relation scales, the 
'I 
standard deviation is less than one. For the negative cluster, the standard deviations on 
the motivation scale are even lower, averaging only 0.58 and actually recording a 
score of zero on Question 35 (Performance pay has helped employees' morale in 
general), where a1116 respondents gave a '7' response. The middle cluster, as perhaps 
to be expected, has higher standard deviations in general but they also show a 
coherent pattern throughout. 
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Table 40 Summary of views of three cluster groups - 'after' questionnaire 
Positive (n-30) Middle (n-63) Negative (0-16) Overall (n=109) 
SCALES Mean s.d Mean s.d Mean s.d. Mean s.d 
1. Fairness 
Q19 2.43 1.01 3.63 1.46 6.25 0.77 3.69 1.73 
Q22 2.57 1.28 4.16 1.72 6.56 0.63 4.07 1.93 
Q30 2.33 0.92 3.59 1.68 6.25 1.06 3.63 1.87 
Q31 2.43 0.97 3.41 1.43 6.25 1.18 3.56 1.75 
Q40 2.13 0.94 3.95 1.84 5.88 1.78 3.73 2.01 
Fairness average 2.37 1.02 3.75 1.63 6.24 1.13 3.70 1.86 
2.Relationship 
with manager 
Q15 2.17 0.95 3.41 1.56 4.44 1.93 3.22 1.65 
Q16 2.70 0.99 4.38 1.69 6.13 1.15 4.17 1.81 
Q25 2.50 0.90 3.98 1.66 6.38 0.72 3.93 1.82 
Q36 3.50 1.70 4.98 1.60 6.06 1.69 4.73 1.83 
Average - 2.72 1.14 4.19 1.53 5.75 1.37 4.35 1.78 
Relationship 
3.Motivation 
Q12 2.67 1.03 4.67 1.47 6.50 0.82 4.39 1.77 
Q13 2.70 1.02 4.78 1.42 6.56 0.73 4.47 1.76 
Q18 3.20 1.19 5.22 1.48 6.81 0.54 4.90 1.75 
Q21 3.00 1.29 4.56 1.42 6.31 1.20 4.39 1.70 
Q28 2.77 1.01 4.56 1.30 6.63 0.50 4.37 1.66 
Q34 2.80 1.10 5.02 1.37 6.94 0.25 4.69 1.79 
Q35 3.83 1.05 5.51 1.13 7.00 00 5.27 1.44 
Ave- Motivation 3.00 1.10 4.90 1.37 6.68 0.58 4.64 1.70 
4. Cultural 
change 
Q26 3.70 1.18 5.10 1.34 6.88 0.34 4.97 1.55 
Q32 2.37 0.89 3.89 1.69 5.94 1.61 3.77 1.86 
Ave - culture 3.03 1.03 4.50 1.51 6.41 0.97 4.37 1.70 
5.Scale of 3.97 1.38 2.92 1.54 2.63 2.28 3.17 1.69 
payment 
(reverse) Q24 
6.Satisfaction 3.27 1.60 4.79 1.65 6.00 1.37 4.55 1.82 
with Pay (Q 23), 
7.Principle of 
performance pay 
Q14 2.40 1.10 3.33 1.59 6.38 1.02 3.52 1.87 
Q39 2.33 0.76 4.75 1.65 6.63 0.62 4.36 1.94 
Ave- Principle 2.37 0.93 4.04 1.62 6.50 0.82 3.94 1.90 
8.Teamworking 
Q17 4.60 1.75 4.41 1.96 2.38 1.71 4.17 2.00 
Q20 1.70 0.79 2.25 1.40 3.69 2.33 2.31 1.56 
Q27 2.27 1.23 3.35 1.71 5.06 1.91 3.30 1.83 
Q29 2.03 0.76 2.24 1.23 4.56 2.28 2.53 1.57 
Q33 3.37 lAO 4.68 1.31. 6.88 0.34 4.64 1.65 
Q38 3.10 0.96 4.70 1.42 6.50 0.82 4.52 1.63 
9. Return to 5.23 1.59 4.16 1.77 1.44 0.63 4.06 1.99 
previous system 
(reverse)(Q37) 
..A detaIled analysls now follows on the negatlve and the posItlve cluster. 
"' 
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5.11.1 Negative Cluster 
Having identified a negative cluster of 16 employees, the next stage is to analyse their 
personal characteristics and compare them with the total sample. This is carried out in 
Table 41. 
Table"l 

Characteristics of 16 employees with strong negative views on performance pay 

Sub set Whole sample 
No % No % 
1. Analysis by sex 
Males 16 100 85 71 
Females a a 31 26 
Details not given - - 3 3 
Total 16 100 119 100 
2. Analysis by trade union membership 
Trade union members 10 63 35 29 
Non-members 5 31 78 66 
Details not given 1 6 6 5 
Total 16 100 119 100 
3. Analysis by job grade 
Grade 1 (lowest) 
- - I 1 
Grade 2 
- -
1 1 
Grade 3 1 6 3 3 
Grade 4 - - 19 16 
Grade 5 1 6 21 17 
Grade 6 10 63 36 30 
Grade 7 2 13 18 15 
Grade 8 - - II 9 
Grade 9 - - 2 2 
Details not given 2 13 7 6 
Total 16 101* 119 100 
Average grade 5.9 5." 
4 Analysis by Service 
Under 1 year . 
-
3 3 
1-3 years . 
-
19 16 
4-6 years 1 6 16 13 
7-9 years 2 13 17 14 
10-20 years 3 19 27 22 
Over 20 years 9 56 33 28 
Details not given 1 6 4 4 
Total 16 100 119 100 
Average Service 22.4 14.3 
5. Analysis by Age 
16-20 - - - -
21-25 - - 7 6 
26-30 
- - 11 9 
31·35 2 13 21 17 
36·40 1 6 17 14 
41-45 3 19 21 17 
46·50 5 31 17 14 
51-55 3 19 16 13 
56·60 2 13 4 4 
61-65 
- -
4 4 
Details not given 
- -
4 4 
Total 16 101* 119 99' 
Average Age 46.8 40.6 
6. Position in pay scale 
Lower end of range 2 13 31 28 
Middle ofrange 8 50 38 34 
Upper end of range . 
-
15 13 
Don't know 6 37 28 25 
Total 16 100 112 100 
• total not 100% due to rounding 
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By concentrating on this group of 16 employees who have the most negative views of 
perfonnance pay, it is possible to highlight certain characteristics about this important 
group. They are important because the strength of their views not only influence the 
statistics of this research but may present a hard core of opposition to the development 
ofperfonnance pay schemes. 
Here, a number of clear differences immediately show themselves. Firstly, they are an 
all-male group. In the whole sample, there are 31 females representing 26% of the 
sample but not one appears in this negative cluster. There is also a much stronger 
representation of trade union members. 63% of the negative cluster are members 
compared to only 29% of the total sample. In terms of seniority in the organisation, 
the average grade level is somewhat higher at 5.9 compared to 5.4 for the whole 
sample. More important, most of the sample is concentrated in grade 10, a grade just 
above the middle rank, indicating a homogenous group. 
The average service is very much higher at 22.4 years for this group compared to the 
whole sample at 14.3 years. More than half the group has over 20 years service. They 
are also somewhat older on average at 46.8 years compared to 40.6 for the whole 
sample. In terms of the position in the pay scale, none of the negative cluster are in 
the upper end of the range, compared to 13% of the whole sample. 
In terms of their overall individual rating, only seven reported the their figures which 
were generally mixed. One other reported that they 'have forgotten but remember it 
was lower than expected'. Given the difficulties with this measure, not too much 
should be read into this specific result. 
To sum-up, those employees with strong negative views are characterised by 
being male, trade union members, older with longer service and being in middle 
grades. These findings are crucial in being more a more precise collection of 
characteristics than those generalised findings for all employees in other research. If 
this research can be generalised, it allows an organisation to be able to pinpoint the 
groups that are likely to strenuously oppose performance pay and who will need to be 
won over. 
'@Wt-g 
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The fmdings are also of interest in that there is some variation with previous research 
findings as detailed in the literature survey. For instance, union membership has not 
always been found to be significantly associated with a negative stance. Long service 
has often been associated with loyalty and commitment, rather than strenuous 
opposition to company initiatives. 
Not surprisingly, the overall reactions of the negative cluster to their combined rating 
(Question 1) was equally negative as shown in Table 42. 
Table 42 Negative Cluster -Response to 'after' Questionnaire, Question 1 
What has been your overall reaction to your combined ratings 
Negative cluster Whole sample 
Nos % Nos % 
Very fair 1 - - 16 14 
Fair 2 2 13 51 43 
Uncertain 3 4 25 30 27 
Unfair 4 5 31 12 10 
Very Unfair 5 5 31 7 6 
Total 16 100 116 100 
Average rating 3.8 2.5 
t Out of the 19 employees in the whole sample who found their combined ratings 
J,' (objectives and contribution) to be 'unfair' or 'very unfair', over half (10) were in this 
, 
group of negative employees. ~ 
I 
A breakdown of the separate ratings for objectives and contribution follows the same 
t pattern as shown in Table 43. Reaction to the 'soft' ratings yielded a slightly higher 
I degree of dissatisfaction. This may be because of the greater SUbjectivity involved in 
these ratings. One respondent commented: J 
• 	 'Most ofthe ratings are total guesswork or opinion of one person. Assessment 
should be on engineers doing job properly - 'are customers satisfied?' 
Most of the criticisms were saved, however, for the way objectives were set, 
monitored and assessed. 
160 
• 'Facts were incorrect. Goalposts were moved. Manager did not know us. It was all 
guesswork. ' 
It 'The objectives were set without any input from me. The assessment was largely 
based on conjecture and guesswork on the part of management.' 
• 'No contact with me so how was assessment achieved?' 
It 'The objectives were unrealistic and unobtainable and the employee cannot 
influence the outcome.' 
Table 43 Negative Cluster -Response to 'after' Questionnaire, Questions 4 and 6 
What has been your reaction to your ratings under objectives and contribution 
Negative cluster Whole sample 
Nos % Nos % 
Objectives 
Very fair 1 -
-
12 10 
Fair 2 3 19 59 49 
Uncertain 3 6 38 22 19 
Unfair 4 4 25 13 11 
Very Unfair 5 2 13 3 3 
No response 1 6 10 8 
Total 16 101* 119 100 
Average rating 3.3 2.4 
Contribution 
Very Fair 1 
- - 15 13 
Fair 2 3 19 50 42 
Uncertain 3 4 25 30 25 
Unfair 4 5 31 7 6 
Very Unfair 5 3 19 4 4 
No response 1 6 13 11 
Total 16 100 116 100 
Average rating 3.5 2.4 
It does not surprise that a number ofhostile comments about the performance pay 
scheme, as a whole, emanate from this sub-group. A number were simple and direct: 
• 'Scrap it!' ( a number of examples repeated this expression) 
• 'Do away with Performance pay' 
Others were more measured: 
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• 	 'Performance pay may be a brilliant idea but, when all is said and done, it is no 
different to a manager assessing you. It just wastes a lot more time, paper and 
money. It probably means that each member of staff is thought about a bit more 
carefully but the outcome is the same from a management point of view. From the 
employees' point of view, it just seems to drop morale even lower. Finally, 
performance pay can and is used by some managers as a weapon. People are 
asked to do ajob, i.e. out of hours. You have a previous commitment and are 
unable to help. You now have 0% for flexibility and so on.' 
Further comments included two that demonstrated the deeply held philosophical 
opposition to the principle of performance pay: 
• 	 'You have no control over your performance pay. You are in as much control of 
your destiny as the white rat has over the experiment in which it is involved.' 
• 	 'Typical mundane methods of treating human resources when under social 
troubles in Britain as at present. Remember people are human and not robots.' 
These employees saw the of performance pay very much as a method ofenforcing 
control, which has been identified in this research as a managerial objective of 
performance pay. They saw little evidence of the 'softer' or 'cultural' objectives, such 
as increasing trust or operating in a fair environment. 
5.11.2 The Positive Cluster 
The cluster analysis has identified 30 employees (27%) whose views were generally 
positive towards the scheme. Table 44 identifies their individual characteristics. 
It stands out immediately that this group contains a high proportion ofJemales (47% 
compared to the whole sample of 26%) and a low proportion of trade union members. 
(17% compared to 29%) The grade position average was not significantly different to 
the average but there was a much greater representation of employees at both the 
higher end (Grades 8 and 9) and at the lower end (grades 4 and 5). The middle grades 
6 and 7 were under represented significantly. 
@ @+ 
-
162 
Table 44 Characteristics of 30 employees with POSI'flye Vlews on performance pay 
1. Analysis by sex 
No 
SlIb set 
% 
Whole sample 
No % 
Males 
Females 
Details not given 
Total 
15 
14 
1 
30 
50 
47 
3 
100 
85 
31 
3 
119 
71 
26 
3 
100 
2. Analysis by trade union membership 
Trade union members 
Non-members 
Details not given 
Total 
5 
24 
I 
30 
17 
80 
3 
100 
35 
78 
6 
119 
29 
66 
5 
100 
3. Analysis by job grade 
Grade 1 (lowest) 
-
- 1 1 
Grade 2 
-
· 
1 1 
Grade 3 1 3 3 3 
Grade 4 10 33 19 1.6 
Grade 5 6 20 21 17 
Grade 6 5 17 36 30 
Grade 7 1 3 18 15 
Grade 8 4 14 11 9 
Grade 9 2 7 2 2 
Details not given 1 3 7 6 
Total 30 100 119 100 
Average grade 5.5 5.4 
4 Analysis by Service 
Under 1 year . 
· 
3 3 
1-3 years 7 22 19 16 
4-6 years 2 7 16 13 
7-9 years 6 19 17 14 
10-20 years 6 19 27 22 
Over 20 years 8 26 33 28 
Details not given 1 7 4 4 
Total 30 100 119 100 
Average service 13.5 14.3 
5. Analysis by Age 
16-20 . 
-
. 
-
21-25 3 10 7 6 
26-30 2 7 11 9 
31-35 7 22 21 17 
36-40 2 7 17 14 
41-45 4 13 21 17 
46-50 5 16 17 14 
51-55 6 19 16 13 
56-60 -
· 
4 4 
61-65 - · 4 4 
Details not given 1 3 4 4 
Total 30 97* 119 99* 
Average Age 40.1 40.6 
6.Position in Pay scale 
Lower end ofrange 12 40 31 28 
Middle of range 12 40 38 34 
Upper end of range 2 7 15 13 
Don't know 4 13 28 25 
Total 30 100 112 100 
* total not 100% due to roundmg 
In tenus of age, the proportions in the younger groupings (21-35) had a somewhat 
higher representation as did those 46-55 with the middle-aged group rather 
umepresented proportionately. Service tended to be lower on average but not 
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significantly. The position in the pay scale also tended towards the lower end but this 
was blurred by the lower proportion who did not know compared to the full sample. 
To sum up, this group was the mirror image of the negative cluster, being non trade 
union members, higher female representation, fewer employees in the middle grades 
or middle aged with somewhat lower service. 
It was, again, unsurprising that this cluster had a positive view of their Ratings, which 
emerged from the performance management process, as shown in Table 45. Their 
average rating was 1.9 and half of the top rating (very fair) came from this subgroup. 
Table 45 Positive Cluster - Response to 'after' Questionnaire, Question 1 
What has been your overall reaction to your combined ratings 
Positive cluster Whole sample 
Nos 0/0 Nos 0/0 
Very fair 1 8 27 16 14 
Fair 2 19 63 51 43 
Uncertain 3 1 3 30 27 
Unfair 4 2 12 12 10 
Very Unfair 5 - - 7 6 
Total 30 100 116 100 
Average rating 1.9 2.5 
The tendencies are even clearer when the responses to questions concerning their 
specific ratings on 'contribution' and 'objectives' are concerned as shown in Table 
46. The average rates are much higher than for the whole sample and only one 
respondent out of 30 has regarded a rating unfair. 
There are fewer personal comments from this positive cluster in proportion to their 
size. Perhaps satisfied customers have less to say, and especially less to complain 
about. The few who contributed were either losing for an ideal of consistency within 
the scheme or had a view relating to the practical issues of team relationships and 
team working: 
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Table 46 Positive Cluster -Response to 'after' Questionnaire Questions 4 and 6 
What has been your reaction to your ratings under objectiv:s and contribution 
Positive cluster Whole sample 
Nos % Nos % 
Objectives Q6 
Very fair 1 6 20 12 10 
Fair 2 21 70 59 49 
Uncertain 3 2 7 22 19 
Unfair 4 1 3 13 11 
Very Unfair 5 
- - 3 3 
No response 
- - 10 8 
Total 30 100 119 100 
Average rating 1.9 2.4 
Contribution Q4 
Very Fair 1 8 27 15 13 
Fair 2 17 56 50 42 
Uncertain 3 3 10 30 25 
Unfair 4 - - 7 6 
Very Unfair 5 - - 4 4 
No response 2 7 13 11 
Total 30 100 116 100 
Average rating 1.1 2.4 
• 	 The Performance pay this time round is fairer I think because the sales target is 
the 'team target'. I am pleased that this has not lessened my motivation to sell. 
• 	 I feel that Performance has created very selfish views to some individuals, i.e.'this 
is nothing to do with me' and they therefore refuse to accept responsibility. Some 
departments don't conform to proper or correct procedures as this goes against 
their Performance pay objectives. 
• 	 The scheme is excellent but it required more accuracy and feed-back to 
individuals requires procedural time tabling in line with staff dialogue or similar. 
• 	 The 'contribution' rating needs re-thinking in line with lower grade personneL 
An interesting final cluster analysis (Table 47) shows support for Equity theory 
(Adams 1965). The positive cluster reports a high score for the fairness of their 
individual ratings under 'contribution' and 'objectives'. This averaged 1.9 compared 
to an average score for the whole sample of2.5. They also scored much higher on 
their individual motivation . 
., 
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Table 47 - Cluster analysis and Equity Theory - after questionnaire 
Positive Negative Whole 
cluster cluster sample 
Q 1 Reaction to combined ratings 1.9 (Fair) 3.8 (unfair) 2.5 
Q4 Reaction to contribution ratings 1.7 (Fair) 3.5 (unfair) 2.4 
Q6 Reaction to objectives ratings 1.9 (Fair) 3.3 (uncertain) 2.4 
Q7 Satisfaction with salary arising 2.2 4.1 2.9 
from performance pay (dissatisfied) 
Q 12 Performance pay has given me 2.67 6.50 4.39 
a greater incentive to get my work 
priorities right 
Q 13 Performance pay has given me 2.70 6.56 4.47 
the incentive to work beyond the 
immediate requirements ofmy job 
Q28 Performance pay has 2.77 6.63 4.37 
encouraged me to give a sustained 
performance at work 
Q34 Performance pay has raised 2.80 6.94 4.69 
my motivation at work 
This demonstrates that those groups of employees who considered that they had been 
the recipients of procedural justice considered that the scheme motivated them. On the 
other hand, those employees who felt that procedural justice was not in place gave 
poor scorings on the motivation scale. The two issues were linked very closely 
together. 
Certainly the two groups produced substantially different results. It the final chapter, 
it will be discussed how, if at all, the organisation can manage to convert the negative 
cluster towards the positive viewpoint and how to make use of the positive cluster is 
discussed. 
5.12 Summary of Finrlings of Telecoms Data 
Chapter 5 has been chiefly concerned with investigating the outputs of a Performance 
pay scheme, researching the employees' views and perceptions of its operation and 
success. However, it was also possible to examine the objectives underpinning the 
introduction of the scheme. 
==7 

I A number of findings emerged from the statistical analysis of the outputs of the 
I scheme. A summary ofthe hypotheses that were tested are set out in Table 48 
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The major elements can be summarised as follows: 
• 	 In the longitudinal aspect of the study, the data from the 'after' questionnaire 
shows the employees having a much more positive view of the scheme following 
one years' experience. 
• 	 Employees have equivocal views as to the 'fairness' of the scheme and are not 
convinced that pay is distributed in line with contribution. They point to many 
fractures in the scheme design and its operation in practice. However, the overall 
view in the 'after' questioonaire veers towards the positive. 
• 	 Employees are quite clear that the scheme does nothing to improve motivation or 
commitment. Evidence supports the working of Equity Theory 
• 	 There is no support for the view from employees that performance pay has helped 
to facilitate a cultural change, a view that did not improve in the 'after' 
questionnaire. 
• 	 Employees showed general dissatisfaction with their level ofpay, although there 
was some improvement in the 'after questionnaire'. There was no indication, 
therefore, that performance pay increased retention. 
• 	 There was continued support for the principle ofperfonnance pay, despite the 
above results and there was no widespread view that the scheme should be 
abandoned. 
• 	 There was support for incorporating team elements into the performance 
management process and that individual performance pay worked against 
effective team working. 
• 	 Employee characteristics analysis showed that women were more positive towards 
performance pay than men, that trade union members were generally antagonistic 
and that younger employees gave it more support than older employees (but not 
significantly so). 
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Figure 48 Summary of hypotheses fi~dings - Telecoms 
Hypothesis one - FAIRNESS 
That performance pay contributes to the 
objective of distributing pay increases in line 
with employee contribution 
Hypothesis two - MORALE AND 
COMMITMENT 
That performance pay contributes towards the 
objective of increasing employee morale and 
commitment 
Hypothesis three - MOTIVATION 
That performance pay contributes to the 
objective of motivating the work force 
Hypothesis four - CULTURE CHANGE 
That performance pay contributes to the 
objective of instilling a positive message 
about performance expectations and the 
achievement ofcompany objectives which is 
recognised by the employees as a culture 
change 
Hypothesis five ­
RETENTIONILOYALTY 
That performance pay contributes to the 
objective of offering a competitive salary and 
benefits package in comparison to rival 
companies in order to reduce staff turnover 
and attract a higher calibre of staff 
Hypothesis six 
That paying performance pay on an individual 
basis works against the concept of team 
working 
Hypothesis seven 
That experience of operating a performance 
pay scheme has a negative effect upon 
employees' perception of the scheme 
compared with their expectations at the time 
when the scheme is introduced 
Hypothesis not proven. Employees 
very mildly positive but not 
significantly so. Problems due mostly 
to difficulties with performance 
management scheme 
Hypothesis rejected. Employees 
believe that PERFORMANCE PAY 
does not increase morale or 
commitment. Again, difficulties with 
nature of scheme and way it is 
implemented. 
Hypothesis rejected .. Employees do 
not believe that PERFORMANCE 
PAY increases motivation. 
Hypothesis rejected. Negative 
perception by employees although 
some indications of accepted change 
through behavioural alterations 
brought about through performance 
management scheme 
Hypothesis not proven. Employees 
not satisfied with pay levels but 
positive about PERFORMANCE 
PAY increases at end of fIrst year 
Hypothesis proven. 
Hypothesis rejected. Employee 

ratings of scheme have improved 

after one year of operation. 

• 	 A cluster analysis showed that three distinct attitudinal groups existed. There was 
an extremely negative cluster who were all male, on average grades, long service 
and with a strong trade union representation. Their strong views influenced the 
overall statistical results. There was also a positive cluster who tended to be 
female, younger, with lower service, non-trade unions members and little 
represented in the middle grades The positive cluster do not hold their opinions so 
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strongly in terms of their scoring. The middle group showed characteristics of the 
sample as a whole. 
Although the general reaction to the scheme appears to be negative, the message from 
the Telecoms employees, may not be such a bleak one. It could be interpreted as 
follows: 
'Our morale and motivation is not improved but we want to hold on to the scheme. 
We are not paid enough, but none ofus would admit to being paid right, let alone too 
much, and we thought the last pay increase was pretty decent. The managers are not 
yet competent at running the performance management scheme but their general 
judgements were not far out. There are still plenty of things wrong with the scheme. 
You need to act to fine tune the details, you need a better process of consultation to 
decide the objectives, you need to give further training on the operation of the scheme 
both in setting objectives and measuring the results, you need a better organised 
communication system to ensure that it reflects the exact value you are trying to instil 
- Communication is open and honest. You need to talk to us more about it. ' 
5.12.1 Methodological Issues 
Before closing this chapter, it is valuable to address some concerns over the 
methodology utilised in this research to ensure that correct conclusions can be drawn 
from data obtained. 
Were the right questions asked? 
In most performance pay survey of employees, the question is asked as to whether 
performance pay motivates employees to work harder. In every survey, including this 
one, the answer is a clear no. In many ways, this is a naive question to ask. Very few 
employees would admit that they did not currently work hard, whether they did or not. 
It is akin to asking if they have a sense ofhumour. It could be argued, then, that the 
answers to this question should be discounted. A more interesting question would be 
to ask the employees' managers if the employees were motivated by performance pay. 
To a certain extent this can be analysed by looking at the responses to employees in 
higher grades who, in general, will be supervisors and managers with staff working 
for them. A total of 13 employees from the top two grades responded for the second 
\ 
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questionnaire. On the construct of 'Motivation', their mean scores are as set out in 
Figure 49 
Figure 49 Responses by Employees in Grades 8 and 9 on 'After' Questionnaire 
Question Mean for Mean for All 
Grades 8 and 9 grades 
12. Performance pay has given me a greater 4.0 4.42 
incentive to get my work priorities right 
13. Performance pay has given me the 4.2 4.79 
incentive to work beyond the immediate 
requirements ofmy job 
18. Performance pay has raised motivation in 4.1 4.84 
general 
21 Performance pay increases the quality of 4.2 4.35 
employees' work 
28 Performance pay has encouraged me to 4.2 4.34 
give a sustained performance at work 
34 Performance pay has raised my motivation 4.4 4.66 
at work 
35 Performance pay has helped employees' 4.0 5.20 
morale in general 
There are three interesting points arising from the response from these two top graded 
employees. The first is that the mean scores are better than the total response for every 
question relating to this construct. This is despite the statistical evidence that there is 
no correlation between the grade level and the positive nature of the response. The 
main reason for this apparent contradiction is that many of the employees in the grade 
7 are the schemes strongest opponents, as explained in section 5.11. However, those 
in a supervisory or management position are more positive. 
The second point is that the means for the questions that refer to the general standings 
on motivation and morale, (Q18 and Q35) are very much better for the higher grade 
employees at 4.1 and 4.0 respectively. It could be said, therefore, that there is a 
dichotomy of views on the troubled issue of the effect of performance pay on 
motivation and morale. One might consider that those at the centre of the 
organisation, the first line managers, would have a more objective view on this 
question than top management, who would have the proverbial axes to grind, and 
employees, who would respond on what they thought, but not necessarily on how they 
;;as 
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actually acted. Having said this, the views ofthe employees in senior grades are only 
neutral at best. But they do not regard performance pay as de-motivational. 
A final point is that the standard deviation for the higher grades is greater than that of 
the whole respondent group. For one employee on grade 9, the responses are all lower 
than 2.0. For one on grade 8, there are three 7s and a six. So the views are very varied, 
even at this level. 
Another question mark could be addressed concerning the question on cultural change 
(Q21126). Would employees recognise a 'cultural change'? Do they know what it 
means? Would a year be sufficient for them to judge whether a cultural change would 
take place? 
Were employees were asked in the right way? 
This question has, to a certain extent, been examined in the chapter on methodology 
but a further point can be made here. There are considerable advantages in 
triangulation and the lack of carrying out extensive focus group work could represent 
a weakness. In such groups, it is possible to anticipate some of the questionnaire 
findings and to question the basis on which employees have the views they possess. 
Those that took place were somewhat inconclusive, partly because insufficient time 
was allocated and there was some questioning over the reason for their inclusion in 
the group. There was also a degree of suspicion over confidentiality. Viewpoints 
expressed were therefore muted and little evidence could be utilised from this source. 
All organisations are the product oftheir history and the recent turbulence of 
Telecoms may have had a severe influence to the extent that employees may have 
wanted to make their voice heard in ways that currently may not have been available. 
This can only be surmised. On the other hand, focus groups have their critics and 
group views expressed in informal discussions need very careful analysis. They can 
be an excellent method of obtaining generalised viewpoints and specific criticisms 
and quotations but they do not naturally lay themselves open to statistical analysis. 
, L 
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Were the right employees asked. 
In this study, responses came from a good cross-chapter of grades, although it could 
be argued that there was insufficient data and comment from senior managers and 
heads of department, such as obtained by Harris (2001). This may have thrown more 
light on the counterpoint between the espoused objectives and strategy set out by 
senior HR managers and the practicalities of running the scheme from an operational 
management viewpoint. This is not regarded, however, as a serious omission. A 
number of respondents to the questionnaire were in grades immediately below head of 
department and had day-to-day control and involvement in major performance issues, 
such as objective setting and input into the performance assessment process. 
Moreover, the overall strategy in relation to the scheme which was described in 
chapter 4.2.3, was written andlor supported by senior management and was well 
publicised in the organisation. 
Conclusion 
The findings in this chapter were extensive. Much of the evidence throws a negative 
light on the hypotheses, while the cluster analysis has thrown up considerable data on 
the nature of the support or opposition to the scheme. These, and other elements of the 
findings will be summarised and interpreted in Chapter 6, 
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CHAPTER 6·· INTERPRETATION, DISCUSSION AND LESSONS FROM 

THE RESEARCH 

6.1 Introduction 
Hamlet: Do you see yonder cloud that's almost in the shape ofa camel? 

Polonius: By the mass, and 'tis like a camel, indeed 

Hamlet: Methinks it is like a weasel. 

Polonius: It is backed like a weasel. 

Hamlet: Or like a whale? 

Polonius: Very like a whale. 

(pvilliam Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act 3, Scene 2) 

The literature review has made it clear that there are many conflicting viev,rpoints to 
performance pay. It is seen by academics and practitioners in different ways, 
depending on their interest and philosophy and the role they play in such schemes. 
The aims of this research have been to throw additional light onto a subject where 
there are many shades of opinion, some darker than others. This [mal chapter will deal 
with the following subject areas: 
• 	 6.2 An examination of the findings from the three case studies as they apply to 
the research questions and the hypotheses. 
• 	 6.3 An assessment of the significance of these findings and whether, and by how 
much, they add to existing knowledge. In other words, whether they have they 
taking our total knowledge any further. 
• 	 6.4 A collection of important implications for management thinking on reward 
strategy in general and specific implications for organisations who are planning to 
operate, or who are already operating performance pay schemes. 
+ 	6.5 Some suggested ways in which the research can be taken forward into key 
areas. 
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6.2 Examination of the Findings 
The research questions (see page 9) in this thesis cover the reasons why organisations 
introduce performance pay and the outcomes "they expect. They go on to investigate 
some of these outcomes in practice, specifically those relating to fairness, 
morale/commitment, motivation, culture, employee retention and the effect on team 
working. Finally the question is asked as to whether specific employee characteristics 
make employees more positive or negative towards the outcomes of performance pay. 
6.2.1 Examining organisational objectives for introducing performance pay 
Research question 1 dealt with an examination of the objectives for introducing 
performance pay in three organisations. A summary of these findings was set out in 
Table 9 on page 98 and Table lOon page 102. 
It can be seen that elements of the objectives reside in each ofthe three organisations 
but they vary in their importance. As far as the operational objectives were 
concerned, control was a key element in the David Webster scheme but was ofless 
importance for the other organisations. An important factor to remember here was that 
most of the workforce carried out their activities away from supervision so an 
alternative method of control was significant. 
U sing performance pay as a communication medium was important for all four 
organisations, but especially so for Telecoms and David Webster, where there was a 
rapidly changing external environment. Performance pay was less important for 
recruiting and retaining employees overall although it did playa crucial part in the 
reward strategy for David Webster. 
U sing performance pay to assist cultural change was the most consistently important 
factor in the cultural elements. All three organisations used schemes either as part of a 
raft of changes or to drive home the one important contextual change element. The 
cultural change to sharing risks was important at Merck, Sharp and Dohme, while 
David Webster aimed to change the mind-set from a local authority viewpoint to that 
of a entrepreneurial organisation in the private sector. 
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To improve a sense of trust and openness had a medium importance at all three 
organisations while the emphasis on encouraging drive and motivation was a long­
term objective for Merck, Sharp and Dohme. This was a more immediate issue for the 
David Webster group, who faced on-going immediate productivity challenges if they 
were to continue to win contracts. Telecoms, too, clearly wanted to improve the sense 
of drive in a highly competitive environment while doing so in a way that rewarded 
employees more fairly than previously was crucial. This did not appear too great a 
factor at Merck, Sharp and Dohme but was important at David Webster. 
The significance of these findings will be examined in chapter 6.3. 
6.2.2 Outcomes of Performance Pay 
The outcomes were tested mainly through a quantitative survey of one organisation 
(Telecoms). A number ofhypotheses were tested and the summary shown in Table 39 
on page 154 (Hypotheses 8) and Table 48 on page 167. (Hypotheses 2-7) 
It can be seen on the basis of these findings that performance pay appeared, according 
to the employees, to fail most of the objectives set. It did not motivate, it did not 
improve morale and commitment and it failed to support culture change. It gave no 
support to team working. It was uncertain whether it was regarded as fair or acted to 
improve retention and loyalty. 
The significance of these findings will be examined next. The only positive feature 
was that it was seen in an improved light after a year ofoperation. 
In terms of employee characteristics, there was greater support from females than 
males and employees in higher grades while opposition came from trade union 
members. 
6.3 Significance of the Findings 
Originality is a prime objective of any PhD study. Its success can be measured by the 
degree to which the findings are significant - that they add important components 
onto the existing knowledge in the areas chosen for research. 
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The study is significant in itself because of the lack of empirical research in this area 
as pointed out by Dowling and Richardson (1997). The summary of British research 
detailed at the start of the literature survey shows the paucity that exists and any 
addition to this list can be regarded as important in itself. 
The originality in this thesis will be considered in three parts. Firstly, in the 
assessment ofmanagement objectives for performance pay; secondly, in the findings 
on the outcomes from perfonnance pay and fmally, in the originality of the findings 
from the analysis of the effect of employee characteristics on the employee 
perceptions of performance pay. 
6.3.1 Management Objectives for Performance pay 
The use of four case studies to examine the model was a significant addition to the list 
of studies. Taking four different organisations, working in different contexts and 
considering their objectives has provided significant information on the reasons why 
the companies embarked on perfonnance pay schemes. The analysis provided further 
case study evidence and supported the viewpoint that objectives were contingent and 
could not be generalised. Although performance pay has been put forward as a system 
that can achieve a number of different objectives (motivate employees, increase 
commitment, retain employees, etc) not all organisation appear to sign onto all of 
those objectives when they begin schemes. They choose those objectives that fit their 
specific context. 
6.3.2 Outcomes of Performance pay 
The findings on the outcomes, as seen by the employees, were significant as a whole 
in that they provided a comprehensive set of data on employee perceptions on a 
scheme both before a scheme began and when it had been running a year. This was 
significant because only one other piece ofUK published research was on a 
longitudinal basis (Marsden and Richardson 1991 and Marsden and French 1997). 
and their research had a gap offive years, rather than one. For Marsden and French, 
continuing experience of the scheme led to lower ratings. A similar result was found 
in an American study of school administrators (Heneman 1984) where the 
administrators were actually involved in the design and implementation of the 
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scheme. In the Telecoms survey, the fact that the expectations were so low was, in 
itself, significant, as most organisations do not expect such a degree of cynicism at the 
opening stage of a major project. The fact that the employees, as a whole, became 
more positive subsequently was also of interest. 
A number of the results of the hypotheses testing the outcomes were unsurprising. 
Most previous surveys have found employees unconvinced that perfonnance pay 
schemes are 'fair' or add to employee retention (Geary 1992, Proctor 1993) and that 
performance pay schemes do not increase motivation, morale or commitment. 
(Kessler 1995, Kessler and Purcell 1994). The results differed from the more positive 
results from Dowling and Richardson (1997) but the results could well have been 
influenced by the fact that this 1997 research covered only managers. Even so, 
additional data in this area add, as has already been mentioned, to a limited set of 
published findings. 
Greater significance can be attached to the findings on team working and the principle 
of performance pay. As shown in the literature survey, employee views on the link 
between performance pay and team working are extremely scarce so the findings here 
add considerably to our knowledge. Dowling and Richardson (1997) comment, for 
example: 
'We did not specifically explore team work in the closed. questions so we did not 
know how important or widespread a worry this is. But we would have thought that 
team working was relatively important in the Health service and that anything that 
threatens to undennine the effectiveness is serious ....it is an issue that merits careful 
treatment by policy makers.' (P363) 
What is significant from the Telecoms study is the fact that employees themselves are 
quite uncertain as to the overall effect. They like to be paid as individuals but they 
regret that performance pay hinders team working. They do not appear to give clear 
advice as to which type of system should be operating. 
Additional significant findings concern the attitude of employees as to whether they 
agree to the principal of perfonnance pay and whether they want it to be abandoned. 
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In both cases, the viewpoint is in favour ofperformance pay, if not by much. Despite 
all the difficulties relating to the operation of the scheme, the support is still there 
rather than reverting to any other system, especially one that operated previously. 
Although this replicates data from the Inland Revenue survey (Marsden and French 
1997), those findings were hidden in the statistics and little reported. 
A further area that could be regarded as significant is the large number of employee 
comments that emerge from the research. These help in the triangulatory process and 
give support to the robustness of the data. They clarify a number of reasons why 
certain viewpoints are held. 
6.3.3 Employee Characteristics 
This research replicated a number of research projects that have attempted to identify 
specific characteristics ofemployees that may make them approach performance pay 
in a more positive or negative way. There were a number of significant fmdings, 
especially those relating to union membership and gender. 
Trade Union Membership 
There was clear evidence associating membership of a trade union with negative 
views on the scheme, as shown in table 34. This disagreed with the findings of 
Thompson (1993) and Heery (1998) who found no significant association. We have 
seen that Kessler and Purcell (1992) found some support for the proposition that 
organisations used performance pay as an additional weapon to undermine union 
power. In addition, Heery (1997a) has put forward a number of reasons why trade 
unions should be wary of performance pay schemes, how they can, as it puts it, 
'disorganise' unions: 
'First, they might succeed in generating a new level of organisational commitment, 
such that employees come to identify more closely with management than they do 
with trade unions. Second, to the extent that new techniques successfully address the 
needs and aspirations of employees, they will diminish grievances at work and hence 
the raw material of discontent which unions need if they are to thrive. Third, 
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techniques may fragment employee interests, so a perception of shared interests and 
the need for solidarity through the vehicle of a trade union fades.' (P430) 
If performance schemes work well, then, unions may lose the loyalty oftheir 
members. In an associated article (Heery 1997b), he sees unions losing even further 
ground under the pressures ofperformance pay. Many unions, he fInds, have been 
'experiencing difficulty in maintaining their role as bargaining agents where schemes 
have been introduced. De-recognition may only have been partiaL ..... but it has been 
a cornmon union experience and the critical role of unions as joint authors of rules 
governing their members' remuneration has been substantially weakened' (P211). 
On the other hand, he points out that if schemes have serious failings, then it provides 
fresh opportunities for unions to organise and represent employees in their 
grievances, especially under a more exacting managerial regime. Heery's research 
f'mds that the official viewpoint of the unions was that they believed their members 
typically opposed performance pay and that management-union relationships 
deteriorate when schemes are introduced. However, in the response from employees 
actually working under the local government schemes, he found that the views of 
union members did not differ significantly towards performance pay compared with 
non-union employees. A final point of interest here was that union members with a 
strong commitment to trade unionism, remained committed to the importance of trade 
unions in mitigating the deleterious effects of performance pay in practice. 
Gunnigle et al (1998) see performance pay as an explicit challenge to collectivism in 
industrial relations and that they 'corrode the essence of collectivism and 
solidarity....dissolving the collectivism into a number of discrete, isolated and 
sometimes powerless individuals' (P575) 
Trade union members may be more likely to be suspicious ofmanagement's motives 
under performance pay. Marsden and French (1998) found that Inland Revenue 
employees in the survey (who were all union members) believed that the scheme 
operated to reward managers 'favourites' and rejected the concept that 'good work 
was recognised and rewarded'. They also believed that a clear quota system of 
payments were in place, despite the explicit rejection of this by management. 
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The importance of the finding in the Telecoms research is that it would give weight to 
the belief that a collectivist viewpoint would be likely to oppose the individualistic 
elements of performance pay. 
As with the Thompson and Reery studies, in Telecoms, the objectives set out for 
employees were all individual ones and the assessment of the 'contribution' was 
carried out on an individual basis. The fact that different (and to a certain extent, more 
expected) results were obtained indicates that more research is needed here. The 
results may be different because of a number of factors, such as involvement with 
scheme design, proportion of trade union members and other contextual areas. 
Gender 
The findings on gender have added some light to the few earlier studies on gender 
differences detailed in the literature survey. Women proved more positive to 
performance pay than men in the Telecoms study, especially after the scheme was 
working for a year and females featured strongly in the cluster of most positive 
employees. 
It has been argued (Rubery 1995) that performance pay can bring a number of 
benefits to women. It can lead to greater recognition of varieties of skills and 
performance in women's job areas, providing the opportunity to pay outstanding 
female employees for their actual work and not the average work demanded in a 
particular job category. Moreover, the link that often exists between performance pay 
and functional flexibility can help to break down barriers between recognised 
occupations and blur the divisions between what have been regarded as 'women's 
work' and 'men's work'. In effect, performance pay could help to undermine the 
traditional job evaluation based graded structure which has groups of male-dominated 
and female-dominated job clusters, replacing this system with a more integrated, 
performance-oriented salary/wage system. This, in turn, can help to reduce the 
significance of occupational segregation in the generation oflow pay for women 

which collective bargaining has failed to eliminate. 
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A further opportunity provided by performance pay is to widen the number of criteria 
for rewarding employees. While job-related pay schemes may differentiate jobs 
according to a limited number of criteria (number of staff supervised, number of 
contacts, responsibility for money, etc.), performance pay can include much broader 
measures, such as ability to innovate, response to customer needs and skills in tearn­
working. Women are therefore more likely to benefit from greater recognition of their 
expertise and contribution to organisational effectiveness (Crompton 1994). 
The Telecoms performance pay system has provided the potential for women to take 
advantage of opportunities to improve their position. However, this potential for 
improving the position of women's rewards can be greatly reduced if the assessment 
decisions are tainted by discrimination. Assessment can be made differently for men 
and women against the same criteria or it may reflect male-type goals, behaviours and 
tasks. A greater emphasis can be placed on the realisation of individual objectives and 
achieving significant objectives, especially if these are stretching and crucial to the 
organisation, which can be seen as male-type goals, rather than supportive team work 
activity or helping new entrants or mentoring weaker performers, which can be seen 
as female-type goals. In the long-term, both types ofactivities have equal contribution 
to organisational effectiveness but the former may receive higher rewards in the short­
term approach and time-scales of performance pay schemes to the detriment of 
women's pay. 
These gender difficulties in assessment processes were highlighted in the IMS report 
(Bevan and Thompson 1992). Firstly, in one of the four case studies, women were 
more dissatisfied with the criteria against which they were being judged t.han men, 
although this organisation was the only one of the four which had pronounced gender­
stereotyped values. Secondly, the whole assessment process appeared to give some 
reinforcement to gender stereotype. For example, assertiveness was considered 
appropriate behaviour for men but not for women for whom tact was often seen as 
appropriate behaviour. Finally, male managers valued different attributes among their 
subordinates than female managers. Males rated the attributes of intelligence, logic, 
energy and creativity more highly than female managers whereas the attributes of 
perceptiveness and organisational abilities were rated higher by female managers than 
male managers. 
> 
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Rubery (1995) questions the fairness in the measurement process inherent in 
performance pay scheme: 
'The whole debate on comparable worth has stressed the relatively intangible and 
unmeasurable nature ofmany skills required in female work. Skills that are assumed 
to be part of the female 'nature', such as caring, organisational, co-ordinating or 
communication skills. Thus a recommendation to look for measurable criteria may 
itself bring in another form of sex bias and contribute to the continuing invisibility of 
female skills.' (P647-8) 
She goes on to point out three further difficulties that may be faced by women under 
performance pay schemes. Firstly, that such schemes may set out to reward the high­
flier at the expense of the steady, reliable mainstream employee, the category that 
women are more likely to fall into, given that many are likely to have domestic 
commitments. This argument, however, may have a certain dated sense about it, given 
the continuing and rapid rise in single and childless bigh-flying women in the 21st 
Century (Elliott and Dobson 2003). Amongst the 22% of women graduates who have 
no family, domestic responsibilities are likely to be no different to men and allow the 
opportunity to benefit from the rewards offered to those dedicated to career and 
reward enhancement under performance pay schemes. 
Her second difficulty centres on the greater emphasis on individualism that is 
apparent in most performance pay schemes. Women, she argues, tend to be less 
individualistic and competitive in their work relations and more concerned to 
facilitate the work of others and to work more co-operatively. Her evidence here, 
again, may be regarded as somewhat dated (Marshall 1984) and not reflect the huge 
strides taken in the last twenty years in female competitive activities in sport, business 
and elsewhere. 
Her final point is that performance pay schemes reduce the transparency of the labour 
market and reduce the scope of collective agreements and legislative rights while 
increasing managerial prerogative. Her strong belief is that the narrowing of the pay 
gap has come about through the transformation and extension ofregulatory systems 
M 
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and not through the exposure of women to pay determination at the discretion of 
management. This is a strong argument, much supported by the EOC and other bodies 
but it does miss out on one vital area ofthe pay and career equation. However, 
performance pay schemes can (and should) provide the opportunity for good 
performers to shine and be noticed in a much more transparent way than in traditional 
job-evaluated pay scales. Such pay scales either have no method in place to 
effectively measure performance or such measures are largely ignored because they 
have no real outcome. Where women take advantage of the transparency of such 
schemes and are fairly rewarded, then it becomes much more likely that the pay gap 
can be narrowed. Furthermore, where high performance leads to career advancement 
and associated pay increases, a further step in pay equalisation is achieved. 
A further argument towards reaching true pay equality is that career advancement 
based on robust performance measures is recognised by all concerned as a far 
preferable system to 'tokenist' promotions based on vague anti-discrimination agenda. 
Role models, promoted through the support of a performance pay system, are also 
more likely to support and extend robust systems within their own fiefdoms. 
The degree of support given by women for the performance pay scheme in Telecoms 
comes with important messages for the organisation. The Telecoms data would 
indicate that the difficulties set out for women under the existing schemes may not 
have been so prevalent in this study but they still demonstrate that there are 
implications for management. They need to ensure that the overall support given to 
the performance pay principle and processes by female employees is reinforced by 
appropriate organisational behaviour, such as transparency and co-operation. 
Other characteristics 
This study found that characteristics of age, length of service and seniority had a 
degree of influence on employee perceptions of performance pay but not a statistically 
significant effect. These findings are significant in themselves because existing 
research findings in this area are quite slim. 
Finally, the fact that a comprehensive analysis has been carried out provides an 

additional element of significance in the findings. The published studies do not 
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provide such comprehensive analysis, mostly concentrating on certain isolated 
characteristics. Thompson (1993), for example, analysed trade union membership 
only. 
Cluster analysis 
The most significant area of findings, however, arises from the cluster analysis that 
has not been carried out before in published research in this subject area. \\!hat was 
discovered was two sets of employees, each with a 'bundle' of characteristics who 
were strongly opposed to or in support of the scheme after it had been running for a 
year. This was significant was that the degree of support and opposition can be 
pinpointed closer at the time that the scheme is being formulated by identifying 
employees with those specific characteristics. 
6.4 Implications for Management 
The findings provide a number of lessons for management, especially for those 
organisations in the position ofTelecoms who plan to introduce performance payor 
who run an existing scheme. This chapter begins with a discussion on the outcomes of 
the scheme, moves on to a discussion on whether the results can be generalised and 
then concludes by suggesting appropriate responses for the organisations concerned. 
6.4.1 Lessons arising from the Outcomes 
The overall results cannot, on the surface, give a great deal of satisfaction to the 
organisation or to those that put forward any form of performance pay as a means of 
helping the organisation reach its strategic goals. The employees in the Telecoms 
study have responded that the scheme does not motivate, has not brought about a 
culture change and are not satisfied with their pay. It is not clear-cut, then - the 
scheme must be a failure? Does it not support the pessimistic view from Smith 
(1993) that: 
, ... '" . Reward Management as a whole amounts to little more than a reliance on well 
worn, simplistic and unsuccessful casually-based links between pay and performance 
contained in a shell of rhetoric and intention' (P56) 
# 
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Well, not quite. Firstly, there will have been widespread reliefthat the scheme was 
not as bad as some senior managers may have feared. Most of the ratings improved 
over the first year, with some crucial exceptions (especially regarding feedback from 
managers). This improvement could have been caused by a number of factors. Firstly, 
employees began to understand the scheme better. Secondly, that the degree of trust 
began to grow over the year and thirdly, employees learned to work with their 
management team to ensure the scheme worked well. 
There also could be a further reason. The organisation put a not inconsiderable sum of 
money into the pay increase pot at the time of the first assessments so that a series of 
good assessments, that lead to reasonable pay increases, could be adequately fmanced. 
This allowed local managers' decisions to be supported, on the whole. The difficulties 
faced by 'rationing' assessments or management 'forcing' ratings did not apply in this 
first year. It was the managers who put forward their recommendations for salary 
increases and one can only assume that they did so using reputable measures. 
Having said this, the overall results still do not appear to respond well to analysis. 
What is crucial is that they do not, as a whole, want to go back to the old payment 
scheme. What is more, their experience of the scheme has improved their ratings and 
there is a strong support for the principle of performance pay. Finally, they give a 
modicum of support for the fairness of the performance management scheme that 
underpins performance pay both in its measures of Contribution and Objectives and 
the confidence in their managers in being able to accurately assess them. 
What appears from these findings to lower the ratings are two factors. Firstly, a 
perception that procedural justice is lacking - there is not enough consultation on 
objectives, they do not always balance across departments, assessments are wrongly 
made, the scheme is not explained coherently, discussions on results are skimped and 
outcomes are communicated badly and late. Secondly, a conspicuous minority cluster 
made up principally of male union members with long service in middle grades who 
are against the scheme both in principle and practice. 
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6.4.2 Can the Conclusions of this study be generalised 
Case study research, as explained in Chapter 3 on methodology, is carried out not just 
to demonstrate that certain ideas, actions and events are taking place in an 
organisation, although this 'story-telling' is of interest in itself. It is to add 
incremental knowledge to a collection already in existence and to demonstrate an 
example of concepts and developments that may be generalised across a wider field. 
The case studies are not 'sampling units' so they cannot be generalised from a 
statistical viewpoint (Yin 1994). The process is one of: 
'analytic generalisation' in which a previously developed theory is used as a tenplate 
with which to compare the empirical results of the case study. If two or more cases 
are shown to support the same theory, replication can be claimed.' (P31) 
The chapter on the significance of the fmdings indicates a number of areas where this 
research has replicated previous findings. It would be safe to support a degree of 
generalisation here. For example, it appears certain that employees (with the 
exception ofmanagers) do not see performance pay schemes as motivators. Similarly, 
a generalisation could be that employees, on balance, support the principle of 
performance pay, if not very enthusiastically. In other areas, where there is conflict in 
findings with existing studies or where the findings are unique, it is less safe to make 
generalisations. 
6.4.3 Appropriate Responses by Management 
Objectives for performance pay schemes 
'There is no such thing as a good pay system: there is only a series of bad ones. The 
trick is to choose the least bad one.' 
(Richard Jolmston, Human Resource Director of Flowpak Engineering, quoted in 
Bratton 1992) 
Kessler and Purcell (1994) set out a number of issues and dilemmas for management 
to consider before embarking on a Performance pay scheme. The first is the cultural 
issue. Although organisations realise that that a greater emphasis is needed on 
performance, they have a dilemma in respect ofwhether or not to use performance 
He 
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pay to try to change the culture and in what form. They suggest that it can be used to 
emphasise the 'cultural break' from old forms of management to new or to recognise 
'cultural sensitivity' and introduce a comparatively 'gentle' form of performance pay. 
Both have problems. If the 'cultural break' version is used, then this is a high-risk 
strategy because if it fails (or is perceived to have major faults by the employees) then 
the whole cultural change process may be put at risk. If, on the other hand, the 
'cultural sensitivity' approach is used, then the scheme may become a weak and 
ineffective one and may show a distinct lack of 'fit' with other initiatives. Whatever 
approach is used, it has to be remembered from the Telecoms research that employees 
do not regard the use of performance pay as a good vehicle for cultural change. 
A second dilemma, linked to the first, is whether performance pay should be seen as a 
high profile leader of change (to 'blast the past' as they call it - p8). Alternatively, 
whether it should be used last of all in a change programme as the last piece of the 
jigsaw when other parts are in place. For example, getting the job design programmes 
in place, the new performance management system right and full communications 
under way before introducing performance pay maybe a year or two later. This is a 
useful suggestion in one way in that it reduces the long list of management objectives 
set out in the model which has received patchy support in this study. 
I 
The third issue is the degree of involvement, especially where unions were concerned. 
If the aim is to re-assert management control, then unions would generally have no 
part. But to exclude them when one of the major aims is to improve communication 
all round, would appear to be contradictory. The Telecoms research indicates that a 
body of negative trade union members can have a serious effect on the overall 
perceptions of the scheme. The harm they can do will depend on their organisationai 
influence but the risks are great. The findings would suggest that consultation and 
1. involvement is likely to obtain better long term results. I 
i, 
Annstrong (1999), always a realist, advocates that not too much is expected from 
j performance pay and that it is not used as the sole motivator because there are other 
ways of improving performance. It should be introduced only if it fits the existing 
I culture or management is fully confident that it will successfully help to change the 
i 
! 
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culture. He is also quite clear that inclusion is vital, that as many people as possible 
are involved in developing the scheme. 
Brown and Armstrong (1999) reflect that the main problems around performance pay 
are often the result of inconsistencies or difficulties in some of the other business 
areas which manifest themselves in pay, such as an unclear business strategy or an 
ineffective performance management system. Therefore the first phase of their 
prescriptive approach called Paying for Contribution, (Figure 5), is to build a solid 
base. 
Figure 5 Paying for Contribution - Three Stage Approach 
Phase One 
• 	 Diagnose and agree the outline approach 
• 	 Understand the organisational and business context and 
rationale 
• 	 Analyse the current reward and HR systems 
• 	 Examine the existing approach to performance pay 
• 	 Compare the various options for change and 
improvement 
• 	 Secure management to the recommended future 
, 

Phase 2 
• 	 Detail the recommended approach 
• 	 Test it in the organisation, in order to ensure its 

relevance and applicability. 

• 	 Assess its likely impact on costs and attitudes 
• 	 Ensure senior management agree the outcomes, system 
design and implications . 
." 
Phase 3 
Test the operating procedures 
Make preparations to implement and operate the scheme 
including sufficient training and communication. 
Source: Brown and Armstrong (1999) p 368 
J 
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They stress in this outline that it is critically important to involve managers and staff 
in all phases of the project as there has been a strong correlation between involvement 
by staff and a more successful conclusion in terms of employee perspectives. 
Murlis's (1990) prescriptions are particularly strategic. Firstly, a successful 
perfoID1ance pay scheme must match the culture and value systems of the 
organisation. Secondly, the design must take place in an interactive way, finding out 
the key performance issues by contact with the stakeholders and designing the scheme 
around them. Thirdly, the rewards need to be closely linked to the business, support 
overall strategy and be flexible enough to respond to changes in strategic direction. 
Fourthly, it must not be regarded as a one-off operation. Provision will be needed for 
monitoring, evaluating and reviewing to ensure that it develops and responds to 
changing needs. Finally, performance targets must not be set mechanistically but 
should be a mix of hard and soft issues. 
In a subsequent publication (Murlis 1993) she gives greater emphasis on the 
avoidance of using performance pay to compensate for recruitment problems, market 
pressures, inability to promote, widening employees' responsibilities through de­
layering and other issues that risk confusing the messages implicit in the system. The 
rewards, she considers, should be capable of being significant for the market sector, 
be easy to understand and be publicly defensible. 
Many of these prescriptions were followed by Telecoms. They linked the scheme with 
the business direction and integrated the performance management system effectively 
with the reward areas. It could be said that the scheme matched the culture that they 
wanted to develop in a customer-oriented fast-moving Telecoms world. The scheme 
was supported by top management as a key strategic initiative, the measures were a 
good mixture of hard and soft targets and they entered into a detailed training and 
communication exercise. In these areas, they followed quite closely both the Brown 
and Armstrong and the Murlis models. Despite this, the ratings were still 
unsatisfactory . 
On the other hand, there was not a great deal of evidence of consultation with staff 

and this may well have been the major cause of the low ratings for the first 
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questionnaire. The staff, having had a series of substantial changes involving 
redundancies and other unpleasant experiences, would simply see this initiative as yet 
another process of cutting pay and increasing the work-load. We have seen that the 
fact that the performance pay rewards were recognised as good by the staff helped to 
raise the ratings at the end of the first year. 
This research may indicate that objectives have to be more realistic. We have seen 
from the outcomes of this and other surveys that it is unlikely that performance pay 
will, in itself, increase employees' motivation or their morale. The removal ofjob
I 
I security in service and administrative areas and organisations is a comparatively I 
I 
recent origin. The huge redundancies ofthe early 1980s scarcely touched the non­I 
manufacturing sector but it came with a vengeance as a result of the recession in theI 
1990s, privatisation ,C.C.T., the de-regulation of (and innovation in) financial services ~ 
I and, probably of equal importance, the arrival ofHRM policies. By deliberately 
t reducing the core ofpermanent, full-time, career-planned employees, by down-sizing , 
at every opportunity to match rivals, (and because people are the most expensive 
expense and easiest to dispose of in the UK) and by decimating the yearly intake of 
graduates and trainees, the message of permanent insecurity has successfully passed 
into the mentality of all employees. Insecurity breeds low morale and organisations 
may have to accept that ifthey adopt HRM policies, then they must accept the 
baggage that accompanies it. Performance pay may, on occasions, get the blame but 
the picture is a much wider one. After all, compensation is at the core of any 
employment exchange (Milkovich, and Newman, 1996). 
" 
Can performance pay increase the level of commitment of employees? Not according 
to the indications of this survey but it is worth questioning the extent to which a high 
level of commitment is appropriate or necessary in today's employment situation. The 
degree of discontinuity of employment, the growing level of outsourcing, the rise in 
self-employment all support the prognosis that long-term commitment may only have 
historical interest. Some organisations in the service sector thrive on high turnover, 
especially those in catering and hospitality. McDonalds is an obvious example. There 
is no conclusive evidence that it is an unalloyed benefit or that it is positively related 
to better performance (Morris et al1993). High levels ofcommitment may engender a 
dislike of change and a lack ofcreativity among employees. ' precisely because they 
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are committed to existing arrangements or joined the organisation with a set of 
assumptions concerning the nature of employment exchange, such as a lower level of 
reward in return for high job security.' (P38) 
Nor will employees recognise the scheme as one that can assist in achieving cultural 
change. The organisation may see the incremental effects and understand its part in 
the whole raft of changes but employees, especially those who oppose the workings of 
the scheme, may only respond negatively when asked about its specific effects. The 
research evidence detailed earlier gave strong support to the difficulties of attempting 
such a change. Harris and Ogbonna (1998) found that top managers frequently view 
organisational culture as a unitary concept and commonly contend that resistance to 
change is irrational. From an employee's viewpoint, however, they found the 
resistance to be perfectly rational because it made sense of their social world by 
balancing the past and present demands of management. In other words, they may be 
suffering from 'cultural change fatigue syndrome' and regard each new phase as a 
further version of a previously failed strategy. It is their duty to oppose such attempts 
for the good of their fellow employees and the organisation as a whole. 
Kessler (1994) points out that using performance pay to help force a change in 
organisational culture is a risky strategy. He describes the outcomes for a newspaper 
company where this approach led to an extended period oftension and conflict in 
employment relations but where, two years on, performance pay had been accepted as 
'the way things were done'. The approach created pressure points forcing a 
concentration not only of minds but also activities and breaking through a 
longstanding procedural and attitudinal stalemate. 
I Attempting to change the culture can have the 'unintentional consequences' 
mentioned earlier. This apples in the technical sense, such as employees concentrating 
p 
l 
j only on completing their specific objectives that can affect their pay increase but also 
in the larger cultural picture in that it encourages a decline in team-working and a 
short-termism in attitude. Just as important, it can create a strong dichotomy of views 
reflected in the cluster analysis, splitting groups and departments and leading to a 
general increase in difficulty in co-operative behaviour. 
, 
I 
WI 
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In terms of fairness, employees' views are mostly determined by the way the 
perfomlance management scheme is set up and is operated. The research has shown 
that procedural justice is a key factor in determining acceptance or opposition to the 
scheme. 
Performance Management Issues 
Much of the academic research carried out on performance management has produced 
has produced damning indictments of the process in general. Grint (1993) commented 
that, rarely in the history of management can a system have promised so much and 
delivered so little. while Bowles and Coates (1993) believe that performance appraisal 
requires subtle psychological and social skills which may not be acquired by many 
managers. Not all is painted as black as this, however. In the IPD research report on 
performance management, (Armstrong and Baron 1998) it was found that employees 
gave high ratings for schemes in organisations where there was a well-developed 
system and where considerable time, effort and money was spent on involving, 
training and communicating with. They supported the importance of the concept and 
the opportunity for feedback and that 'quality time' spent on the reviews was very 
well spent. 
The IPD report indicates that the criticisms of the Telecoms scheme are not untypical 
(Armstrong and Baron 1998). An organisation faced with such criticisms needs to 
take remedial action. The interim feedback is the most obvious where the score after 
the first year was very negative at 4.69 and where there were a number of complaints 
that employees were given their ratings without any discussion or explanation. Other 
specific employee criticisms detailed in the findings should be addressed. Objectives 
should be agreed and not imposed. Objectives do have to be meaningful to the 
business and the objectives for each individual, taken as a whole, should give a well­
rounded view of performance. An assessment needs to be made to ensure that 
objectives do not conflict between individuals and across departments. 
Where an organisation uses the measurement of competencies (or, in Telecoms terms, 
'contribution' measures), the criticisms ofvagueness relating to the competency 
descriptions need to be examined and revised. In the case of Telecoms, the number of 
criticisms made that level 5 was too high to be achieved should also be taken on 
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board. Briefing processes needs to be better planned with briefings carried out in 
groups of 10 to 15, not 50 and the organisation should be prepared for likely 
questions. 
These are specific recommendations but they fit in with research carried out into 
successful performance management. Greenberg (1987) found that there were five 
crucial procedural factors that contributed to the perceived fairness of the evaluation 
process: 
• Employee input is solicited before the evaluation and is utilised in the process 
I • There is two-way communication during the evaluation interview 
! • Employees have the ability to challenge or rebut the evaluation 
, 
I • The rater is familiar with the employee's work 
.~ • Standards are applied consistently. 
I 
~ 
! 	 These may appear rather obvious but it is astonishing how often they are forgotten in 
the rush to both set a scheme in motion and then to wind up the year's appraisals in a 
limited time span. 
Feedback does not have to be restricted to the fonnal, fixed occasions. In fact Farr 
(1993) contends that 'informal or day-to-day feedback is more important than annual 
or semi-annual performance appraisal sessions in terms of its impact on work 
perfom1ance and attitudes' (PI77). 
There are two important areas that follow on from the issue of effective objective 
setting and good feedback. Firstly, it is the view ofMarsden and French (1998) from 
their studies in the public sector that it is the performance management process, and 
specifically the goal-setting and feedback, that has led to a substantial minority of 
employees working harder under performance pay schemes they have studied, rather 
than the linking of pay to performance. In the Inland Revenue study, for example, a 
clear majority considered they had sufficient opportunity to discuss their performance 
with their manager, that they could change their objectives when their workload 
changed and that the goal posts had not be moved during the year. In the Employment 
• 
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Service study, the scheme had raised awareness of the Agency's targets and that their 
own targets had become clearer while in the NHS Trust study, a majority of 
employees believed that the scheme had led to work targets being set much more 
clearly. 
The second issue is the nature of feedback. Although the traditional process is that of 
the manager individually giving feedback to their members of staff, the disadvantages 
of such schemes have been widely publicised in recent years. Williams (1998), for 
example, sums up these point well: 
'Though line managers have a legitimate role in assessing performance, this is not to 
say that they are necessarily the 'best' people to make those judgements. First, the 
manager cannot observe all that the job-holder does or accomplishes - the manager, in 
other words, has only a partial view ofperfonnance. Andthis may become a greater 
problem in those organisations that have experienced downsizing, delayering and the 
like as the span ofcontrol may have become wider. This leads to the possibility that 
job-holders may have little contact with their managers. '(P160-1) 
I 
Williams goes on to point out that it is possible that most managers value results more 
highly than behaviours. This may be one explanation for discrepancies between self­
ratings and supervisor ratings. Furthermore, in some fonns of work organisation, such 
as matrix organisations and team working, it is not always clear who the manager is. 
So, though managers may be a necessary source of information for performance 
management activities, they are by no means a sufficient source. He recommends a 
serious consideration of the system known as 360 degree feedback to improve the 
employees' view offaimess and equity. 
i 	 McHale (1990) found that there is a critical dimension in performance management, 
which is the level of contact. Where the barriers to contact were high, the negative 
attitudes formed as a result prevented the transmission of positive performance 
messages, resulting in indifference or negative messages. 60% of employees who 
receive regular feedback have a strong believe that their pay was linked to their 
performance while this dropped to 15% where contact was low. He concluded that, in 
a high-barrier company, using pay was an expensive and ineffective. way of passing 
d 
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performance messages. The clear implications were that regular and effective two­
way contact was essential to successfully implementing a performance pay scheme. 
So what are the options? There can be the encouragement of a quite common system 
of self-appraisal that dovetails into the formal management-led system. Coming to the 
table with their own thought-through opinions of the appraisee's performance will, at 
the least, stimulate discussion on areas where there is disagreement. It should lead, 
hopefully, to a better understanding between the two parties. 
The difficulty still remains that the person being managed may not, ultimately and 
sometime rightly, respect the judgement of the person managing. This is where 
multiple feedback or 360% appraisal comes in. Here, a series of opinions on the 
performance of the appraisee are sought from interested parties or stakeholders. These 
can include their subordinates, colleagues, internal and external customers. It is an 
initiative that is growing fairly rapidly, according to a Towers Perrin survey (1998), 
although it may be a complex, costly and time-consuming process. According to 
number of reports and case studies, (Megginson and Casserly: 1996, Handy et al:1998, 
Jacobs and Floyd:1995) it facilitates understanding by the appraisee of their strengths 
and weaknesses and generates a greater sense of fairness. However, it still is rarely 
used as part of a performance pay scheme due to the uncertain response of 
stakeholders to making such judgements that will influence pay decisions (IRS 1998). 
One example of where it is in operation is at Cable and Wireless Communications 
(IDS 1998, p9), where employees can exercise the option of having multiple 
feedback. 
Throughout these considerations, the issue offaimess is paramount. There is strong 
evidence that there is inherent tension between performance management and 
performance pay, including the problems of the stifling of communications when 
employees are aware that discussing problems with their managers can endanger their 
ratings. (Milkovich and Widgor (1991). In fact, the demands of a performance pay 
scheme strains the relationship between managers and their staff (Milkovich and 
Newman 1996). 
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Are the payments high enough? 
In the Telecoms research, employees indicated that the outcome of the first year of 
operation showed that the payments were regarded, in general, as too small. 
Agreement to this statement changed from a mean of3.70 to 3.18 indicating 
experience of the scheme strengthened employees' opinions. In terms of Expectancy 
theory, the valency was simply not high enough. However, small payments in 
administrative performance pay schemes are not unusual (Bangoura 1987, IDS 1998) 
and increasing the payments can lead to increased divisiveness. This opens up again 
one of the fundamental dilemmas between pay schemes that promote equality of 
payments for work of equal value and those that promote equity through pay in 
accordance with effort and performance. Too much emphasis on the former 
discourages the high performer; too much emphasis on the latter spreads greater 
dissatisfaction, jealousy and divisiveness. High pay-outs to company directors under 
performance pay schemes continue to be heavily criticised, as detailed in the literature 
revIew. 
, 
The balance here is one that can only be tested by experience and experimentation. If
,•j the organisation wishes to promote the cultural changes thoroughly, it will need to ,
, extend the performance pay variations but this should be approached cautiously on an 
incremental basis with a constant review of the process. The perceived effectiveness I 
.i 
of the perfonnance management scheme will have a large influence here and 
increased confidence in that process will allow the organisation to continue a step-by­
step approach towards differential awards. 
Special issues with group/team performance pay schemes 
The research outcomes indicated some confusion in the minds ofemployees over the 
issue of team rewards. One way forward here is to gently tune the objectives towards 
a mix oftearn and individual. However, if there are special incentives to teams, then 
care must be taken in at least two areas. Firstly, to give the appropriate assessment 
and payment for the varying types of teams (Wright. 1994, Saunier and Hawke 1994). 
Secondly, there a problem of perceived 'Social Loafing' when employees withdraw 
their individual efforts in the hope that other group members will ensure the group 
meets its goals (Bettenhausen, K. 1991). Rewarding through Gainsharing (Welbourne 
and Mejia. 1995) could be considered. There are 2,000 such schemes now operating 
--
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in the U.S. but only a handful in the UK, such as one operating in BP. There is 
certainly evidence that companies are thinking this through carefully as North. and 
Madden (1994) found that 26% of companies in the financial services sector were 
considering introducing some form of Team-based rewards and the IPD survey 
(Armstrong 1996) found similar interest. However, there is some evidence that teams 
fail to produce better than the aggregate of individual members, which throws some 
doubt onto the headlong rush by organisations into empowered work teams (West and 
Slater 1995). 
Encouraging preferred behaviours 
Reinforcing preferred employee behaviours has often been associated with 
performance pay, as indicated in the literature survey. The link is a close one where 
competencies are an integral part of the performance management process but they 
should be spelt out clearly if no framework exists. They can vary from those 
associated with a competitive private sector organisation, where risk-taking, customer 
focus, flexibility in work patterns and innovation are essential, to those behaviours in 
many public sector schemes, such as in the teaching profession, where the emphasis is 
on conformity, development, quality focus and an ethical stance. 
The presence ofsuch preferred behaviours is part of 'joined-up' management strategy. 
It may work if it has a sound, consistent framework, is convincingly portrayed and has 
the overall support of line management who 'walk the talk' All of these requirements 
are essential pre-requisites. With on part ofthe jigsaw missing, the picture is 
unconvincing from an employee's viewpoint. 
Ensuring continued support by female participants. 
We have seen that the Telecoms data has found women to feature highly in the most 
supportive group of employees. This is despite the traditional viewpoint that women 
do not thrive in the culture of competition, goal achievement and individualistic 
assessment. It is also despite the many overall criticisms voiced by respondents as to 
the weaknesses in the performance management process. The results indicate that 
women do not consider the processes to be discriminatory and that they have 
responded to the opportunities available to be judged individually on the quality of the 
work they do and their contribution to achieving the organisational objectives. 
sd 
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This aspect of the data has considerable implications for organisations running, or 
considering implementing a performance pay scheme. Because the growth of 
performance pay schemes are located amongst managerial and administrative 
employees, then women tend to make up at least 50% of participants, often more. 
Satisfying the aspirations of this large group is crucial and the aim should be to 
achieve this by a number ofmeans. Firstly, it goes without saying that the 
performance management aspects ofthe scheme should be handled effectively. The 
scheme and its measures should be robust, the processes should be consistently 
applied and the system as a whole should be transparent. Secondly, monitoring should 
regularly take place to ensure that no apparent discrimination is taking place and that 
managerial prerogative is not being unfairly applied. In the circumstance where the 
bulk of operating managers are men and the maj ority of staff are then special 
safeguards should be in place to ensure that managers do not favour the minority male 
staff. As a matter of urgency, the male authority dominance needs to be addressed. 
Thirdly, the scheme should be utilised to improve the communication processes 
throughout the organisation but especially to marry the differing requirements from 
work relationships between men and women. Performance pay schemes which have a 
built-in system ofregular review between the parties can help all sides to focus on the 
key operational requirements established as objectives and develop the behavioural 
aspects set out as competencies. 
Convincing the unconvinced 
The group of employees who have been identified as strongly opposed to performance 
pay need to be addressed. Being able to identify the grouping that is most likely to be 
'at risk' can be most helpful as resources can be set aside to approach this difficult 
group. It can be the key to gaining overall acceptance of the scheme. The importance 
of professionalism in planning and implementing perfonnance pay schemes was 
found by Beery (1997a) as a key factor in ensuring that union members accepted 
performance pay in local government. This was especially true where performance 
pay was associated with policies to improve communications, enlarge jobs and invest 
in training and development rather than to reduce wage costs or force through 
efficiencies. As with all successful negotiations, it is trying to get the opposed side to 
; 
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raise proposals that are constructive and useful but do not have a long-term cost or 
undermine the main principles of the scheme, that usually brings groups round from 
outright opposition to at least acquiescence. 
The Telecoms scheme was introduced after consultation with the union but at a time 
when it tended to be associated with a 'survival' plan. Although it was not called that, 
employees understood it as such. It was, therefore, not generally opposed by the 
union. An approach for an organisation in Telecoms situation may be to seek to have 
closer touch with the union on this sensitive area. Heery (1997b) sees the union role 
as to seek to regulate management decision-making and minimise the exposure of 
members to management arbitrary discretion, for managers to follow explicit rules in 
awarding payments and for appeals procedures to be in place and regularly exercised. 
A further role would be to limit the amount of money at risk - in other words to limit 
the contingent payments available, especially if they were at the expense of a 
guaranteed pay increase. They would also want to have access to all the facts relating 
to contingent pay 'pot', the methods of awarding pay and the monitoring of equity in 
the awards. Most of these approaches could be seen as a reasonable role for a union to 
play, supported by the human resource department as long as it did not lead to a 
bureaucratisation of the scheme, a slowing down of decision-making processes and 
awards being reduced to valueless gestures. 
Heery's research demonstrated that the introduction of performance pay schemes do 
not lead necessarily to the marginalisation of unions or union members. However, an 
alternative approach would be for the company to use the scheme as a message to 
encourage into the organisation those with a risk-taking character who are in 
agreement with the pay-at-risk concepts and who believe strongly in the meritocracy 
vision. If it decides that the existing union opposition is too small, weak and thinly 
distributed, then it could take the view that such minorities could be safely ignored, 
having been given the opportunity to radically alter its viewpoint. 
Is there any alternative to performance pay? 

Employees in this research supported the principle ofperformance pay and did not 

want, on balance, to return to the old scheme of payment by job and service. These 

findings are supported by the few other surveys where this question is asked, even in 
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the union-dominated Inland Revenue research. On that basis, it does not seem to be 
the case ofwhether performance pay should operate or not but what form it should 
take. There are, of course, a few limited exceptions. The literature review has shown 
that the contingency approach to HR strategy would indicate that in those sectors 
where the vocational element is strong, (vocational in its old-fashioned meaning of a 
'calling') then performance should can be avoided. These areas include the charity 
sector and certain professional areas in the public service, such as the police, prison 
service, nurses, doctors and social workers. 
Overall, though, there is little purpose in academics and unions railing against 
performance pay and demanding its abandonment because there is no going back to 
the cultural elements associated with job and service based pay. This brings the 
subject back to the introduction to this dissertation where the features of the modern 
economy were detailed. There is no long-term employment, little security, no fixed 
ways ofworking or unchanging operational rulebook. Not, at least, for those 
organisations that want to survive in the globalised economy. 
Finally, is performance pay worthwhile? Not, according to Brown (quoted in McHale 
1990) who believed that: 
, All material rewards suffer from the law ofdiminishing returns. Trying to satisfy 
individuals with material rewards is like trying to fill a bottomless pit.' (p 13) 
The issues in motivation between financial and non-financial rewards have been 
debated long and hard over the last 50 years or more. Achievement (McClelland 
1975), recognition (Maslow 1954), responsibility (McGregor 1960), growth (Alderfer 
1972) are all indisputable elements that can provide positive support to an individual's 
progress. But the latter part ofthe twentieth century has been a highly material period 
and attempting to reduce the importance of financial reward can be akin to attempting 
to drive back the tides. It is likely to be in the combination of both elements of 
financial and non-financial rewards that an organisation will find its greatest success 
in employee satisfaction. 
j 
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An important aspect in deciding whether performance pay schemes are worthwhile is 
to try to assess how successful the outcomes have been in practice. Very few 
organisations in practice attempt to do this (lPD 1998). Less than 5% appear to carry 
out a financial analysis to estimate if the costs of the schemes have been outweighed 
by the benefits, nor do they survey employees to obtain their views. That is not to say 
that the measure of 'success' fmds a ready consensus between employers and 
employees. Prendergast (1993) pointed out that even when the outcome of an 
incentive arrangement is that the employees pay greater attention to conforming to the 
requirements that are the base for the measurement system, criticisms can be made 
that employees are simply becoming 'yes men'. The conforming process produces 
inefficiencies and a risk-averse workforce. In other words, a re-stating of one of 
Kohn's (1993) criticisms of performance pay that it produces only temporary 
compliance. Management may find compliance, even of a temporary nature, provides 
a satisfactory context for implementing change and improving performance. 
Employees may regard this situation with less sanguinity (Kessler 1994). 
6.5 Suggestions for Further Research 
'In spite of the rapid growth in the use ofperformance pay schemes in the UK, there 
have been surprisingly few attempts to gauge their success and even fewer attempts to 
explain empirically any observed success or failure' (p 348) 
We return to this opening quotation from Dowling and Richardson (1997) for this 
final section. These final comments concentrate on the author's views ofkey areas. 
Research is required into organisations that have introduced forms of team based pay, 
including gainsharing and the reaction of employees to these schemes. There has been 
no published case study research from an academic viewpoint at all into team-based 
payor gainsharing in the UK. The tension between individual and team-based 
rewards is a particularly vital area and cases are required to see how organisations 
have attempted to resolve this tension. 
Further studies are also needed to clarify the issue of the characteristics of key 
supporters and opponents of performance, assuming that the findings in this research 
are supported elsewhere. If there are identified stakeholders of either persuasion, then 
201 
a strategy can be worked out to help transform those opponents and encourage he 
supporters. 
An examination of the internal environment would also be valuable. To date, more 
research has been carried out in the public sector so a concentration on the private 
sector and the competitive environment would be useful, especially organisation in 
the high-tech industries or those where individual performance or group performance 
are crucial to organisational success. Lewis's (1997) PhD findings make good iruoads 
into this area, especially in mapping the internal and external context of the 
organisations but further work is certainly required. 
How line managers respond to performance pay and the additional pressures this puts 
on them is another area that calls for research. Schemes are unlikely to work without 
managers operating them effectively and this usually does not take place without 
adequate involvement, training and resources so research into these factors with some 
success measures would be valuable. 
There is a large research gap in the use of360 degree feedback as a crucial element in 
performance measurement leading to pay outcomes. As most schemes struggle to 
achieve satisfaction with the performance management process, such research into 
employees' satisfaction with 360 degree feedback would be valuable. 
Case studies ofperformance pay schemes in practice, especially longitudinal ones, is 
another useful area of research. Investigations could be carried out on how 
organisations make changes year on year, the degree of flexibility in the schemes and 
the respond to stakeholders' advice and complaints. An attempt could be made to 
measure the way schemes become corrupt and decay. Specific attention in these areas 
would be applied to the underpinning performance management processes 
underpinning the performance pay schemes. 
Finally, communication and training for performance pay schemes are so important 
that they warrant an investigation of their own. Criteria of success is another difficult 
area to consider but one that is essential in the long term. This brings us back to the 
underlying questions. Is performance pay introduced from the viewpoint of 
hi $1 
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operational efficiency or for cultural reasons, or both and do the views of employees 
matter in any case. if management view the scheme as a success from both the 
operational and cultural viewpoints? 
« 
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QUESTIONNAIRE 1 (BEFORE) 

APPENDIX 1 
.­
ATIJ.TU1)~TO THE ~nooucnoNOf PERfOR.,\.fANCE RELATED PAX . 
RESULts 
Please answer the following questions as lully as you are able and return the completed <ll1estionnaiz~ 
dlnd to Puttuidge 1S1U)' in the reply-paid envelope provided. G'uformmc:e Related Pay wUl be rdemd 
~ as PRP) 
SECTION 1 • ABour THE INl1tOOUcnON Of nn:: SCHEME 
Question 1 
Have you been briefed on the new PRP $Cheme? YES[!] NO [2] 
ill No, go to question 1) 
105 
Question 2 YES 
What form did the briefing take? 
Briefing to the Department 30 0 no reply 17 
Individual Briefing by your Manager 43 both 7D 

.Other (please specify) ....................................................................................................................... 

Question 3 
Please rate the Briefing in general as follows (tick): 
1 2 3 4 5 
Excellent 0 Good 0 Fair 0 Poor D VeryPoor 0 Mean = 2.95 
5 26 41 n 4 
Question 4 
Please give a rating against these aspeds of the briefing using th~ scale: ( note· scores reversed) 
Excellent 1 / Good 2/ Fair 3 / Poor 4/ Very Poor 5 RATING 1 2 3 4 5 mean 
5 25 40 19 10 3.04 
2) Opportunity for questions 
1) Clear Explanation 
17 30 32 6 14 2.70 
5 13 28 37 15 3.453) Satisfactory answers to questions 
3 18 23 15 38 3.694) Quality of handouts 
-.~ 
_1%J4ri& P"'";:s 
Qu.estionS 
Do you ~dentand the follOwing asp«ts of the PerfonNnce Related Poly scheme?: 
ill ~, pve & rating as above 1 to 5) .. 
YES NO RATING 1 2 3 4 5 Mean 

Objective 5etting 86 
 12 8 17 26 2 11. !3S 

Staff dialogue in ~lation to PRP 64 
 34. 9 10 23 19 3. 1..Q;

Overall contnbution 81 
 17 7 16 29 22 7 ~93 

,------­
Qu~tion6 
. How would you improve the Briefing proc~? 
_...............- ................................................................................................................................................................. 

...................... ........ ......................................................................................................................................... 

..... ..... ........................... .............................................................................................. ................................... 

SEcnON 1· ABOtrr YOUR VIEWS AND EXPEcrATIONS ON PRP 
In t.~$ section, please indicate the extent to which you agree or disa~ with each statement that 

follows by circling the appropriate number in the columns. 

Q7 
Q9 
Ql0 
Qll 
QU 
Q13 
l'RP will gi ve me a greater incentive to get 
my work priorities right. 
PRP will give me the incentive to work 
beyond the immediate requirementsof my job. 
The principle of relating pay to performance 
is a good one. 
1 am ct:mfident that my Manager will take 

the Objective setting very seriously. 

My Manager is good at giving me feedback 
on my performance. 
It will be easier to work together with 

other employees if we reteive the same 

rewardsunder PRP. 

PRP will raise motivation in general. 
Strongly 

Agree 

1 

4 

1 

3 

1 

19 

1 

19 

1 

9 

1 

15 

1 

S 

2 

9 

2 

5 

. 
2 

28 

2 

20 

2 

14 

2 

13 

2 

5 

3 

28 

3 

23 

3 

14 

3 

21 

3 

14 

3 

16 

3 

11 

4 

10 

4 

13 

4 

12 

4 

19 

4 

21 

4 

23 

4 

17 

SO:ongly 
Oisagree 
5 6 

18 19 

mean = 4.49 

5 6 

29 16 

mean =4.66 

5 6 

S 6 

mean =3.49 

5 6 

12 8 

mean = 3.35 

5 6 

15 18 

mean =4.26 
5 6 

15 8 

mean:3.92 

5 6 

21 20 

mean =5.00 

7 

18 

7 

17 

7 

18 

7 

7 

7 

15 

7 

16 

7 

ZJ 
Q29 PlU' will raise my moti~tion at wOfk 1 
3 
2 
0 
3 
18 "23 
5 
14 
man a 
6 
18 
5.03 
7 
28 
Q30 PRP will help employees' morale 
In general. 
1 
0 
2 
3 
3 
11 "13 
5 6 
18 23 
mean~5.49 
7 
36 
Q31 t I!Xp«t to re<:eive regular feedback 
(rom my maNger ~gmy progress 
towards a~ ra.tgets and objedives. 
1 
22 
2 
29 
3 
14 " 18 
5 6 
10 7 
mean a 2.98 
7 
3 
Q32 The Job Crading exercise was C3tT'ied 
out fairly. 
1 
3 
2 
15 
3 
n 
-4 
2S 
S 6 
15 12 
meana4..S3 
7 
22 
Q33 PRP will help the department to work 
ta~ther as a team. 
1 
3 
2 
" 
3 
19 
.. 
16 
5 6 
19 23 
mean,,,,V6 
7 
20 
Q34 PRP will mean that good wofk is 
recognised and rewarded. 
1 
" 
2 
11 
3 
19 " 18 
S 6 
18 12 
mean=4.S3 
7 
22 
Q3S My manager will krow enough about 
my work to give me an accurate 
assessment. 
1 
8 
2 
14 
3 
21 "10 
5 6 
16 13 
mean .. 4.34 
1 
22 
SECTION 3 • Details about yo~li 
Q36 What age group are you in: (ticld 
1~11) OJ 21·25 (!) 26-3{) [§ 31-35 @] 
46-30 @l 51-55 m ~G 6H5 m 
~~ 41-43 ~ 
: 
Q37 Are you male ~ or female \34\ 
Q38 What i$ your current job grade (circle) 1 
0 
2 
0 
3 
8 "16 
S 
26 
6 
29 
7 
lS 
8 
4. 
9 
1 
Q39 How long have you worked for the organisation as a whole: 
under 1 year ill 1 to 3 ye:ars @l 4 to 6years 
7 to 9 yeal"3 (E] 10 to 2Qyean ~ over20~n 
~ 
(ill 
040 Are you a member of a Trad~ Union y~m No ~ 
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QUESTIONAlRE 2 (AFTER) 
111 
•APPENDIX 2 
I 

I 

I 
I 
I 
A 1111 UDES TO THE INTRODUcnON OF PERfORJ.'dANCE RElATED PAY 
,~.-'ISECTION 1 - MEASUR.E...~!'01"" AI.'lD ASSESSME!.~"" 
, 'Question 1 
What has been your overall reaction to your combined ratings? 
Very Fair ~ Fair W Uncertain[1Q] Unfair 1:llJ Very Unfair W 116 
1 2 3 4 5 2.40 mean 
Question 2 
Have you any views on the method of assessment under'contributing rating'? 
Comments 
Customer comes first 	 ....................................................................................................................................... 

.................................................................................................................................. 

Total commitment to quality 	 ..................................._........................................................................................... . 

Empowerment and responsibility 
Teamwork makes a winning team 	 ....... -_ .................. __ ............ _- ....................................................................................... 

Communication is op~n and honest 
Question 3 

~ . d 'T k ak ., "" '1
Wha .. was your own rating wi er eamwor mesa W-JlU'UL'"tg ...am ........................................................ . 

APPENDIX 2 
AllII UDES TO THE INTRODUcnON OF PERFORMANCE RELATED PAY 
• .t;~.,ISECTION 1· MEASlJRE.'tlENT AND ASSESSME.'t'T 
, 'Question 1 
What has ~ your ollerall reaction to your combined ratings? 
Very Fair W Fair [1il Uncertain5Q) Unfair 1121 verr Unfair [1J 116 
1 2 3 4: 5 2040 mean 
Question 2 
Halle you any views on the method of assessment under 'contributing rating'? 
Comments 
Customer comes first ••••e"••_" ... _" ................_.............. __........................................................................................
e.~ 
............................................ ............................ ....................................... ..........._.­
Tota! commitment to quality 
Empowerment and responsibility 
Teamwork makes a winning team 
Communication is open and honest 
Question 3 

'What was your own rating under 'Teamwork makes a w".nni..i.g team'? ....................................................... . 

-"-----­
I 
\ 

Qu~tion 10 
Please give any specific comments arising from questiOt'lS 8 and 9: ................................................................... . 

... .. .. ..... .. ... .... .. .. .. .. .. .... .... .............. ...... .... .. .. .. .. ..................._....._........................._...................- ._.....- ........................................_....•...- ................_.. 

...... ......... .... ...... ...................................................................~............................................................................................_......... 

............................................................................................................................................................................................ 

............. ............................. ..............................................................................................................................................................
~ 
Question 11 

Are there any ways in which you would improve the scheme? ......................................................................... ~ 

..................................................................................................................................... - ............................................................... ···········_•••••0 

.................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 

ISECflON 2- YOUR VIEWS ON HOW PRP HAS WORKED FOR YOU IN' ITS FIRST YEAR 
[n this s~tion, please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each statement that follows by circling 
the appropriate number in the columns. 
Strongly Strongly 
Agree Disagree 
Q12 PRP has given me il greater incentive to get 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
my work priorities right 5 11 31 11 11 13 23 n~ 
4.-C mea 
Qt3 PRP has given me the incentive to work 1 2 3 4 5 6 i 
beyond the immediate requirements of my job. 7 9 25 16 21 13 2... r­
.L -­•. : 't mea 
QH I have found that the principle of relating pay 1 2 3 4 5 6 i 
to performance is a good one. 17 24 27 17 9 9 13 115 
3A3 mea 
Q15 My Matlager has taken the Objective 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
setting very seriously. 15 29 27 24 8 5 8 11;­
3.22 mea 
Q16 My Matlager is good at giv"ing me feedback 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
on my performance. 4 23 25 18 16 H 17 11;­
4.10 mea 
Q17 The performance of my team would improve 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
if We were all paid an identical sum of 18 7 14 21 19 17 19 115 
money under PRP rather than different 4.24 me2 
individual payments. 
Q1S PRP has raised motivation in general. 1 2 3 4 5 6 i 
3 7 24 21 10 21 31 p-., 
·t~ me~' 
• 

Strongly 
Agree 
Q3S 	 PRP has helped employees' morale t 2 3 4 
in general. 5 12 22 
Q36 	 t receive regular fee:iback from my 1 2 3 4 
manager concerning my progress 7 10 14 21 
towards agreed targets and objectives. 
Q37 	 rwould prefer to return to the old salary 1 2 3 4 
system before PRP was introduced. 13 Z2 10 28 
Q38 	 PRP has helped the department to work 1 2 3 4 
together as a team_ 8 24 26
'" 
Q.39 	 PRP has meant that good work i3 1 2 3 
recognised and rewarded. 7 19 23 "17 
Q40 	 My manager knows enough about 1 2 3 4 
my work to give me an accurate assessment. 15 26 22 IS 
•I
, 
I 
I " 
I 

ISECtION 3· OETAILS ABOUT YOURSELF 

Q41 vVhat age group are you in?: (tick) 
123 ~ 5 
16-20 @] 21-250 26-30 @J 31.3S§ 36-40-@1 
41-45 G.i] 46-50 [IT] 51-55 [i§J 56-60G] 61-65 Gl 
6 7 8 9 10 
Q42 Are you male [83 or female W 116 
1 2 
Q43 What is your current job grade? (cirde) 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 1 3 19 21 36 
Q41 "Vhat was your overall rating? 0% Insufficient results 
Strongly 
Disagree 
S 6 7 
22 22 31 114 
5.20 ~. 
5 6 7 
18 21 ZS 116 
4_69 C:. 
5 6 7 
15 !2 21 116 
4..12 t:' 
5 6 7 
20 14 20 lIS 
4.43c: 
5 6 7 
10 16 2S Il7 
4:.30 cr 
5 6 7 
8 11 18 II7 
3.69 rI" 
Average 38 
115 
7 8 9 Average 5.4 
IS 11 2 III 
!II 
IF iAw' 
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EXAMPLE OF 'CONTRIBUTION' GRID 
• 

APPENDIX 3 

.. 

Teamwor/c Ma/ces a Winning-Team 

Sought by others, wilhin 
own learn and elsewhere, as 
all expert. Willingly gives 
advice and guidance. 
Sharcs information and 
expertise wilh Ihe leam. 
Seeks to build on 
contributions from olllers. 
E~changcs info(malion wilh 
colleagues clearly and 
concisely. Panlcipates as a 
full member of the leam. 
Normally joins in with Ihe 
team co achieve 
depar1Jl1clllal goals. 
Works independcnlly. Docs 
not share informalion or 
seek opinions ofoilier leam 
members. 
Promotes IC4lm olJj~clivcs 
and spirit (0 act IOgethcr 10 
achieve Department and 
Company goals. 
Encourages olhers 10 
conlribule IllO(C ill onler 10 
improve team success. 
Always cOlllriblltcs own 
ideas and opinions for Ihe 
leam good. Regularly gains 
Icam baking for suggestions 
lUade. 
Able 10 put forwilfli own 
idC<ls and opinions and 
Jlositively iu.flliellce 
Supports colleagues when Plcpared 10 work wilh the 
possible/able. U· II I "1(14~(''''''lcall'\'t{,'v.~on ove1all 
Trusted by team membcrs~~.: su@, ,~., .:.va~.menl. "'~I"'-.....J\\."\... ." I 
Seeks advice from olher 
team members SllId 
occasionally Jluls OW/l idcas 
forward. 
~.. ~; 
Seeks 10 assisl olhe( 'cam 
members to develop. 
MOllvates others to want to 
improve. 
Willingly advises olhers 
and gives feedback 10 
deve!op the Icam. 
TeflJll Mef11bersIJip 
COlllrihuliolllO Tefll11 Success 
COlltribution 10 Teanl Deve~opmel11 
A I\lajor cOII(ribulor 10 IClIII\ 
success. fully particlpales 
and encourages all olher 
/lIcmbelS of the leam. 
Support 
-~ ---..~ -~'''i!1P.J$n"'iill!ii ·.~",,,,C'''''''''1'~,ir,'.''''.•"',!0f_~~~~~-;{1iw",*111!.'-'!'~~.M~,,~_,-, ll!!l!-~-. f}'tr:)"'>:0W"~~_'~.-'W'-.-·_'~1'~~~;_1IM~-"-_---~~-c_";_ i;fi'¥3',''Yiwc:_1JIiI#*~''--.~-_'~:~''_',''''''''H_''''''''''"''-
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APPENDIX 4 
Summary of Major British Performance Pay Research Studies. 
Swabe (1989) Case Study in the Financial Services 
In this single company study, where 9000 were employed (75% unionised) a perfotmance-related pay 
scheme was introduced after two years of careful planning and a union-agreed ballot, with the main 
objective being to reward better performers within a controlled cost basis. Comprehensive training in 
the appraisal process took place for all staff and the merit awards. The appraisal system was based on a 
series of in1posed objectives. The method of calculation was through awarding a merit rating on a five 
point scale and then converting this into actual pay through a complex pay grid system. An appeals 
process was built in and was operated in 27 cases in the first year of operation. 
The outcome after a year was that management's objective of constraining pay costs was achieved and 
the views of employees arising from an attitude survey at the end of the first year was that 77% felt that 
the system was an improvement on the one operating previously and only 4% considered it a backward 
step. However, 42% did not consider that their merit pay accurately reflected their perfonnance. 
Geary (1992) Study of three American owned electronics companies ill Ireland 
This study looked at reward systems as a whole but much of the report deals with appraisal-based 
rewards in two of the companies and comparisons with the third where pay was based on the rate for 
the job. The evidence was gained from a series of interviews with managers and a limited number of 
shop floor employees. Examples were given of the way that the awarding ofmerit rises allowed 
supervisors to make it quite clear what was required of employees and for this clarity to reduce the 
areas for clashes and argument. 'Desirable work behaviour could be pulled by the prospect of future 
rewards.' (P43) Management's intentions were to individualise the pay contract, make 'mind-set 
changes' and shape employee's normative orientations. 
The views gained from the interviews with employees showed, however, that many employees did not 
buy into the system. Less than half of the employees were happy with the merit review and most found 
that the managers' claims for greater fairness to be shallow, chiefly on the grounds of the subjectivity 
of the review. Management and supervision agreed with the difficulties over providing a fair and 
objective review and providing consistency across departments. Other difficulties which provided 
comments from both sides included: 
.. Collectivism versus individualism - the way attempts were made to develop a collective identity 
around team working but to reward employees on an individual basis. 
.. Skills development versus flexibility - how the emphasis on moving employees reduced their 
ability to become highly skilled in one area. 
.. Integrating all employees through a stock ownership plan but still to measure and pay them on a 
divisive basis. 
In terms of the final outcome, the addition of individual performance pay brought about a general sense 
of satisfaction with the overall level ofpay. The pay system also influenced the general dissipation of 
opposition to increased flexibility - their 'instrumental rationality in the face ofchanges in working 
patterns' as Geary puts it. 
Proctor et al (1993) - a case study from the electronics industry 
This was a research project based on a single heavily unionised company over a five year period 
concerned primarily with the human resourse implications of the design and implementation ofa 
flexible manufacturing system. Evidence in the pay area was gained from 20 semi-structured 
interviews from differing levels in the plant out of the 600 employees on site. The introduction of 
performance pay could be identified as a more acceptable alternative to de jure de-recognition.(p64) 
The researchers found a far from happy system in operation with variations in the criteria for the 
awards, assessment grades were concentrated in the middle of the range, the system was costly to 
operate in terms of staff resources and fmancial restraints posed a threat to the system. Overall, there 
• 
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was a lack of confidence in the scheme, not helped by the refusal to publish a summary of the appraisal 
results. The appeal system was not utilised, reflecting the general disillusionment with the system as a 
whole. 
At the end of the research period, the company imposed a pay freeze due to the worsening economic 
situation throwing doubt onto whether the system ofperformance pay could continue to operate. 
With such a small number of interviews (the break down into management, employees, trade union 
responses was not given) it is difficult to view the research too seriously. The lack ofuse of the appeal 
system (one of the few hard facts given) could also indicate an acceptance, albeit reluctance, of the 
results and the scheme. The changing economic outlook between 1987, when the scheme was 
introduced, and 1991, when the article was written, would certainly have an effect on the success of 
performance-related pay from the viewpoint of management. 
Lewis (1997) Research into performance-related pay in financial services industry 
As part of a PhD project, Lewis investigated performance-related pay operating in three organisations 
between 1993 and 1995. The unnamed organisations were a high street bank, a building society and an 
insurance company. The focus of the study were the managers who were recipients of the scheme. The 
methodology utilised was qualitative, namely 63 semi-structured interviews with these managers and 
23 interviews with the managers responsible for the design ofthe system or its implementation. 
The research indicated examples of clustering of ratings around the middle grade, the influence of 
favouritism and a lack of communication and feedback. One manager, in pointing ou.t that genuinely 
good and bad managers were not recognised, said: 
'One ofthe problems with the last award was a difference between a 3 and a 3.5 rating. It translated to 
0.1% of the pay increase which was ridiculous. People will rightly say why did I bother? The 

difference in effort required surely warrants more than that!' 

(Lewis, pl0) 

Feedback on performance was mixed with one organisation approaching the whole performance 
management process with enthusiasm and dedication but the other two organisations showing little 
consistency. The lack of communication, especially in benchmarking an individual manager's 
performance against their peers, failed to provide the information from which managers would have 
derived 'self-esteem, solace or just satisfied curiosity' (Lewis 1997 p 14) 
Lewis concluded that the performance-related pay cycle was not integrated effectively with business 
objectives or in 'developing resourceful humans' The developmental aspects were clearly missmg 
through ineffective feedback, narrow objectives and lack of differentiation between good and bad 
performance. 
Kessler and Purcell (1992, 1994) Templeton Performance-related pay Project. 
This substantial project ran from 1990 to 1993, sponsored by eight companies who provided the survey 
field. This has been, to date, the largest performance-related pay research project and a number of 
publications emerged. It was reported that the methodology provided considerable problems and 
influenced the largely disappointing and inconsequential fmdings. Eight companies were too large to 
allow for intensive case study approach but too small to constitute a free-standing database. The 
companies had different agendas in relation to the research and a number baulked at using employee 
attitude surveys. They also objected to the attempts to identify indicators of company performance 
which might be linked to the use of performance-related pay so conclusions on whether the schemes 
'worked' could only be sketchy and subjective. 
From the managerial viewpoint, the reasons for the introduction ofperformance pay were a mix of 
traditional drivers - recruitment, retention and motivation - but a stronger element also came through 
of using performance pay to assist corporate transformation. The elements here were to promote values 
of employee flexibility, to move from a collectivist approach to individualism by encouraging direct 
manager-staff relationships and, fmally, to develop managerial skills which focused on performance 
and achievement. 
7 
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The two attitude surveys that were used found that: 
• 	 Performance pay did not appear to have either a positive or negative impact upon employee 
attitudes. 
• 	 The principle of pay for performance commanded strong support 
• 	 Younger employees and those with short service were generally more supportive of performance 
pay compared to older and long-serving employees. Women were more enthusiastic than men. 
Union membership did not affect views. 
Marsden and Richardson (1992) and Marsden and French (1997) Inland Revenue Surveys. 
The 1992 study was funded by the Inland Revenue Staff Association with full co-operation from 
management and the research was based on 2423 questionnaires (60% response rate) from union and 
non-union employees. The report describes the origins of the scheme in 1988 where the principle 
reason given for introduction was one of aiding recruitment, especially in London and the South-East. 
The questionnaire asked staff for their views on how they believed performance pay had affected their 
work and their attitudes. The principal fmdings were: 
• 	 A large majority of staff considered that the scheme had not increased their motivation (80%), a 
view confirmed by their managers (85%) 
• 	 The underpinning appraisal scheme was considered to be fundamentally flawed and unfair. 
Despite these strong views, a majority of staff agreed with the principal of performance pay (57%) and 
that it should stay in place for all its faults. (55%) 
The scheme was revisited in the 1997 report which investigated how successful the subsequent changes 
to the scheme were, including the removal of the 'quota' system which limited the number of high 
appraisals. This time, the response rated was nearly halved (30%) and, in overall terms, the scheme was 
seen in a more negative light by those responding. For example, the percentage of respondents who 
considered that performance pay raised staff awareness of the objectives of the organisation fell from 
57% to 38% while 57% thought that managers used the scheme to reward their favourites compared to 
35% in 1992. 
From a management viewpoint, however, the scheme was seen to increase productivity (from 22% in 
1992 to 42% in 1996), cause many staff to work beyond the requirements of the job (from 15% to 
37%) and to increase quality (from 10% to 17%). The authors concluded that the atmosphere had 
clearly deteriorated since 1992 with performance pay a main target of blame by staff. 
• 
Thompson (1993a) IMS study 
Although not the largest research project, this has probably been the most influential of the last 20 
years. Data was collected regarding performance management and reward from three organisations: a 
building society, a large retailer and a local authority, all of whom operated individual performance pay 
schemes for all or a proportion of their employees. Over 1000 questionnaires were returned. 
The following results were recorded, backed up by extensive statistical analysis using SSPS: 
• 	 In motivational terms, performance pay had, overall, a neutral or slightly negative effect. 
• 	 Poorer performers recorded a higher negative effect but good performers did not produce a higher 
positive effect. 
• 	 Performance pay had no effect upon good performers' intentions to stay with the organisation. 
• 	 There was no evidence that performance pay helped to change organisational culture towards one 
that was more honest and open, with effective communication systems. I 
• 	 There was a strong correlation between employees' views of the 'fairness' ofthe scheme and its I motivational effect. 
'I 
\ • The most important factor by far influencing the employee's perception of the fairness of the 
I scheme was the relationship with the immediate manager who carried out the appraisal. 
•I 
I 
I 
~ 
,ill 
---
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• There was no .evidence o~ differing or distinct views between union and non-union employees.
• The more senwr the gradmg, the more positive the view on the scheme and its motivational 
elements. 
• T~e apparent failure to motivate could have been influenced by the universal lack of consultation 
pnor to the schemes commencing. 
• 	 Where training in appraising techniques had taken place, it had a moderate influence on the 
employees' attitudes towards the fairness of the scheme. 
Dowling and Richardson (1997) Health Service Study. 
This study evaluated the performance pay scheme for managers in six NHS Trusts in the South of 
England, using responses from 114 managers. 
In contrast to most other studies, the results indicated that managers considered the scheme to have 
raised their own motivation, ifnot by a substantial amount. For example, 29% felt that the scheme had 
a positive effect on their motivation to do the job well, 67% felt that it made no difference while only 
5% considered that it had a demotivating effect. Where managers considered the scheme a success, a 
strong element was identified as the degree of challenge which managers could respond to under the 
objectives agreed through the scheme. Where other managers found the scheme to be unsuccessful, 
important contributory elements included poorly perfonned objective setting, inappropriately 
conducted assessments and unattractive rewards. 
Heery (1998) Performance-related Pay in four local authorities 
The operation of performance pay for non-manual employees in four local authorities in Southern 
England with the perceptions of around 1300 investigated. Discussions were held with 33 managers 
and 14 trade union representatives. 
Heery found that the performance pay schemes generated neither positive nor perverse effects. 
Employees considered they did not work harder, are not more conscious of the [mancial costs of their 
actions, co-operation has not been damaged and they are just as prepared to take on extra tasks. They 
also believed, a little surprisingly, that their own performance had been fairly assessed and, even more 
surprisingly, that they were more satisfied with their total pay as a result of the performance pay 
scheme. Heery did fmd, however a 'strong under-current of suspicion about the equity of the scheme 
with substantial percentages claiming inconsistency and favouritism in performance rating' (P88). 
He found no significant differences related to employee's characteristics, such as age, sex except that 
higher grade employees were more positive. 
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APPENDIX 5 
Aligning Rewards to Organisational Goals - Merck, Sharp and 
Dohme's Experience 
Published in European Business Review January 2000 
5.1.1 Introduction 
The ,:ay empl?yees are rewax:ded is starting to alter rapidly. For many years, pay systems have 
remaIn.ed relatively stable whlle the wOrld. about the~ was dramatically changed. These major changes 
be¥an In the early 19805, led b~ t~e. Amencan motor mdustry giants who had seen their market share 
qUlckly eroded by Japanese. relta~lhty and. price advantage. The motor industry began the west's long 
march towards customer orientation, efficiency and quality, dragging its employees throuo-h successive 
traumas of re-structuru:g, re-~ngineering, re~undancy and revitalisation. It became clear that, amongst 
many other changes, hlerarchlcal structures m predictable environments altered to fluid organisational 
forms working in uncertain environments (Heery 1996) 
The evolvement ofthe concept of Human Resource Management in the mid-1980s led to the 
recognition that the workforce was one of the key areas of competitive advantage. How that workforce 
was recruited, trained, challenged and involved became critical components in ultimate organisational 
success. In each of these components, reward issues need to playa major part to produce a well-oiled 
high-performance people machine, focused on organisational objectives. 
The key word here is 'alignment'. Reward policies have often been made on an ad-hoc basis (Smith 
1992), resulting from immediate difficulties in the labour market or to pave the way to settle awkward 
negotiations with employees. This has lead to the collection of reward practices being out of line with 
each other and with the overall business needs. One only has to look at many of the 1970s·style shop 
floor incentive schemes which were based solely on productivity where good results (often as a result 
of countless allowances) often led to poor quality, an increase in waste and poor delivery performance. 
Even today, many schemes of performance related pay have a built-in conflict because they have been 
devised to reward the achievements of individuals while other parts of the human resource policy puts 
great emphasis on building up teamworking skills and practice. 
In the last 10 years, reward policies have begun to follow the parade, rather than just watching. 
Commentators, particularly Schuster and Zingheim (1992) who coined the phrase' The New Pay', set 
out some of the ways that remuneration systems have altered to match the new style cultures. 
5.1.2 Strategy 
Firstly, there must be a reward strategy in place. It must be derived from and contribute to corporate 
strateoy and be based on corporate values and beliefs. Glaxo-Wellcome, for example, as a world leader 
in ph:rmaceutical research and knowing that long-term investme~t is the only alternative for surv~val at 
the top, has a reward strategy of paying salaries at the upper quartile level to attract, d~velop, ~otlvate 
and retain quality research staff. Dow Chemicals has a strategy to provide compensation ~at lS 
responsive to, and reflective of, the quality ofperfonnance of both employees and ~e busmess. . 
(O'Neill 1995) Abbey National has used a reward strategy to move from a centralIsed bureaucratlc 
structur; to one that is decentralised with empowered operational units. Textron has recently used 
rewards to support the strategy of flexibility by introducing skills-based pay while Whitbread Beer 
Company and Vauxhalls both use rewards to encourage initiative and innovatio?s. 
Even the world of fast food has joined in. Burger King has recently annou~~ed unproved pay and 
conditions for its staff to help the move to become 'the preferred employer m the mdustry (Walsh, 
1998) 
A further development in reward strategy. is relate~ to the .development of c~mpetenci~s. Organisations 
have identified specific competencies whlch can dlfferentlate them fro:" ~helr c~mpetltors. Th~ clearest 
example is customer service but other examples of 'generic competencl~s have tncl~de? effectlve 
communication teamworking and a focus of quality. It becomes essentlal for organisatIOns to seek to 
align these orga'nisational generic competence to the behaviour ~d performance ~f employees. For 
example, a business that sees its competitive advantage as supenor customer servlce must focus 
-
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employees ~n the benefits of~hi~ s?,ategy. As an aid to reinforcing this process, organisations base 
sorr:e of therr rewards on the mdlVldual or team achievement in the area of customer care. These 
achievements can be measured through well developed marketing methods such as custo 
or the use of'm t h ' B 'ld' ,mersurveys 
. ys ~ry s oppers. Ul mg systems of competence-based payor incorporating the 
~eward for :mprovmg competenci.es within a performance pay system. Volkswagen and ICL now have 
Job evaluat~on schemes based entirely on competencies while directly paying for achieved 
competencies takes place at, amongst other major organisations, Scottish Equitable, Guinness and 
Royal Bank of Scotland (Brown and Armstrong, 1997) 
5.1.2 Flexibility 
A second feature is the need for rewards to retain considerable flexibility. This reflects the need of 
organisati~ns themselves to be nimb~e-footed. ~ach generation of new products must be brought to the 
~arket qUicker. ~ew contracts ~on m the service sector must be brought on stream in an ever quicker 
timescale. ReactIOn must be SWift to competitors in a globalised market place. Rewards, then, must not 
be fixed and immutable but contingent upon circumstances and performance. Skills based pay, for 
~xample, n:ay be emphasised one year !n one division to support the drive for multi-skilling amongst 
Its productlOn employees; at the same tune, another division will have a two-year gainsharing plan to 
turn round a loss-making operation and make it profitable. There has been a growth of incentive 
schemes introduced to last for only a few months with rewards in the form ofvouchers or holidays 
such as at Cable and Wireless and AEG. (Fisher 1996) These used to be restricted to the salesforce but 
they are now becoming more widespread amongst administrative, service and even production 
employees. 
As more executives move around Europe, due to the effects of the global market, the need for more 
flexible reward packages has become more apparent. A single compensation package which, with 
minor adaptions, can suit a transfer to any country in the world, has become outdated. Integration with 
the pay system for the country concerned and a reduction in the emphasis on the division between 'ex­
pats' and 'nationals' has led to a far more flexible and contingent approach to intemationallong and 
short-term assignments, as the case study shows. 
As a fmal aspect, to give support to this concept of flexibility in the organisation, employees may be 

empowered to choose the benefits to suit their own personal situation and needs through a flexible 

benefits programme, such as that operating at Price Waterhouse or ICL. 

5.1.4 Variable pay 
A third feature is that pay must become more variable. Instead of a wage or salary being a fixed 
amount each week, month or year, a growing proportion should become contingent upon performance. 
Performance can be measured on an individual basis, often called performance related pay, or through 
teams (team based pay) units of operation (gainsharing) or whole organisations (profit related pay). By 
introducing these schemes, employees are obliged a greater burden of the business as their pay rises or 
falls contingent upon the performance being measured. 
By the same token, the proportion paid to employees as their basic pay must reduce. 'On target 
earnings' must replace 'annual salary' as the advertising mantra for all employees, not just the 
salesforce. A fixed pensionable basic salary becomes converted into a base salary making up 70-80% 
of earnings with the remainder, often non-pensionable, made up of individual or group contingent pay. 
For senior executives, the proportion ofbase pay becomes even smaller with chief executives oflarge 
organisations receiving no more than 20% on base pay and huge incentives paid out as annual bonuses 
arId share options. 
Employees will be encouraged to get more involved in the organisation's progress and performance by 
incentives to, literally, buy into the organisation. Share option schemes for all employees, usually under 
the tax-approved SAYE arrangement, have become far more wid~spread ~d: for employees ~f . 
organisations that have seen very rapid growth in th~ ~alue ofth~rr orgar:lsatlOns, such as Smith, Klem, 
Beecham, Norwich Union or many privatised electriCity companIes, the l~creased val~e of the average 
shareholdings can be quite substantial, running into thousands ofpounds m a year. This can also act to 
increase the employee's commitment to the organisation. 
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A summary of some of these changes is set out in figure 22. 
Figure 22 - The Changing Nature of pay 
FROM TO 
Pay as an expense Pay as a competitive advantage
Compensation for having to be at work Reward for achieving desired results 

Fixed pay grades in a rigid job evaluation scheme 
 Flexibility within a broad banded structure 
Fixed weekly or monthly wage Variable pay where bonuses are added based on 
successful performance I 
Equity sharing limited to Directors Share Options for everybody 
Fixed benefit programme without choice Flexible benefit programme suiting individual 

requirements 

Pay policies based on government control or Pay determined by organisations to meet local 

national agreements conditions 

Compressed differentials Wide differentials from the boardroom to low-

paid parHime staff 

Paying for length of service Paying for performance, skills or competencies 

Paying for turning up for work Paying for employee's ideas, initiative and 

innovation 

Bonus schemes based on narrow measures of Incentives based on broad measures of 

production organisational success 

Source. author 

5.1.5 Basic Pay 
A Tmal change concerns basic pay itself, which also needs to be more flexible. The first major change 
has been in how levels of basic pay have been determined. In the public sector and in many large 
private concerns, basic pay levels used to be subject to national negotiations between a collection of 
unions and officials from the trade association or government body. In recent years, the volume of such 
negotiations have drastically declined. In manufacturing, for instance, the national agreement in the 
engineering industry has been all but abandoned and other industries, such as shipbuilding, are only a 
pale shadow of their former size. National agreements in the privatised utilities are now very patchy. 
Agreements still exist in local governments, although not all authorities take part, while the creation of 
Agencies out of former government departments have served to fragment much of the national 
bargaining. 
Movement to local bargaining in the private sector has been swift. Even a company such as Vauxhall, 
which only has two sites, has moved back to negotiating separate agreements for each site with certain 
pay and conditions reflecting local labour markets and site performance. The outcome is that 
organisations have a much freer hand in ensuring that basic pay is now much closer related to the needs 
of the organisation in its own location rather than having to fit in with the dictates of a national pay 
agreement. 
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It was not uncommon for national agreements to incorporate a pay structure based on a national job 
evaluation scheme. As organisations look to their own local needs, there has been a hard look at the 
benefits of retaining such schemes. Rather than being determined by the traditional job evaluation 
system with its emphasis on a multi-graded structure together with internal equity, fairness and 
bureaucratic application of a complex system of rules, the movement is towards the collapse of grades 
into a small number of pay bands (maximum of five) where movement within the band is determined 
by the individual's performance and external pay comparisons. These have been called 'Broad-banded' 
schemes and this subject makes up the main part of the case study in question. 
5.1.6 What is Broad-banding? 
At the end of a conventional job evaluation exercise, all the jobs studied have been awarded a total of 
points for all the job factors that have been examined. The next phase is to layout all those jobs in 
numerical points order and create a set of grades by fixing boundaries at particular points scores. 
In the past, it has been common to create at least 5 and sometimes as many as 15 grades, such as still 
exist in the Employment Service scheme. The aim has been to create equity by highlighting the 
differences between the sets ofjobs and giving greater rewards to those whose jobs are rated higher 
than others. The structure is seen to motivate by encouraging employees to bid for promotion to a 
higher job through a permanent, fair and transparent system. A higher job, a higher grade, a bigger 
salary, nothing could be simpler or fairer. The first major grading system like this was set up by the 
American Government in 1923 and operated, with some amendments, for 60 years. (Barringer and 
Milkovich, 1995) 
Figure 23 - Broadbanded structure - 150% band width 
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 
£'000 
Today, the external environment has changed considerably. Promotions are now far fewer as 
organisations have de-layered, reducing greatly the number ofmanagement and supervisory positions. 
Employees need to be far more flexible, willing to change their roles and learn more skills to meet the 
needs of the quickly changing national and international market place. The stiff, hierarchical grading 
structure is far less likely to match the quick-moving, responsive culture required in both 
manufacturing and service industries. (Armstrong and Ryden, 1996) 
Further criticisms of the multi-grade system is that can encourage the employee to adopt a rigid 
approach to the job. 
"My job has been described closely, it has been fixed at a particular grade, therefore 
that is the job 1 am paid for. 1 am not prepared to do anything new or extra outside of the job description 
unless I am paid more for it." 
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Figure 24 - Traditional graded structure - 50% grade width 
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 
£'000 
Long-standing schemes have strong tendencies towards grade drift, which, in tum, causes salary drift 
and headaches for the remuneration specialist. lfthe employee loses then the extra work will only be 
carried out grudgingly, it at all. Too often, employees think of themselves, or describe others, in terms 
oftheir grades. To be called a 'grade four' rather than a senior clerk, is still not unusual in organisations 
where the grading structure is deeply ingrained. 
Under a broad-banded scheme, the artificial divisions, which normally distinguish between grades, are 
ignored. What normally happens is that a set ofgeneric job titles, such as 'manager', 'supervisor', 
'operative', 'clerk' are gathered into one large band containing alljobs with this title. This allows all of 
the employees in an organisation to fit into a salary structure which may have as few as five broad 
bands. An illustration of the difference between the two structures is shown in Figures 23 and 24. 
Being broad, there is a large difference between the top of the band and the bottom. Sometimes the top 
of the band can be 250% higher than the bottom. (Le. a range for the 'managers' band from £16,000 to 
£40,OOO.Moving up the band is the key to the whole concept. First of all, the decision process is in the 
hands of the departmental manager to act within guidelines and in line with their budget. This replaces 
the formalised and personnel controlled re-grading process. (Hewitt Associates, 1994) The criteria for 
authorising movement falls into four main areas :­
A competence approach where clear guidelines are laid down on the acquisition of important 
competencies, such as operates with General Electric (Milkovich and Newman, 1996). Measuring 
them is not easy and will be a mix of subjective analysis, the attainment ofNVQs or equivalent, or 
through third party judgments, such as in 360 degree appraisal. 
An informal system of job development zones, where employees move from a probational role 
through to being an experienced employee and fInally to being an expert performer. There are 
very clear guidelines on how that should be judged and how long that should may take. Such 
movements are often anchored to market rates, analysed on a regular and consistent basis by the 
human resources department. (see Exhibit 4) 
Enlarging experience approach, where employees move between jobs and between departments, 
gaining extra skills and generally becoming more useful and knowledgeable employees. 
By performance, where the outcomes of the performance management scheme indicates a 
movement up the band due to enhanced and proven performance. 
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Figure 25 Broadbanding Zones 
£15,000 £20,000 £25,000 £30,000 

Learning Zone Competent Zone High Performance Zone 

5.1.7 Benefits of broad banding 
Advocates of the scheme put forward the following advantages :­
Employees have a much greater incentive to achieve results for the organisation. Ifthey become 
more competent, have a higher performance or enlarge their skills and experience, then they can 
be paid more. This encourages the type of values that organisations want to promote. They do not 
have to wait to apply for grading or a promotion. 
Giving the lack of managerial and supervisory jobs, employees can still make progress with the 
organisation. By employees improving and being motivated to improve, the job of the over 
stretched manager becomes easier. 
The system is far more flexible. New jobs and processes can be introduced easily without worrying 
about employees' narrowly defmedjobs. 
By putting the decisions in the hands of the manager they will act realistically and responsibly 
towards their staff and their total salary bill. 
Managers view broad bands as creating a more flexible environment in terms of directing their 
own careers because the system links earnings potential to performance rather than advancement. 
(Abosch, 1995) 
5.1.8 The downside 
It can be seen that broad-banding could be regarded as much more than a sophisticated version of 
the salary structure in a small, infOlIDal organisation that has not yet found the necessity for job 
evaluation. In fact, broad-banding can be so flexible that there is actually no need for job 
evaluation. This informality can lead to all the accusations of subjectivity and favouritism that led 
to job evaluated wage structures in the fIrst place. Unless the criteria for salary progress are robust, 
really understood and operated fairly, then the system will not be seen as fair itself. 
There can also be a tendency for it to be expensive. Under narrow grades, employees came to the 
top of their grade and realised they may have to stay there unless promoted. Under broad bands, 
most employees see an almost unlimited opportunity to make continuing progress and managers 
may fmd difficulty in holding salary increases back, particularly if employees meet the criteria. 
Employees may be de-motivated if they meet the criteria but the manager's budget restrictions stop 
the increase. Under traditional job evaluation schemes, budget restrictions could not stop a re­
grading. 
Making sure that managers act in a consistent fashion across the whole salary structure is not easy. The 
role of the human resources department here is crucial in acting as an auditor, an advisor, mentor and 
informal adjudicator. Without such a fallback, the wage structure is more than likely to fall into chaos. 
5.1.9 Merck,Sharp and Dohme's move to broad banding 
Merck,Sharp and Dohme Ltd is a wholly-owned subsidiary of the US based company which is one of 
the world's leading pharmaceutical companies operating in every major market throughout the world 
with a very strong market position in Europe. There are around 1,500 1JI<. employees in a number of 
sites with the Head Office based in the Home counties. It is not unionised, although joint consultative 
committees discuss points of mutual interest. 
In view ofthe huge sums invested in research and development, centralised control is more common in 
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the phannaceutical industry and this has been reflected in company policy on reward management. 
Together with training/development, Merck,Sharp and Dohme has always regarded reward systems as 
key areas of human resources and has put them at the heart of their integrated corporate systems. 
Employee appraisal, job evaluation and pay determination mechanisms are established at the US 
headquarters and cascaded through the various subsidiaries world-wide. Therefore, managers operating 
in, say, France will be appraised and rewarded under the same system as in the UK. 
The Hay job evaluation scheme had played a central and successful part in the overall pay system for 
over 20 years for managerial and senior technical staff. Each and every position has been carefully 
evaluated, Hay points allocated and the employee's basic salary determined by the Hay system on a 
range of 80% to 125% around the salary control point. This control point was carefully researched in 
relation to the market place through extensive and continuing market surveys and generally represented 
a point around the upper quartile of market rates. 
The responsibility for determining the Hay points lay with the HR department who were extensively 
trained in the Hay process and kept very close liaison with Hay staff on market developments. Most 
managers knew how many Hay points had been allocated to their job although they generally knew 
little of the scheme details and were unsure of how the precise points total had resulted. This was less 
well known at lower levels. 
5.1.10 Pointers for change 
As part of their close relationship, Hay carried out a regular audit of the scheme's operation on an 
international basis. In 1992 their audit showed that difficulties related to the application of the scheme 
had begun to surface. There were two main problems. Firstly, it was becoming increasingly difficult to 
align the scheme successfully across America and Europe. During the 19905, the economic 
circumstances in America had been markedly different from Europe. Their recession had been earlier 
and was not so deep as that occurring in Europe. Even within Europe at that time, economic 
circumstances varied greatly between, say Britain, where unemployment had been rising steeply for 
two years, and Gennany where their steep rise had yet to begin. These differences, accentuated by 
currency fluctuations, were reflected in the job market and the salaries required to attract the right 
calibre individuals. It was becoming impossible to encompass all of these varying cases in one a11­
embracing scheme. 
Allied with this problem in the operational and administrative grades was the problem of work 
flexibility. As employees' jobs were increasingly being stretched due to reduced headcount, team 
working, mechanisation and computerisation, the rigidity of the Hay evaluation scheme was placing 
strains on work patterns. There was also a growing demand for re-evaluation of jobs which was 
proving unsettling. 
The final problem was the growing difficulties of switching jobs. The era of de-layering had started 
(although on a low-key basis) and some employees whose jobs had been redefmed or re-engineered, 
were being offered alternative jobs. More commonly, employees developing their careers were 
considering and being offered jobs seen as 'lateral' moves by the company. In a number of cases, 
employees were refusing jobs that carried fewer Hay points (say, from 588 to 571) even though the 
salary and other benefits were identical or even better. The rigidity of the Hay scheme became a 
barrier. Problems with international transfers between America and Europe or within Europe came into 
the same category. When the market pressures were added to these problems then it became impossible 
to operate an efficient salary structure inside a narrow banded scheme 
5.1.11 Designing a new scheme 
It took two years of deliberation from the 1992 Audit to the launching of the revised system as part of a 
world-wide compensation re-design programme sponsored by the US corporate head office. 
The principal feature was the establishment of revised broad-banded salary structures. The flIst global 
system was for professional staff and had five grades in total from graduate entry to senior 
management a total of over 2000 staff worldwide. The second was for administrative and operative 
staff and was specific to the UK. An extensive mapping operation took place to fit the existing jobs into 
the Hay grades. The know-how element of Hay evaluation was retained as the principal measure and 
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the grades fell roughly into line with one step of know-how. 
The salaries established against the grades were a more tricky problem. The intention was to establish a 
grade range that encompassed all of the jobs and the current job-holders salaries. As in all salary re­
organisations, not everybody fitted into the structure. Moreover, the US head office preferred bands 
that were not too wide, probably with a range of 50% from bottom to top. This was felt to be too 
narrow by the UK HR department and lengthy persuasion was necessary to allow the scheme to have 
bands of around 75% for grades one to five and 125% for the senior management grade five. The new 
salary bands at that time are set out in Figure 26 :­
Figure 26 - MSD Broad banded salary structure - Management 
Band 1 £14,500 - £27,000 
Band 2 £20,000 - £40,000 
Band 3 £33,000 - £64,000 
Band 4 £47,000 - £95,000 
Band 5 £61,000 - £130,000 
The process of slotting employees into grades was achieved by the normal process of establishing a 
series of benchmark positions and then comparing all other jobs with those benchmarks. With only five 
grades in total this presented few problems. The HR staff carried out this exercise, liaising with line 
management to confirm straightforward decisions and consulting over the five per cent or so that did 
not naturally fit. It provided the opportunity to remedy perceived distortions where the Hay system had 
not adequately recognised a complex and sometimes unique role. 
For the UK administrative grades, similar principles applied although the number of bands was 
restricted to three and the band width was smaller at around 70 per cent (Figure 27) 
Figure 27 - MSD UK Administrative Bands 
Band 1 
Band 2 
Band 3 
£8,000 to £13,000 
£12,000 to £19,000 
£17,000 to £27,000 
5.1.12 Market Information 
As is common with large multinationals, decisions on salary movements within the broad banding 
system have always been heavily influenced by the market information provided by the HR 
department. (Sable, 1990) This information is generated from four main sources, predominately from 
within the pharmaceutical industry: 
Exchange Groups - Merck,Sharp and Dohme has joined together with other top companies in the 
industry to exchange information on compensation and benefits. These groups meet at least twice a 
year and provide detailed breakdowns of crucial salary movements and any innovations in benefits or 
incentives. They have a high value to participants in that the information is focused, the service is free, 
up-to-date and is accurate. Participants can follow up particular areas of interest on an informal one-to­
one or small group basis. 
A major consultant's salary club established the pharmaceutical pay survey more than 15 years ago and 
now has 100 participating pharmaceutical companies in the UK. The company has around 1000 client 
companies in over 40 surveys covering particular employment chapters, including one for secretarial 
and clerical staff in the South East. A conference is organised once a year for the pharmaceutical group 
to consider the fmdings in their surveys and discuss wider issues. The information is important for 
monitoring pay across the full range ofprofessional roles and to consider any areas where special skills 
shortages are developing, demonstrated by exceptional pay inflation. 
Hay survey - This is a very substantial and wide-ranging survey oforganisations that regularly use the 
Hay evaluation scheme. It provides very useful checking information to confmn Exchange group data 
and to compare pharmaceutical management and technical salary data with other industries. 
Local surveys - Merck,Sharp and Dohme takes part in local salary surveys for locally recruited jobs 
such as accounting and clerical staff, storekeepers and security staff. This is, in effect, a local exchange 
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group and is free, with the information very focused. 
Exhibit 7 provides an example of information on market trends provided to line management and a 
Salary Guide Matrix for management grades based on market data terciles. In total, the budget set aside 
for gaining market information works out at about £4.00 per employee plus the cost of half a person to 
collate and process the information into regular internal reports. 
5.1.13 Salary determination 
The authority for determining initial basic salaries and for movement within the salary band still lies 
with line management. The comprehensive market information provides them with a more precise tool 
with which to make these decisions. Rather than the rigid Hay progression system of moving steadily 
between 80% to 125% of the control point, employees are now recruited into what is seen a reasonable 
market salary and then they may progress to the upper quartile at an appropriate speed. This is justified 
through their manager's perception of their performance, acquisition ofmarket-valued skills and their 
value to the company, not simply how long they have worked for the organisation. The width of the 
bands provides a greater flexibility than before. 
Figure 28 - MSD Example of Market information for Line Managers 
£ 14,500----------------------Band Salary Limits------------------------£27 ,000 
I I 
£ 18,3A,6o~------....S""'a:Tle=-:s=-:r==e=p::-:re:-::s..".en:='lt""ar.b=-:ve-::.-------'-£2'TS"",""'ST<Onl 
£17,200 --- Planner --- £22,700 
£20100 --- Personnel Analyst --- £26,400 
Examples ofInter-quartile ranges 
A second advantage is the flexibility provided for changing organisation structures. For example, the 
sales force structure was fundamentally structured two years ago with significant changes to job roles 
and many new roles established. Slotting existing employees into their new roles and managing many 
salary adjustments arising was a much easier process under the grading structure where there was no 
issue of total Hay points,just a consensus on the know-how factor and a continuing discussion on 
individual progression through the grade. The degree of precision necessary has been much reduced. 
5.1.14 Performance Management 
The fmal part of the basic salary determination jigsaw is the PM system. Currently, this is a corporation 
wide system with a fixed distribution of designations in particular groups depending on divisional 
performance. The first group are 'TF' (in the top 5%) the next TQ (top quintile) and the next group are 
'Outstanding' with 'Very good' and 'Good' being the next categories. LF (lower 5%) brings up the rear 
and this category leads usually to no pay rise, bonus or stock option for the recipient. As with all other 
PM systems, difficulties arise when employees drop a notch, being TQ one year and only 'Outstanding' 
the next. 
The PM system, which is also the basis for the payment of incentives and stock options, takes place in 
December/January with decisions on bonuses taken in February and paid in March before the end of 
the tax year while salary changes are implemented from April!. 
5.1.15 Incentive arrangements 
On top of the flexibility that the broad-banding scheme brings to employee rewards, the company also 
operates two separate incentive packages which has led to the rewards being more variable. The first is 
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a annual award, arising from a 'pot of gold', determined by the overall organisational performance 
cascaded down the operating companies and units and distributed according to the individual's ' 
performance. The employee guide to this scheme makes it clear that the criteria for bonus distribution 
within one unit may be different from another unit because each will have different business 
requirements. 
The second payment, based on the same criteria as for the annual award, is in stock options and has a 
more limited application but with the clear intention of increasing the employees' commitment to the 
organisation. 
5.1.16 Summing up the total package 
In moving towards the Broad-banding system, Merck,Sharp and Dohme has not regarded the change as 
revolutionary, more an evolutionary process reflecting the faster nature of the changing world and the 
need for a greater degree of flexibility. The operation ofthe incentive schemes encourage that degree of 
flexibility as set out in the 'Employee Guide': 
'Your manager might decide to: 
Provide more ofyour total reward by increasing your base salary, ifyou are paid low in your 
definedjob range, andprovide you only a modest annual bonus. 
Limit your salary increase because your base salary is right where it should be, relative to the 
market, but prOVide a larger annual bonus because you have made an outstanding contribution in 
the last year. 
Combine an annual bonus, which rewards current contribution andperformance, with a stock 
option grant, which can have future value and emphasises long-term reward, to deliver total 
compensation that reflects the nature ofyour contribution. 
The scheme has been well received by employees to date. The somewhat tortuous process of appeals 
against total Hay points have been abolished and the new arrangements have led to no formal appeals 
under the company grievance procedure. The rewards, though more variable, have proved very 
beneficial to date for employees in line with the current period ofgeneral high profitability aligned to 
the business cycle. Should the business cycle turn to one of recession, then the variability of the 
rewards would work in the opposite direction. 
Further evolutionary progress may come through systems of team-based pay and 360 degree appraisal, 
both of which are currently being evaluated but, like any new pharmaceutical product, they need to be 
tested with extreme care before being marketed to employees. 
Can we conclude that there is no 'best practice' any more? 
The earlier part of this paper emphasised the need for strategy, flexibility and variability and the case 
study has shown how one particular organisation has moved in this direction. As reward structures and 
systems need to be aligned to the specific requirements of the organisation, then it follows that there is 
unlikely to be a 'best practice' that will work in all environments. For example, Conservative 
government enthusiastically embraced performance related pay, demanding its implementation through 
the Citizen'S Charter and through integrating its introduction with the creation of numerous agenCies. 
The outcome has been far from successful in many situations, including universities, the health service 
and the Inland Revenue. The failure of pilot schemes in the Police Service ensured that its general 
introduction has been put on the back boiler. (Taylor, 1997) The reason for these failures is not hard to 
fmd. Individual performance related pay does not align with the general organisational strategy of co­
operation and intrinsic rewards that are often at the heart of human resources in the public sector. 
For HRM practitioners, therefore, it becomes essential to look at the overall business needs and to 
identify how reward strategies can assist in guiding and changing employee behaviours which will lead 
to long-term performance improvement. Strategies that do not just follow political agendas or attempts 
to follow the 'best practice' procession but those that meet their own organisation's unique requirement. 
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APPENDIX 6 
DAVID WEBSTER LTD: A CASE STUDY IN THE PAYMENT AND 

OPERATIONAL SYSTEMS INTRODUCED THROUGH COMPULSORY 

COMPETITIVE TENDERING 

Published in Small Business and Enterprise Development November 1997 
ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the development of operational and payment systems in a small company that has 
responded to the entrepreneurial challenge presented by UK legislation promoting compulsory 
competitive tendering. An analysis is made of the alignment of reward strategy with the business 
imperative. A comparison is made of the contrasting approaches relating to risk-sharing, flexibility and 
new patterns of work between the local authority labour force, with its traditional public sector 
approach to providing services and David Webster Ltd. which introduced a raft ofirmovative measures. 
Implications for the public sector are outlined and discussed. 
Managerial and Policy implications (to be added) 
Key words :- Pay for performance, CCT, flexible working, rewards. 
5.2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Compulsory Competitive Tendering (CCT) was one of the major reforms of the Thatcherite era for 
whom it was a key political platform to support a more entrepreneurial economic culture thereby 
reducing the size of the public sector. The central vision was to increase cost effectiveness and the 
quality of service to the public. 
This case study seeks to illustrate the hypothesis that, to operate successfully within the changed 
environment, organisations need to change the levers that support and control the new methods of 
working. The pay system is seen here as a key lever. 
5.2.2 ALIGNMENT OF PAY TO THE BUSINESS IMPERATIVE 
Strategic reward management concerns the design, implementation, maintenance, communication and 
evolution of reward processes which help organisations to improve perfOlmance and achieve their 
objectives.(Armstrong and Murlis, 1994) 
Human Resource Management theory introduced the concept that separate initiatives in Personnel 
would fail if they were dysfunctional to the corporate environment in which they operated (Storey, 
1992: Guest,1987). A lack of coherent and systematic HRM strategy, including reward related issues 
such as job evaluation, can compound weaknesses in the company's operations (Debrah,1994). 
Until the end of the 19705, the objectives of the British public sector was to achieve equitable treatment 
for its stakeholders. All areas had to be brought up to the same standard and operate in an identical 
fashion, no matter if their needs and requirements were different. Centralised planning systems with 
intricate controls were introduced together with more substantial centralised funding. This was 
reflected in terms of pay with centralised wage bargaining to produce standard pay systems and terms 
of employment. Employees and their representatives were regarded as just as important stakeholders as 
the electorate or the community and power was awarded to them accordingly. 
Unfortunately, the events of the late 1970s when there were numerous strikes in the public sector, 
where rubbish accumulated in the streets and the dead were left unburied, coincided with a political and 
economic imperative to drastically reduce public expenditure. The new Conservative government 
recognised the opportunity to make changes in the Industrial Relations legislation that would have 
broad public support and, in the late 1980s, to encourage the public sector to move to de-centralised 
pay agreements which contained elements of variable and contingent pay (Murlis, 1992) 
Numerous attempts followed to graft systems of performance pay onto the public sector with mostly 
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disappointing results (Bright and Williamson, 1995; Spence,1990; Fowler, 1988) It was clear from 
these examples that the process of operating a system that relied upon flexibility, initiative and 
subjective local judgments did not lie comfortably with an organisation run in a centralised 
bureaucratic, rule-bound way. ' 
Proponents of the "New Pay" (Schuster and Zingheim, 1992) argue that total compensation strategy 
"aims" pay programmes at what the organisation wants to accomplish. Simple and flexible strategies 
are most likely to encourage action; complex and rigid strategies are more likely to create confusion 
and inaction. These strategies can be seen as a source of competitive advantage as they encourage 
flexible employees with initiative and ambition to join and stay with the organisation (Milkovich and 
Newman 1996). This supports the writings of Porter (1990) who has postulated that reward 
management (compensation) is one of the key determinants of the competitive success of nations. 
Research by Wood (1996) has indicated that the pay systems associated with successful "High 
Commitment Management" are not wholly associated with bonus schemes that pay either individually 
or through teams. It is the way that these schemes are constructed to match the organisation's 
requirements that is crucial to their success or failure. 
5.2.3 INTRODUCTION OF CCT 
The concept of CCT originated in Tory-controlled Home County local authorities who experimented in 
the late 1970s in putting small parts of their puJ?lic services out to tender. The authorities were able to 
achieve this process because the number of staff involved was small (sometimes in single figures) and 
often because a deal was reached with the in-coming contractor to take on all staff who wished to 
transfer. On a few occasions, the union was in too weak a position, even in the 1970s, to rouse itself to 
outright opposition. The consequent savings made (some authorities quote 20% or more) led the in­
coming Thatcher administration to convert this voluntary process into a compulsory one by passing the 
Planning and Land Act 1980 which was strengthened by the Local Government Act 1988. Currently, 
£2.4 billion of local authority work is under CCT. (LGMB, 1997) A strong current of anti­
collectivisation ran through this legislation as the administration wanted to remove the union 
stranglehold on vital public services and well understood that the successful contractors are often small 
and either non-union or where the union influence was marginal. Not that contractors are always 
successful. It is still true that over 80% of all CCT work is won by the Local Authorities Direct 
Services Organisations (LGMB, 1997) Small firms have particular difficulty dealing with the detail in 
the tendering process, the size of the contract itself and the need, expressed in the tender (although 
often ignored in reality) to obtain a quality standard such as BS 5750. (Abbott et a11996) 
Those that have been successful have been associated with an entrepreneurial, risk-taking and 
opportunistic character. Often they are owned and controlled by the founder of the enterprise. Their 
driving force has not simply been wealth creation but also a genuine desire, as customer themselves, to 
see a continuing improvement in efficiency and service. The means of achieving such improvement is 
centred on changing the ways that employees work and using pay to reinforce these changes. David 
Webster is one such company. The author worked for this organisation for a short time and has 
subsequently returned for research and consultancy activities. Data for this study was gathered over a 
two year period by interviews with David Webster, his fellow Board members, operation supervisors 
and street lighting operatives together with full day observations of the lighting operations. 
5.2.4 DAVID WEBSTER LTD 
David Webster Ltd was founded in the early 1960s as a street lighting contractor in a buy-out by David 
Webster from a family connected building contracting business. Its early years were spent erecting new 
street lighting units for a number of Councils in Southern England with a small labour force varying 
from 9 to 20. 
In 1966 the quality of service it had provided was a key factor in the awarding of the contract for 
maintaining all the street lighting for Hatfield District Council in Hertfordshire. Like many local 
Authorities, the contract had been carried out over a number of years by the Electricity Board. This was 
the first example in the UK of a local authority awarding a contract for day-to-day lighting service 
activities to a private contractor. This contract was for an initial 3 year period but has been renewed in 
various forms every since and now exceeds 30 years. 
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Build~g o~ that .e~~erience, the company won ~ sm~ll sel~ction of maintenance contracts, gradually 
spreadmg Its actIvitIes around .the Home Counties, mcludmg Bromley and Richmond. During the 
1980s another arm of the busmess developed as work on civil engineering lightino- work grew 
culminating in substantial contracts on the M25, Ml and other major road works. '" , 
By the time the CCT legislation was passed, the company had grown to 200 employees with a turnover 
in excess of £10 million. CCT provided the opportunity to tender for contracts on a nationwide basis 
and a number of substantial contracts were won. These contracts and two strategic acquisitions 
allowed the organisation to more than double in size by the early 1990s. It remains a private company 
wholly owned by the founder and his family. 
5.2.5 OPERATING CONTRACTS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 
A typical local authority lighting contract operated by David Webster Ltd involved remedying defects 
in the 20,000 or so lighting points in the District. A list of work would be passed to the contractor to 
remedy within a fixed time, usually 3-5 days.. An inspector working for the authority would inspect a 
selection of these defects to ensure that they had been remedied properly on time. Other work involved 
the cleaning and painting of columns, bulk larnp replacements, planned preventive maintenance work 
and the repair work following traffic accidents. All of these activities had a fixed payment and fmancial 
penalties were applied if the work was not completed on time and in accordance with the specification. 
5.2.6 CHANGING METHODS OF OPERATION 
From very early days David Webster had realised that the traditional local authority pay system 
operating prior to the introduction of CCT was inappropriate for his method of operation. Under the 
local authority system, terms and conditions were negotiated nationally by local authority unions to 
cover a wide range of employees in a variety of services with some small local variations relating to 
working practices. In the interests of equity, employees working in street cleaning, cemeteries, grounds 
landscaping, etc. would be on the same conditions and their pay would be detennined by the national 
grading system. Lighting operatives would have a 40 hour week with hours from 7.30 a.m. to 4.30 
p.m., Monday to Friday with an hour's unpaid lunch break. They would start from the depot and be 
allowed 30 minutes to load up and a further 30 minutes to unload plus a short paid mid-morning break. 
They would work in two man teams because this had been conceded as a general safety issue. They 
would be allocated work for the day but bad weather, shortage of material, problems with the vehicle or 
a difficult remedial job could all be reasons given why the work was not completed. That might mean 
that overtime was required, paid at time plus a half. 
Supervising the work and verifying the reasons given for poor performance was not easy, as the 
operatives were spread over a wide area and often without communication to their base. Bonus schemes 
were occasionally tried by some authorities but were generally unsuccessful, for the following reasons: 
(1) The schemes needed to be negotiated with the unions who were generally suspicious and 
demanded earnings safeguards before agreeing to their introduction. 
(2) A major cause of disputes related to the external factors that hindered output. Unions would 
insist that allowances were given for vehicle breakdowns, bad weather, etc. and claims in these 
areas provided difficulties for the unit manager. If they agreed to the claims, then this would lead 
to further claims, often difficult to authenticate which, in tum, would lead to wage drift. If they 
acted tough and turned the claims down then unions would become hostile to the scheme and may 
decide to terminate it. Worse, the claim could be taken over their heads to a meeting with higher 
management. If agreed at that forum, it would do much to undermine their authority. 
(3) An additional problem related to the potential extra pay coming from the scheme. High 
performance could give an employee an extra 10% in earnings. However, working a Saturday 5 
hour overtime shift could give an employee almost 20% earnings increase. It was far more 
profitable for the employee to extend the time taken to do the work, allow it to accumulate then 
work the overtime. This was particularly true when such Saturday shifts were often on a 'job and 
[mish' basis and could be completed in 4 hours or less! 
Artificial cut-off points or ceilings for the bonus were often inserted which allowed only a limited 
amount of improvements. There was no incentive, therefore, to extend perfonnance over those 
limits. 
• 
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Schem~s were therefore difficult.to agree, difficult to operate fairly, open to manipulation and unlikely 
to motIvate. It was clear to D~VId Webster that a .system where lighting operatives were working on 
fixe~ hours, to a flat wag~, WIth a ~all back ove~une system and a closely defmed job met only the 
reqUIrements of the routme, predIctable operatIons of a closed community. It did not fit the 
requirements of the flexible, profit-seeking, CCT environment in which David Webster worked. 
5.2.7 NEW PAY SCHEME 
The essential features of the new pay scheme, which was to be at the heart of the company's operations 
are set out in table 1. ' 
Firstly, employees do not work under any fixed hours. They have keys to the main gates of the depots 
and can start work and finish work at whatever times suit them. They are expected to work a 45 hour 
week but the hours are not counted. Only complete days of sickness are noted. There are no official 
breaks, paid or unpaid. Employees can take as many or as few breaks as they wish. If employees wish 
to start at 5.00 a.m. summer to avoid traffic and fmish at 2.00 p.m. to playa round of golf, they are free 
to do so. They can also choose to work a 12 or 13 hour day. There is no time given for loading or 
unloading - the quicker this is done, the more time employees spend on the work to be done. 
Secondly, the basic hourly rate is quite low. It varies a certain amount by geographical location but is 
generally around £4.00 an hour, much lower than the basic rate paid by the local authorities. 
Thirdly, there is a substantial bonus scheme. The employee receives a bonus for each piece of work 
priced on the basis of the amount that the authority is invoiced under the tenus of the contract; so much 
for a lantern repair, so much for a repair to the electrics at the base of the column, and so on. Details of 
these prices cover 2 pages of A4 paper and it seems, at fIrst, to be a very complex scheme. However, 
employees learn each job under training and the 80/20 rules apply: 80% or more of their work comes 
under 20% ofthe work categories and many of the prices listed are rarely-used. The employee records 
each job done and this is used to pay bonus and to invoice the authority. Any false claims by 
employees, therefore, have a double check built in. 
No allowances are given for any special circumstance relating to the work - weather, difficult work, 
etc. The justification for this is two-fold. Firstly, that the authority pays no allowances to the company. 
Vlhen the contract is tendered, the company has to build into the price a sum to cover such 
circumstances. Secondly, the swings and roundabouts argument applies where an employee hit by 
difficult circumstances one month will, by the law of averages, have some easier circumstances the 
following month. The on-target earnings under the scheme aims to allow the average employee to more 
than double their earnings through the bonus scheme. 
Fourthly, there is no overtime. Employees who wish to work more hours do so by being issued with 
other work, if available, or by helping on other routes that are shorthanded through illness when they 
have ftnished their allocated work. They do not receive any extra basic hours in these circumstances, 
although they can earn bonuses on the extra work. For this reason, there is never an incentive to spin 
out the work. 
Fifthly, their contract is one of flexibility. They can be moved about within the contract onto whatever 
work is available. Furthermore, they can be moved onto a nearby contract if the necessity arises. For 
example, employees based on Hertfordshire contracts have been moved onto the London Borough of 
Ilford contracts. Flexibility extends to working as a one-man or two-man operation which are carefully 
delineated in terms of health and safety issues and terms of the contract. 
Finally, there are some downsides for the employees. The sick pay is very poor and the company 
recognises this. It is only a small contributory scheme dealing with the very occasional week-long 
absence. Overall, this is not regarded as too big a problem as sickness is very low and absenteeism 
negligible. There is no pension scheme and there are none of the additional benefits that a large 
organisation may offer such as Private Health Insurance. Employees are enc.ouraged to £ina.nee th~se 
long-term schemes through their enhanced earnings and occasional meetmgs are orgamsed WIth 
fmancial advisers to assist where necessary. 
___ 4ii_""",,", __ we ______________________ _ 
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5.2.8 THE EFFECTS OF THE BONUS SCHEME 
It can be seen that this fonn of bonus scheme under CCT encourages the employees to see themselves 
as more like a set of mini-contractors, each with their individual contractual responsibilities to provide 
a cost effective and profitable service to the public with the prime responsibility to help win the 
contract at the next renewal date. It is feasible to see the bonus as their slice of the contract's profits. A 
well organised, efficient employee earns high bonuses. The self-regulating nature of the scheme 
overcomes the significant difficulties that usually apply when trying to supervise at a distance. 
The bonus scheme has a further advantage. By linking it so closely to the prices agreed with the local 
authorities, employees are involved in the heart of the whole business operation. They can appreciate 
which individual items have higher margins than others and where savings can be made to benefit the 
organisation. The units are small enough for regular meetings to take place between the manager and 
their teams to discuss how to improve operations for their mutual benefit. Tips on efficient working 
are shared around. The entrepreneurial spirit also spills over to the attitude of the employees towards 
unions. David Webster has not been overtly hostile to unions and ballots have been held on union 
membership at the largest unit with full management co-operation on 3 occasions. Each time, a 
substantial majority of the employees voted against joining a union. 
A recent development has been the introduction of bonuses for Unit Managers. This is based on the 
Return on Capital employed at each unit. A general target percentage return is set and for each 1% 
above target, a bonus is paid. The nature of the local authority main contract is taken into account as 
some contracts were won with lower margins than others. The feedback to managers through this 
reporting system and the accounts that underpin the scheme have given the managers a far greater 
understanding of finance and unit profitability and rewarded them for efficient working. Recent 
developments include the movement to de-centralise purchasing to the Business Units, which gives 
managers greater opportunity to control their operations and improve their bonus by better planning 
and organisation. Other staff at the units also receive part of the bonus and this has been modified to 
include an overall bonus for Head Office staff. 
5.2.9 CONTRASTING APPROACHES - MEETING THE CHALLENGES IN THE PUBLIC 
AND PRIVATE SECTORS 
For David Webster, changing the reward structure has been an essential feature of the operational 
changes required to produce a profitable operation within the CCT confines. The starting point was the 
construction/contracting industry where bonuses are endemic, so this has meant no major cultural 
change for employees, except for those who have moved with the contract from a local authority 
culture. The increasingly tighter interpretation of the Acquired Rights Directive by the European Court 
of Justice, operated in the UK under the Transfer of Undertakings (protection of Employment) 
Regulations, 1981, has meant that all local authority employees who wish to, transfer to the new 
contract with their existing tenns and conditions. The changeover to the David Webster Ltd method of 
operation is now slower than it was in the 19805 when Local Authorities made their workforce 
redundant and the new contractor started with a clean sheet. Transferees now work under their old 
tenns for a few months before they are given the choice of changing to the new ways of working. Most 
choose to accept as it gives them increased earnings and a more flexible lifestyle. 
For the Local Authorities, the challenge comes on two fronts. Not only do they have to compete against 
private sector organisations that employ more efficient and profitable methods of operation but they 
also have to work within centralised union agreed terms and conditions. Although bonus arrangements 
can be superimposed on these terms, they still retain the rigidity of allowances, fixed hours and pension 
costs. The challenge is to devise and agree terms that can match the required flexibility while retaining 
the security and predictability of earnings that is the hallmark of the public sector. The 1997 pay 
negotiations recently concluded have given encouragement to further degrees of flexibility in exchange 
for benefits hannonisaation and thereby enable local authorities to promote further initiatives in more 
flexible pay systems. 
CCT remains a controversial area. Advocates point to the substantial cost savings made by local 
authorities with an improved service (or, at least, one that has not deteriorated) but evidence is lacking 
here either way. Opponents point out that employment becomes less secure and safety standards are at 
risk. The new Labour government has indicated, at the time of writing, its scepticism for the 
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compulsory aspect, although encouraging local authorities to continue market testing and obtaining 
value for money. 
CCT has a number of attributes which may appear to give it a superior position in the pantheon of 
human resource management theory. It promotes flexibility in working practices, it has a clear unitary 
approach in its employee relations, it is customer focused, it encourages innovation, it has a positive 
employee involvement programme and performance pay is central to its operations. This has been 
wholly adapted by David Webster in their system of operation. On the other hand, CCT can also 
produces an environment of insecurity as the contract comes up for renewal every 3·5 years. When 
CCT is supported by an incentive based pay system, it can encourage long and unsocial hours, too great 
a focus on high productivity at the expense of some quality and safety aspects and a concentration by 
employees on short-term earnings as opposed to longer-term benefits such as life assurance and 
pensions. Without sufficient control, schemes may degenerate into conflict between employees over 
internal equity issues such as work allocation. 
The innovatory approach detailed in this case study is in contrast to the study of pay systems in small 
and medium size non-union firms by Beardwell and Storey (1996) where they found little evidence that 
pay and reward systems had a strategic foundation or any innovatory zeal which non-union firms are 
supposedly expected to display. The majority tended to have a conservative, traditional or merely 
pragmatic approach, nor did they appear to be particularly adept at avoiding the normal pitfalls of 
labour market pressures, internal differentials and the need to arrive at explicable pay structures. Many 
have no discernable pay strategy at all. For this reason, broad conclusions based on the David Webster 
case alone should therefore be treated with some care. It is an example of a conscious, successful and 
continuing attempt by an entrepreneur to align the pay system to the business needs but further research 
is required to determine both the degree of importance of the innovative pay system and whether 
genuine success in the area of CCT can be achieved through more conventional payment methods. 
Figure 29 
Comparing traditional Local Authority terms and conditions with David Webster scheme 
TRADITIONAL WORKING PRACTICES DAVID WEBSTER 
SCHEME 
Fixed hours of work No fixed hours 
Fixed loading and unloading times No loading or unloading times 
Fixed breaks No fixed breaks 
Two men teams Team size to fit job requirement 
High basic wage Low basic wage 
No bonus scheme Bonus scheme a key factor 
Overtime endemic No overtime 
No movement between contracts Movement between contracts as required 
No penalties for poor quality Penalties for quality 
Generous sick pay Limited sick pay 
Involvement limited Involvement crucial 
Just ajob More like a small business 
References 
Abbott, B., Blackburn, R., and Curran, C. (1996) The Privatisation ofLoca! Authority Services and 
Market Opportunities for Small Firms. In Blackburn, R. and Jennings, P. (eds) Small Firms : 
Contributions to Economic Regeneration, Paul Chapman, London. 
Armstrong, M. and Murlis, H (1994) Reward Management. Kogan Page, London 
Beardwell, 1. and Storey,J.(l996) "Paying the Piper" Pay Determination in the Non- Union Firm. 
Conference Paper, "HRM - The Inside Story" Open University, Milton Keynes, April. 
Bright,D and Williamson,B. (1995) Managing and Rewarding Performance. In Warner, D. and 
Crosthwaite,E. ( eds) HRM in Higher and Further Education. Open University Press, Buckingham. 
Debrah, Y.A. (1994) The Management ofOperative Staff in a Labour Scarce Economy. Asia-
Pacific Journal o/Human Resources, 32(1) 97·116 
Fowler, A.(l988) HRM in Local Government. Longmans, London. 
Guest, D. (1987) Human Resource Management and Industrial Relations. Journal of Management 
Studies 24:5503-21 
244 
Local Government Management Board (1996) CCT Information Service, Survey Report No 15 
LGMB, London 
Milkovich, G. and Newman, J.(1996) Compensation. Irwin, Chicago. 
Murlis, H. (1992) The Search for Performance Improvement. Public Finance and Accounting. February 
28 14-16. 
Porter,M. (1990)' Competitive Advantage ofNations. Free Press, New York 
Schuster, J.R. and Zingheim, P.K.(l992) The New Pay. Lexington Books, New York. 
Shanna,B. and Chew,I (1992) The Role of Compensation Policies in Singapore's 
Competitiveness:...Asia Pacific Journal ofHuman Resources 16-24 
Spence, P. (1990) The Effects of Performance Management and Performance Related Pay in Local 
Government. Local Government Studies July/August 
Storey, J. (1992) Developments in the Management ofHuman Resources. Blackwell, Oxford. 
Wood, S. (1996) High Commitment Management and Payment Systems. Journal of Management 
Studies 33: 1 January pp 53-77 
-245 

APPENDIX 7 

CLUSTERS ANALYSIS 
*****HIERARCHICAL CLUSTER ANALYSIS****** 
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